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Abstract 
 
This PhD thesis examines the everyday politics of microcredit networks by 
drawing on a case study from Limpopo Province, South Africa. Special attention 
is focused on how the distribution of rights and responsibilities between the 
microcredit organisation and the microcredit groups, together with the 
multifaceted struggles over authority and power, mediate the different actors’ 
social agency and opportunities to benefit from the microcredit programmes. 
The study rests on thematic interviews and participant observation carried out 
in four villages and semi-urban settlements in May-July 2007.  
Drawing on the theoretical ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, the thesis undertakes a 
critical analysis of the interpretations of social capital and the associated 
solidarity and reciprocity based on the conceptualisations of Robert Putnam, 
interpreting social capital as networks of everyday politics and replacing 
romanticised notions of co-operative social ties with an awareness of the 
realities of inequality and everyday struggle that characterise the microcredit 
clients’ social networks. The study explores the everyday politics, contradictions 
and tensions at several levels, including the clients, organisation and the wider 
economy and society. In the spirit of the concept of governmentality by Michel 
Foucault, the thesis also illustrates processes and practices of governance, and 
the creation of a set of rules and procedures that can govern and discipline 
microcredit clients to achieve selected goals. 
The results of this study illustrate how social relations between the members 
of the microcredit groups were based on ambiguous forms of co-operation and 
conflict around diverse interests and multifaceted power relations. While social 
networks were crucial for the establishment and maintenance of business 
operations, the structural conditions of poverty and marginalisation placed the 
women in competition with each other over limited resources and easily 
saturated markets. The group loan system caused various anxieties about 
solidarity lending and tensions between group members. The contrast between 
the idealistic speeches of solidarity, and suspicions circulating over who benefits 
from which businesses and on what grounds, was a striking characteristic of the 
everyday politics of microcredit. 
Although no financial collateral was required, various systems of collateral 
existed. High repayment rates were secured through strict rules and monitoring 
procedures; public reprimand in the repayment or “centre” meetings; extending 
repayment liabilities to husbands or other relatives; and refusing to let anyone 
leave the repayment meetings until the money was paid. Although according to 
the microcredit rhetoric group members take joint liability for loan repayment, 
 in reality the centre, community and kin operate as collateral for microloans. 
This is an assumption in the group-based loan system in which the generally 
accepted rules apply only to the liabilities that clients as a group, as one unit, 
have to the organisation. In this kind of system, joint security is a fact only at the 
institutional level. There is no corresponding rule on the terms under which 
financial obligations are covered, shared or compensated among group 
members.  
In the everyday politics of the clients, business affairs and the logic of 
decision-making were tightly intertwined with financial, social and cultural 
norms and political power relations. The most successful clients were those who 
were able to utilise various social networks and regular household incomes, as 
well as take advantage of their social status to create the market, the network, 
and to gain symbolic capital, bolstered by various power symbols.  
In the everyday practices of the microcredit organisation, fieldworkers were 
in a key position to communicate the “truths” and the “right knowledge” about 
the microcredit programmes to the clients. Tension existed between 
empowerment objectives and disciplining of women, and guiding them towards 
NGDO-specified objectives. The adverse incentive system largely produced these 
conflicts by encouraging development facilitators to take as many clients as 
possible, which easily led to concentrating on quantity over quality.  
In terms of the disadvantageous ways in which people are incorporated into 
economic and social life, the study highlights the contradiction between the idea 
of a microcredit organisation operating as a “linkage” between formal and 
informal economies and borrowers considered as agents of their own 
empowerment, and the structural obstacles the poor encounter under systematic 
political inequality. Analysing incorporation and governmentality as processes of 
“dispossession”, that is, as the appropriation of poor women’s social networks to 
serve as an engine for development, the study calls more attention to the 
everyday struggles of these poor women caused by the distorting microcredit 
rules and mechanisms, the weak pillars of the society, and the vulnerability and 
disadvantageous power relations within which people are caught. 
 
Key words: authority and power, co-operation and conflict, everyday politics, 
microcredit, rules and responsibilities, social networks, solidarity, South Africa 
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 10 | INTRODUCTION 
 Introduction 1
 
The aim of the study 
Under the most popular tree of a village in Limpopo Province, a group of women 
are gathered together, trying to find shelter from the blistering heat of the sun. 
Every two weeks, month after month, a microcredit repayment meeting – or a 
“centre meeting”, as they call it – starts with a hymn, sometimes with a prayer, 
and the vows of collective repayment. 
This day did not differ from many others, except that a visitor from a faraway 
country was attending the meeting. This special situation seemed to energise not 
only me but all the participants from the clients to the “development facilitator”. 
As always, each group leader delivered the repayments and the ledgers to the 
meeting committee in charge of the bookkeeping. If someone did not pay, the 
other group members would be expected to contribute. The development 
facilitator and the committee would then cross-examine the hapless group about 
their noncompliant conduct.  
All of a sudden, a group of women started dancing and singing. It was only 
afterwards, after hours of chatting with some of the women that I realised why. 
One of the clients was absent and the other group members did not have enough 
money to pay on her behalf. The dancing was intended to create a diversion 
while the development facilitator ordered the members of this particular group 
to go and get the money, one way or another, without my realising what was 
happening.  
The leader of another group revealed to me how she managed the chaotic 
situation: she tricked the development facilitator by secretly paying on the behalf 
of one of her group members. “This was just to keep the group’s books clean”, 
she said, when explaining her strategy for bending the rules.  
Thus the records ended up spotless on that sunny day. The chairperson 
sealed the money in a strongbox, and took a minibus to deposit the carefully 
protected notes into a bank account in the town. The development facilitator still 
reminded the women of the importance of saving before she rushed to the next 
meeting in another village. This scene, with or without any tricks, recurs among 
those engaged in microcredit programmes in dozens of villages every day all 
around Limpopo.1 
 
                                                 
1 This narrative is based on the notes recorded in the field diary of my experience of fieldwork in South 
Africa in 2007. 
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Microcredit, as an extension of small loans to poor citizens with limited access to 
formal credit markets, has become one of the most popular development 
strategies in various parts of the global South in the last decades. The most well-
known story of microcredit emerged in 1983 when the Grameen Bank, currently 
serving 8.4 million clients, started lending operations to poor households in the 
rural villages of Bangladesh (Grameen Bank 2012). Today, hundreds of 
microcredit institutions all over the world have adopted the Grameen lending 
model, including the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) operating in South 
Africa. In this variation, a group of five, mainly female members obtain an 
individual loan but take joint liability for the loan repayment. With a loan 
women can, for example, buy a sewing machine, make dresses, sell them and 
gradually gain some profit. Typically, no financial collateral is required. The idea 
is that “community-based” women’s groups share the solidarity and follow the 
rules and ethics of participatory interaction (Grameen Bank 2008). If serious 
repayment problems emerge, all the group members will lose the subsequent 
loans. If everything goes well, the group will have a chance to receive larger 
loans in the next loan cycle.  
Microcredit is focused on increasing poor women’s income-generating 
activities and entrepreneurship. Although women in different parts of the global 
South struggle to find paid employment, one of the commonly promoted 
alternative options, self-employment, might be equally difficult because of 
women’s limited access to assets, credit, and other financial services (Guérin 
2006). Formal banking and financial institutions are not willing to lend money 
to the poor because of excessive risks attributable to high transaction costs, low 
return rates and the poor’s inability to back up their loans. In most of the remote 
villages of South Africa, as elsewhere in global South, financial services have 
long been available only through “informal” mechanisms such as savings and 
credit associations. For many, a loan from loan sharks, mashonishas,2 has been 
the only way of getting any loan. According to Muhammad Yunus (2011), the 
establisher of the Grameen Bank, one of the key goals of microcredit from the 
beginning has been to eliminate the presence of loan sharks. As banks do not 
consider the poor to be a potential market, loans sharks thrive on scarcity. 
As a development instrument, the aim of microcredit is to break the vicious 
circle of poverty. The underlying vision behind the group lending model is that 
the provision of small loans and other financial services for the poor, and for 
women in particular, facilitates socio-economic development and livelihood 
improvement in rural and semi-urban settlements with high rates of 
unemployment, lack of working capital, and problems of chronic poverty. 
Providing small amounts of credit for impoverished women to initiate business 
ventures enables them to generate income for the basic needs of living, cope 
                                                 
2 Mashonisha is a northern Sotho word and means “loan shark” in English. 
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with adverse shocks, learn to manage cash flows, and save money for further 
investments. Moreover, microcredit is regarded as an efficient tool for 
empowering women with increased self-esteem, decision-making capability, and 
new business opportunities (CGAP 2008).  
While microcredit as a term usually refers to small loans, the broader 
meaning of the concept refers to a certain kind of “poverty lending approach” 
developed by Grameen Bank, which focuses on poverty reduction and social 
change, and where non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs) act 
as the key operators (Robinson 2002: xxxv). Gradually, along with the notion 
that the poor need a more diverse range of financial services, a shift from the 
term “microcredit” to “microfinance” has occurred, reflecting also a shift in 
orientation towards the “financial systems approach”. This approach includes 
the idea that commercially oriented, financially self-sufficient organisations, 
which no longer target the poorest of the poor but instead the “better-off” 
clients, would allow microfinance organisations a greater opportunity to fulfil 
their socio-economic objectives (Robinson 2004, Roodman 2012). The broader 
term of microfinance also refers to more broadly defined services, such as 
insurance and savings, a phenomenon that Robinson (2001: xxxiv-xxxvii) calls a 
“microfinance revolution”.  
The aim of the financial systems approach is to eliminate continuing 
subsidies, to reach a large number of clients and to create a globally affordable 
model in order to “maximise the potential of microfinance” (Robinson 2002: 
xxxvi). The best-known trailblazers of the financial systems approach are the 
United States Agency for International Development, USAID, and the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest, CGAP, a World Bank-associated 
programme supporting institutions that are “motivated to provide sustainable 
financial services to the poor” (CGAP 2008). In the late 1990’s, the financial 
systems approach was virtually confirmed and it began to replace the original 
Grameen Bank-inspired microfinance model as “best practice”. As Bateman 
(2010: 16–17) notes, many developed country governments, bilateral 
development agencies and international development organisations began to 
shift their microfinance support policy and programmes towards the new model.  
The group lending model included in many microfinance schemes is based 
on the idea of social capital as a “valuable asset” that the poor can turn to even 
when economic assets and incomes are scarce (González de la Rocha 2007). 
Especially the conceptions of Robert Putnam (1993, 2000), which regard social 
capital as networks of trust and reciprocity that can enhance co-operative goals 
and at the same time reduce the costs of economic transactions, have gained 
increasing popularity in mainstream development thinking in recent years 
(Hietalahti and Nygren 2011). Belief in the capacity of trust relations, solidarity 
networks, and associational life to fuel sustainable economic and social 
development under conditions of poverty has inspired the World Bank, the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other development agencies to allocate 
an increasing amount of resources from traditional poverty reduction strategies 
to microfinance programmes (Molyneux 2002).  
The impact of microfinance on millions of poor people’s lives has been 
recognised through various international awards. The United Nations declared 
the year 2005 as an International Year of Microcredit. The following year, the 
Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank for 
their “efforts to create economic and social development below” (Nobel Peace 
Prize 2006). This event became a symbolic breakthrough for the microcredit 
industry, and as Karim (2011: xiv) notes, “legitimised the microfinance model as 
key to women’s economic and social empowerment”. According to the 
MicroCredit Summit Campaign, more than 3,600 microcredit institutions 
served 137.5 million clients worldwide by the end of 2010, about 113 million of 
whom had been living on less than one dollar a day before their enrolment in 
microcredit programmes (Maes and Reed 2012: 3).  
The perceived success story of the Grameen Bank and the associated group 
lending model has promoted lively discussion about achievements and 
constraints of the microcredit programmes. In development circles, Grameen 
Bank has achieved its global recognition by showing that poor women are 
“bankable”. Karim (2011: xxii), who investigated the effects of the discourses, 
policies, and practices of microfinance NGOs on the lives of rural women in 
Bangladesh, concludes that the Grameen Bank functions “as a powerful 
metonym of what works in development” for development organisations.  
The capability of group lending to guarantee high repayment rates and to 
reach the poorest has inspired several economists to gain empirical evidence on 
impacts of microcredit (Aktaruzzaman 2009, Khandker 2003, Pitt and 
Khandker 1998, among others) as well as to analyse the incentives used in the 
group lending model and the mechanisms of client selection, peer monitoring, 
and peer-sanctions included in the microcredit programmes (Anderson et al. 
2002, Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, Hermes et al. 2005, Morduch 
1999, Mosley 2001, Stiglitz 1990). The core attention in these analyses has been 
the way in which microcredit programmes use dynamic incentives, regular 
repayment schedules, and social ties of solidarity to diminish the problems of 
adverse selection, moral hazard and free-riding, and in this way, succeed in 
guaranteeing high repayment rates, reducing lenders’ transaction costs and 
offering banking services to the poor. One of the signposts has been the World 
Bank-supported study of Khandker (2003) on the impact of microfinance on 
poverty in Bangladesh. By comparing massive statistical data from 1991–1992 to 
1998–1999, Khandker concluded that access to microfinance significantly 
contributes to poverty reduction, especially for female participants, and to 
overall poverty reduction at the village level.  
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Nevertheless, these kinds of arguments about poverty reduction through 
microfinance have been recently challenged by a number of researchers. 
Jonathan Morduch re-examined Khandker’s (1998) data and found that his 
conclusion on the “drop in poverty appears to be far too optimistic” (Armendáriz 
de Aghion and Morduch 2005:  220–222, Karim 2011: xxvii). For Bateman 
(2010), the continuing dispute over the effects of microcredit on poverty 
reduction, after twenty years of debate, only implies that undeniable impacts do 
not exist. A somewhat more consensus-oriented approach is represented by 
Roodman (2011, 2012), who notes critically that busting the myths of 
microfinance have become a hype that is overhyped. According to Roodman 
(2012), while microcredit hardly lives up to its popular image, that does not 
mean it is useless; microfinance should simply emphasise its strengths in 
delivering useful services with looser linkages to international development 
funding apparatus. 
Partly the dispute is methodological. The statistical and static perspective on 
microcredit has especially been criticised by researchers who describe the 
financial systems approach as a move away from the original mission of 
microcredit, which has been to focus on the poorest clients and on long-term 
social change (Dobriansky 2002, Drake and Rhyne 2002, Mayoux 2001). In his 
recent overview of such studies, Bateman (2010, 2011) suggests that microcredit, 
in fact, is incompatible with women’s empowerment and sustainable poverty 
reduction, and that the increasing commercialisation of microfinance only 
amplifies this phenomenon. According to Elyachar (2005: 94), what is needed is 
more research on the forms of power “that are emerging at the interstices of the 
state, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations”. 
At the same time, a growing number of social scientists have challenged the 
romantic notions of “social capital”, “solidarity” and “participatory 
emancipation” involved in the conception of microcredit programmes as 
extraordinary tools for sustainable development (Bähre 2007a, Elyachar 2005, 
Hietalahti and Nygren 2011, Karim 2011, Maclean 2010, Mayoux 2001, 
Molyneux 2002, Rankin 2002). According to these researchers, development 
policies promoting microcredit programmes as “magic bullets” for economic and 
social well-being are based on simplistic assumptions about harmonic kinship 
and neighbourhood relations in southern communities (Maclean 2010, Rankin 
2002), about the gendered roles of women as money savers and business 
minders (Bateman 2010, Molyneux 2002), about the ability of horizontal norms 
and networks to generate trust and solidarity (Guérin 2006), and about local 
communities as “pristine” sources of social capital (Bateman 2010, Bähre 2007b, 
Hietalahti and Nygren 2011, Maclean 2010). Karim (2011) argues that high 
repayment rates of microfinance NGDOs are based on manipulation of the 
existing kin and social relations, and the use of public shaming as a loan 
recovery tactic. Through the appropriation of social networks as an engine for 
development, the poor become, in fact, “dispossessed” of their own social capital 
(Elyachar 2005). 
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In this respect, just as development policies have different modes, circulating the 
concept of social capital in microcredit rhetoric easily becomes what Tvedt 
(2002: 370) calls “buzzwords” that serve as a “symbolic means of integration of 
an international development system” (Kontinen 2007: 2). In this system, the 
ideology of bottom-up development is turned upside down. It becomes 
operationalised as a top-down system, in which the poor as active actors are 
responsible for their own development. In the worst case, the poor clients use 
the instruments diffused through development projects or financial services, but 
remain silent partners in business negotiations.  
 
Microcredit repayment meeting in Limpopo. 
Going back to that sunny day in Limpopo and examining the women’s 
behaviour, it becomes clear that considering microcredit simply as an 
organisation that provides the poor with access to financial services through 
which they can lift themselves out of poverty constitutes a relatively narrow view 
of the scene in Limpopo. The figures in the microcredit organisation’s financial 
balance sheets and annual reports reveal only a fraction of the actual 
engagements, contestations and concerns prevalent in the repayment meetings, 
markets, and everyday interactions among the members of the microcredit 
groups, and between the microcredit groups and the microcredit organisation. 
Although things may appear simple on the surface, underneath, microcredit can 
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be seen as a “game” in which various players use different cards and play 
according to different rules, trying to utilise the available resources and 
opportunities in their own ways (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 125, Olivier de 
Sardan 2005: 185, Wilshusen 2009a: 393). 
This study examines the everyday politics of microcredit networks in 
Limpopo Province of South Africa drawing on ethnographic-oriented analysis. 
Special attention is paid to the complicated rules and responsibilities affecting 
the relations between the microcredit organisation as a loan provider and 
women clients as loan receivers, as well as to the ambiguous networks, norms, 
and forms of decision-making among the clients as microcredit groups and 
participants in small business ventures.  
Drawing on the theoretical ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, the thesis challenges 
essentialist notions of microcredit as networks of solidarity. It undertakes a 
critical analysis of the concept of social capital, replacing romanticised notions 
of co-operative social ties with the realities of inequality and everyday struggles 
that characterise poor women’s social networks. In the spirit of the Michel 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality, the thesis also illustrates practices of 
governance, and the creation of a set of rules to govern microcredit clients to 
achieve selected goals.  
I conceptualise microcredit as “an arena of struggle” in which various types 
of actors, with their differing interests, logics, strategies and goals, and endowed 
with different degrees of decision-making and political power, interact, confront 
and compete with each other (Bourdieu 1977, 1985, 2005: 69–70, Olivier de 
Sardan 2005: 137–138, 185, 189–190, Siisiäinen 2009: 41). Such a standpoint 
helps to understand who has access to and who is excluded from strategic 
resources, and why. At the same time, it helps to analyse why certain individuals 
and groups are able to only marginally profit from available resources, while 
others have the ability to turn the game to their own ends (Bastiaensen et al. 
2005: 980−981, Bourdieu 1985, Bähre 2007a).  
Drawing on my field research in Limpopo in 2007, I examine the complexity 
of rules and responsibilities involved in the microcredit programmes, from the 
point of view of both the microcredit organisation and the women as target 
groups. Through an analysis of how the clients are selected, how the economic 
incentives are comprised, how the groups are formed, how the businesses are 
monitored, who is trusted and how the different rights and responsibilities are 
distributed, I aim to construct a picture of microcredit as a socio-political, 
economic and cultural institution. My purpose is to illustrate how women’s 
economic affairs are tightly intertwined with social rules, cultural norms and 
political power relations in the business of microcredit and liabilities. By the 
term “institution” I refer to embodied social networks and organisations as well 
as to formal and informal rules, procedures and norms that govern interactions 
and confrontations of various actors between and within certain structures 
(Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 980, Foucault 1978).  
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By paying careful attention to local politics and institutional processes when 
evaluating the achievements of and challenges for microcredit programmes, my 
aim is to show how the social ties between the women engaged in microcredit 
programmes are mediated by complex webs of solidarity and conflict with the 
ambivalent politics of everyday life (Wilshusen 2009a). Through an analysis of 
how access to resources and social networks is mediated by power-laden 
distinctions, and how certain forms of capital serve to reproduce the distinctions 
(Bourdieu 1977), my purpose is to illustrate the complex forms of negotiation 
and contestation involved in the interactions between women in microcredit 
groups, as well as between microcredit groups as loan receivers and a 
microcredit organisation as a loan provider. As many of the power relations and 
socio-political processes shaping the conditions of microcredit extend far beyond 
the local boundaries, I examine the opportunities of women to negotiate the 
terms of their involvement in the microcredit programmes through practices 
that are structured, although not completely determined, by the wider 
institutional and political settings (Hietalahti and Nygren 2011). 
 
 
Many faces of South Africa 
The Republic of South Africa, with a land area of 1.2 million square kilometres 
and 49 million habitants (SouthAfrica.info 2009), occupies the southern tip of 
Africa. The coastline of 2,500 kilometres, stretches from Namibia on the Atlantic 
coast to Mozambique on the Indian Ocean. On land-side, South Africa shares 
frontiers with Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and an enclave Lesotho.  
Within these boundaries, we have a country with rich linguistic, ethnic, and 
cultural diversity. In a South African town you can pass an internet café, an 
Indian restaurant, a group of fragrant jacaranda trees, a mosque, a jazz club, 
electric-fenced houses, a Boers’ rugby club, and a glossy shopping centre, all 
within a few steps. A look at the headlines of a South African newspaper will 
show that the country is at the top in economic growth and resources, 
biodiversity and cultural diversity. Wine tours in Stellenbosch, game drives in 
national parks, and golf courses in Cape Town under the magical African sun 
promise tourists a breath of paradise.  
A few more steps and you enter another world. Go round the shopping centre 
and you will find hundreds of Africans crammed into minibus taxis taking them 
back to their villages and backstreets. Step into a warehouse at the back of the 
shopping centre and you will find a market area where poor hawkers try to eke 
out a living by selling Mopani worms, cold drinks, self-made hats and nail 
varnish. Further down the street you will see a line of car washers vying for 
customers, ready to undercut each other’s prices. Take one more look at the 
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headlines and you will find South Africa coming out on top also in less flattering 
ratings: in poverty and inequality; in HIV-infection rates and infant mortality; in 
crime and sexual violence.  
To be able to locate microcredit within South African society, considering the 
effects of the colonial history on the country’s socio-economic and political 
development is essential (Bähre 2007a: 23). While settlers’ supremacy 
characterises the history of any colonial African country, what makes South 
Africa exceptional is the history of apartheid; the Afrikaans word meaning 
segregation. It was a social philosophy that legalised the system of racial, social 
and economic segregation, and assured White supremacy for decades. While the 
apartheid regime officially ended in 1994, the legacies of colonialism and 
apartheid continue to hinder the creation of an undivided and more equal social 
structure (Butler 2004: 5).3  
The story of South Africa often starts with a reference to the voyage of Vasco 
da Gama round the Cape of Good Hope in 1497–1498; it continues with the 
arrival of the first Afrikaners, or Boers, who settled in the Cape in 1652; it then 
rushes on to the discovery of diamonds and gold in the 1870s, and to the 
opportunities and threats these findings presented to the imperial power of the 
British (Butler 2004: 7–9, Teppo 2004: 26−27, Thompson 2001: 1–2). At the 
same time, as Thompson (2001: 10) notes, there are two other historical stories 
to tell: the story of the Khoisan people, known today as Khoikhoi and San or 
Khoe-San, who have lived in the area of current South Africa since around 1,000 
BC, and the story of the Bantu-speaking farmers, the ancestors of the majority of 
the inhabitants of present-day South Africa, who moved into South Africa in 
approximately 300 AD, and who are now referred to as Africans. Unfortunately, 
little information exists of the pre-colonial inhabitants of Southern Africa. As 
Thompson (2001: 2) describes in his extensive exploration of South Africa’s 
history, reconstructing the history of pre-literate societies is always difficult. It 
was only in the 19th century that the first significant descriptions were written 
down.  
In the 16th century, when the first Portuguese had rounded the Cape of Good 
Hope on their way to India, many South Africans were living by hunting and 
gathering. The basic economy consisted of agriculture, pastoralism, and 
metallurgy. Most Sotho people lived in communities consisting of 50–400 
people, including a dominant extended family, several other families, and a few 
dependents (Thompson 2001: 14–23). Wealthy men were polygamous; a 
                                                 
3 That said, it is also important to note that the informal practices and norms through which networks 
are structured have historical roots that often arise from indigenous social history, which was affected 
by, but not entirely defined by, colonial history. Equally important is to note the introduction of money 
that, as Bähre (2007a: 23) remarks, connected with the arrival of colonialism and capitalism “led to 
particularly drastic renegotiations of these relations.” 
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remarkably powerful chief might had as many as a hundred wives. One of them 
was recognised as the “great wife” (Thompson 2001: 23) and the mother of the 
heir. 
Characteristic of mixed cultivating people was a strong rule of solidarity 
among kin, extending far beyond the nuclear family. At the same time, however, 
these relationships were determined by a strong sense of social hierarchy. While 
the senior married man dominated the farming society, and owned both the 
agricultural produce and the cattle of the homestead, the role of his unmarried 
sons and clients was to assist the chief. Generally, men controlled women, elders 
controlled youths, and patrons controlled clients. The women’s responsibility 
was to raise the children, to carry out planting and harvesting the crops, to 
maintain the domestic issues and to serve the food. During the growing season, 
women controlled the land they cultivated. At other times the fields were the 
common property of the community. Various forms of social networking also 
occurred among women. They worked together, taking each woman’s field in 
turn (Thompson 2001: 22–23). Thompson describes vividly how sometimes 
women made a special brew of beer and invited as many as two hundred 
villagers to come together. First, they carried out a task such as weeding 
together, and then had a party when the day’s work was done (2001: 22–23). 
In the course of time, new chapters were written into the history of the White 
intervention in South Africa: the intensified conquest of South Africa in 1795, 
when the British took over the Cape; the Great Trek, “die Groot Trek”, the Boers’ 
migration from the Cape Colony to the north in the late 1830s (Butler 2004: 10); 
and the following displacement of multitudes of African farmers from the area 
that the White colonists referred to as the “empty land” (Butler 2004: 7−8, 
Teppo 2004: 25−26). What crucially shaped South Africa’s history and brought 
the different historical stories together was the discovery of diamonds in 1867 
and gold in 1884; these discoveries revolutionised the economy and transformed 
the focus of all of Southern Africa on the Transvaal (Butler 2004: 5). The fights 
over minerals and economic-political power, together with the long-time 
conflicts between the British and the Boers, led to the Anglo-Boer War in 
1899−1902, and finally to the unification of South Africa in 1910 (Butler 2004: 
12, Houghton 1971: 10−17). The Act of Union formalised the existence of the new 
state and began a period that, according to Butler (2004: 13), significantly 
shaped South Africa’s history by laying “the economic, political, and institutional 
foundations of segregation and apartheid”. The racial segregation became 
further entrenched along with industrialisation, and focused on serving the 
Whites’ interests and positions of power (Butler 2004: 13). The Natives Land Act 
of 1913 removed landowning rights from non-White inhabitants, allocating 87 
per cent of the land to the Whites, and forced sharecroppers to move into 
“reserves” (ANC 2009, Butler 2004: 14).  
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For Africans, towns with mines represented better livelihood opportunities 
compared to rural poverty and growing landlessness (Butler 2004: 13, Bähre 
2007a: 27, Welsh 1971: 173−175). Along with the strained apartheid laws, the 
vulnerability of agriculture, failure of cash crops, starvation of cattle and 
taxation drove young men to work in the mines, cities, or White-owned farms 
(Bähre 2007a: 25). In 1918, approximately half a million of people were 
employed in industrial activities (Butler 2004: 12−13, Houghton 1971: 2−9, 
21−22). In the Transvaal, approximately one fourth of the 1.7 million Africans, 
mainly Tswana, southern Sotho and Pedi peoples, had moved into towns after 
unification (Kuper 1971: 431). By 1920s, about 40 per cent of active men in rural 
areas participated in mining work (Butler 2004: 13). 
  Along with migration, wage labour and the new forms of livelihood in the 
early 20th century, conventional power relations and customs among kinship 
began to change, affecting women as well as men. Conventionally, husbands 
were responsible for the family’s livelihood – clothes, money, and other material 
goods – while the women’s role was to be one of the stay-at-home wives, sisters 
and daughters-in-law. Property belonged to the “house” (James 1999b: 100–101, 
Verhoef 2001: 259–260). When men started to migrate to towns, however, 
women and children began to carry out agricultural tasks.  
Gradually women began to follow their husbands to the cities. At first they 
heavily depended on their husbands’ income and help; gradually, however, they 
began also to earn their own money by working as maids or by brewing and 
selling beer, and in this way gained some social and financial independence 
(James 1999b: 23–25, Verhoef 2001: 259–260). Women also helped each other 
in various ways: they used informal contacts to find jobs, and organised different 
types of stokvels: burial societies, savings clubs and dance teams (Bähre 2007a, 
James 1999b: 23–25, Verhoef 2001: 259–260). These social networks were 
organised among kin, neighbours, and “home-people”, people from the same 
village who shared the same language (Bähre 2007a; 2007b, James 1999a: 75–
83; 1999b: 63).  
Towards the 1930s, various nationalist organisations increased their power 
in South Africa, and racial segregation was intensified. Relocations of Africans 
increased: people were resettled from urban to rural areas, from White-owned 
farms to crowded Bantustans, from one place to another within the Bantustans 
(Sharp and Spiegel 1985: 133–134). Gradually the emergence of Boer 
nationalism and the growth of the new National Party (NP) expanded all around 
the country, leading up to the party’s victory over the United Party (UP) in the 
elections of 1948, under the slogan of apartheid (Butler 2004: 14−15). After this 
critical milestone, under the rhetoric of “politics of fear” (de Villiers 1971: 374), 
the National Party promulgated that “Africans should continue to be excluded 
from political power and that White supremacy should be maintained” (Butler 
2004: 16).  
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More and more racist legal Acts were created. One of the pillars, the 
Population Registration Act of 1950, provided a basis for the engineering of the 
forthcoming “high apartheid”. This act classified people into four racial 
categories: White, Coloured, Indian/Asian, and Native (Bantu or African) 
(Butler 2004: 17, de Villiers 1971: 402−403). Such a division was justified by 
“assuring” each race their “inherent” social status (Teppo 2004: 50). In order to 
protect racial purity and control Black population growth, mixed marriages and 
any sexual contact between the races was outlawed by the Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act of 1949 and The Immorality Act of 1950 (Butler 2004: 17). 
Residential segregation was established through the Group Areas Act of 1950, 
which physically separated White and non-White living areas (de Villiers 1971: 
410−411). In towns, Africans were regarded as visitors with no equal political or 
social rights (de Villiers 1971: 406−407, Welsh 1971: 191). The Natives Act, i.e., 
Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act of 1952, forced Africans 
to carry a “reference book” all the time. This “pass” contained details of the 
holder’s employment record with employers’ signatures and encounters with the 
police. Since women were prevented from joining their husbands in towns, the 
laws of apartheid kept families separated for years (de Villiers 1971: 409−410, 
Bobby-Evans 2009, Welsh 1971: 200−201). 
Residential segregation was extended through the Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act of 1953, which forced segregation in all public spaces, services and 
transport with the aim of eliminating contact between Whites and non-Whites. 
This act was emphasised by number of notorious racist signs: "Whites" – “non-
Whites” or “Blankes” – “Nie Blankes” (Suedafrika.net 2009). In order to make it 
“unnecessary” for Africans to look for work in the cities, their businesses were 
allowed only in African townships; if businesses grew, they had to be moved to 
Bantu areas and no other businesses than those providing daily necessities could 
be established (Welsh 1971: 193–196). While the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 
had already created a legal basis for the removal of Africans into separated 
“homelands” (de Villiers 1971: 410−411), in the 1960s such a system became the 
bedrock for the implementation of the “separate development” making Africans 
legally citizens of “Bantustans”, ten tribally based and nominally self-governing 
homelands. Approximately 3.5 million people faced forced removal in 
1960−1989 (de Villiers 1971: 410−411).  
Along with the resettlement of Africans, the interrelationships with kin 
encountered new tensions. As Bähre (2007a) carefully demonstrates in the 
context of African livelihoods in Cape Town, reliance on neighbours increased 
and neighbours, both in urban and rural areas, were less likely to be kin 
anymore. In the 1970s and 1980s, political and economic development at the 
local and national levels again changed the structure and the strategies of 
African households. Political instability and the wave of strikes affected men; in 
particular many of those who were in formal employment lost their jobs (Lee 
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2009: 55–59). In this situation, some women assumed a stronger economic 
position vis-à-vis male members within the African households. Lee (2009), who 
has investigated the survival strategies of the urban poor in the Cape Town area, 
suggests that this was partly because women were able to participate more 
actively in the informal economy, and because women typically worked in the 
largely non-unionised domestic service sector.  
The disappearance of African men as active providers for their families and 
the shift towards a matriarchal household structure has shaped the growth of 
multigenerational households, and made household immobility, “a choice not to 
move” (Lee 2009: 60), a vital livelihood strategy for women. In this 
multigenerational system of care, elderly women in particular have become the 
core providers of the household. Lee (2009: 48) suggests that such development 
has depended greatly on elderly women’s access to state old-age pension 
payments and council housing, and their relative ability to manage the resources 
of their mobile daughters and granddaughters. As illegitimate children usually 
remain in the mother’s family, children being cared for by their grandparents 
have contributed to the growth of multigenerational households as well as to the 
shift towards the decidedly matriarchal character of the society (Lee 2009: 48, 
69). 
Racial segregation prevailed despite the Africans’ organised resistance. 
Eventually, however, apartheid was defeated by the combination of international 
political pressure, globalisation of financial markets, democratic processes in 
neighbouring countries, domestic economic and structural change, and a 
powerful mass protest that began to shake the foundations of Afrikaner military 
regime. According to Butler (2004: 22−23), the determining factor, however, 
was the Africans’ defiance of influx control. Despite the risk of arrest, millions of 
workers preferred trying to find a job in a city staying in the overcrowded and 
impoverished reserves. The turning point took place in February 1990, when the 
new President of South Africa, Frederik Willem (F. W.) de Klerk, lifted the 30-
year ban on the ANC, and made a commitment to release jailed Nelson Mandela, 
a member of the ANC party in the 1940s, the forthcoming President in 1994–
1999, and the icon of anti-apartheid activists. Such reforms allowed resistance to 
apartheid for the first time in 40 years of National Party rule, and brought de 
Klerk the praise of world leaders. The relief that the Anglican Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu expressed to the press reflects fairly well the significance of de 
Klerk’s declaration: “He has taken my breath away!” (BBC 1990). 
South Africa still has a long way to go to overcome its apartheid history as 
well as its current global challenges, and make the most of the diversity that can 
lead to a multicultural democracy and what Tutu famously named a “rainbow 
nation” (Butler 2004: 1, 19; Heino 2004, Sparks 2003, Tutu 1999). Even if the 
oppression has officially ended, the idea of separate development is still deeply 
embedded in the society. Twenty-first century South Africa is trying to recover 
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from the burden of its bitter history, and at the same time, to balance the 
economic and social strains that poverty, unequal economic development and 
insecurity have produced (Butler 2004: 1, 19). Part of these development efforts 
focus on strengthening market economy through various Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) programmes. The idea of these development programmes 
is to include into society those citizens who have been excluded and 
marginalised in the past. In this work, microcredit is one of the major topics 
(Bähre 2007a). 
 
 
Microcredit industry in South Africa 
Alleviating poverty through providing small-scale banking and credit services for 
the poor is not an entirely new idea, neither in South Africa nor elsewhere in the 
world. The emergence of microloans for women can be traced back to the 1950s. 
Robinson (2002: xxxiii) describes vividly how bankers began showing up in 
small villages on their bicycles or jeeps in the 1960s and 1970s in remote areas of 
developing countries in Asia. In those times the debate on financial self-help 
groups was closely connected with modernisation. Geertz (1962) suggested that 
rotating credit associations were a “middle rung” between the traditional and 
modern worlds. The fundamental idea was that through credit groups people 
would gradually adapt themselves to modern society; they would eventually 
leave informal credit associations and turn to formal financial institutions that 
would offer them new paths to socio-economic wealth. Today this narrow view 
of development as a historical transformation from the traditional to the modern 
has given way to more careful interpretations highlighting poverty alleviation 
strategies on a broader scale.4 The emphasis on sustained economic growth as a 
process from a simple low-income system to a higher-income economy has, 
however, not disappeared. This holds true for the current mainstream 
microcredit rhetoric as well, especially when directing “pro-poor” microcredit 
towards commercial practices. 
Similarly to many other developing countries, South Africa has a long history 
of financial self-help groups as instruments of informal credit, such as rotating 
saving groups and credit associations as well as burial and funeral societies 
(Bähre 2007a). While the schemes and contributions to the saving and credit 
societies vary, in most respects they operate as Rotating savings and credit 
associations, or ROSCAs. In such associations, each member regularly 
contributes a fixed amount of cash to a common fund, which is then given as a 
lump sum to one member during each cycle. Alternatively, members can draw 
                                                 
4 See Bähre’s (2007a) sophisticated analysis of Xhosa migrants in South Africa, which illustrates that 
self-help groups do not lose their significance when people start using modern financial institutions. 
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loans with interest from the pot, and at a given time each member can receive 
his or her savings together with the share of any interest earned. Burial and 
funeral societies, for their part, insure money and other mutual assistance to the 
bereaved (Burman and Lembete 1995, Bähre 2007a: 9–16).  
These “financial mutuals” (Bähre 2007a: 9) are called locally by many 
different terms, each name meaning a particular type of organisation. Sotho 
people call savings and credit associations mahodisanas, denoting literally “to 
make pay back to each other” (Verhoef 2002: 94). In the Transvaal they are 
called mogodiŝo, adapted from the Sotho word gogodiŝo, “to grow”. Xhosa 
people, in turn, name them imigalelo, which originally derives from the verb 
ukugalela, “to pour” (Bähre 2007a: 12, Verhoef 2001). In official South African 
English, these organisations are commonly referred to as stokvels;5 the word is 
apparently adapted from the compound of “stock fairs”, referring to livestock 
markets held in the Eastern Cape in the early 19th century. In these annual cattle 
shows African farmers who worked for European settlers engaged in socialising 
and gambling and “pooling their money to buy a head of cattle at a stock fair”, in 
this way giving birth to the first stokvels (Thomas 1991: 292 in Bähre 2007a, 
Verhoef 2001).6 
Among African women, stokvels spread especially during the urbanisation of 
the 1920s and 1930s as a form of financial and mutual support. While traditional 
kinship relations denied African women’s access to property and cash, migrant 
women began to gain economic independence and earn money of their own from 
domestic employment or informal market activities, such as working as a maid 
or brewing and selling beer. Gradually women began to help each other in 
various ways: they used informal contacts to find better jobs, and organised 
various types of stokvels for different purposes (Bähre 2007a; 2007b, James 
1999a, 1999b: 49−50, 57, 62−63, 79−83, Verhoef 2001: 259−261, 276). As 
women were responsible for the maintenance of the family, stokvels served as a 
survival strategy, remaining as one of the few sources of capital until the end of 
the apartheid regime (Verhoef 2001). Based on long-standing trust relations, 
stokvel members were usually friends, relatives or neighbours. The members of 
individual stokvels were usually either exclusively men or exclusively women 
(Bryson 2008, Verhoef 2001).  
In recent years, stokvels have gained new forms and new meanings, 
spreading also among higher income South Africans, particularly as a fun way to 
socialise with friends. In Limpopo, well-off South African British ladies arrange 
tea parties and buy quality porcelain, while young, middle-class African women 
go shopping and buy shoulder bags or trinkets with their “stokvel money”. 
                                                 
5 The term of stokvel may mean different kinds of organisations in different areas. In this study, the 
term stokvel is used when referring to various kinds of informal savings and credit societies. 
6 For other suggestions see Bähre (2007a: 12). 
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However, the original role of stokvels as a vital survival strategy for the poor in 
villages and townships has not vanished. Many poor still lack access to or 
familiarity with formal financial services and thus rely on different kinds of 
informal financial instruments. According to recent statistics, approximately 
37% of South African adults still lack a bank account in a regulated financial 
institutions (Napier 2009: 10). 
The adaptation of a stokvel-type lending strategy to microcredit programmes 
began in South Africa in the 1980s. Just like the progression of the entire 
microcredit industry in South Africa, the establishment of these formal group 
lending schemes partly parallels the political democratisation process of the 
country. As the apartheid regime aimed at racial segregation in all aspects of life, 
the banks also concentrated on serving only the White population while 
restricting the access of other segments of the population. Gradually, non-
governmental development organisations (NGDOs) and community 
development associations started to express concern over the livelihood of the 
African people and to build up developmental projects, such as microcredit 
programmes targeted towards poor African populations (Porteous and 
Hazelhurst 2004: 1−2). One of the pioneers and the best-known lending NGDOs 
in South Africa is the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF), established in 1992.  
The critical divide in South African microcredit schemes took place on 31 
December 1992 when an exemption to the Usury Act was signed. The intention 
was to facilitate the legalisation of microcredit institutions and foster lending for 
development purposes by removing price controls on small and short-term 
loans, precisely, loans less than 6,000 rand and 36 months (Anderson 2007: 
660, Daniels 2004, Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004: 77). As organisations could 
suddenly charge anything they wanted on loans, masses of private actors entered 
in the consumer lending business, and the boom was ready. Spurred by 
democratisation reforms, such as the opening of financial markets, the South 
African commercial lending business grew from nearly zero into a massive 
industry within a couple of years (Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004). What finally 
made reaching hundreds of thousands of new clients possible was the 
development of ATM and bank card technology and innovative repayment 
collection methods. In cash lending systems a client delivered identity 
documents and a bank card with a PIN number to the lender as collateral. On 
pay day the lender withdrew the money from the bank account and returned the 
card when the payment was completed. In the payroll deduction system, the 
lender agreed with the client’s employer on charging partial payments directly 
from the client’s salary (Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004: 81−89).  
The final breakthrough of commercial lending happened around 1995. The 
market success and large returns of Baobab Solid Growth Ltd, a stock-exchange-
listed venture capital fund, led to a frenzy of new listings of micro lenders on the 
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JSE Securities Exchange.7 By the end of the decade, hardly any retail bank 
existed in South Africa that would not have declared some kind of micro lending 
strategy. The number of micro lenders, including NGDOs, increased by an 
estimated 192%, resulting in 3,500 formal institutions by the end of 1995, and 
trebling the turnover from R3.6bn to R10.1bn (Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004: 
81−82).  
As the lending industry grew, problems also emerged. Having masses of loan 
suppliers, who nevertheless served only salaried clients, meant that the market 
became saturated at some point. Increasing competition between the lenders 
raised the pressure to decrease interest rates and to lower credit standards. As 
credit was suddenly available from many sources, lenders had more and more 
difficulties in estimating clients’ repayment capabilities. Another problem was 
that lending was channelled into consumption rather than micro 
entrepreneurship, which led to repayment problems and more severe money 
collection methods (Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004: 81−89). These problems 
became even more complicated due to the wavering interaction between the 
lenders and the clients. Vestiges of racial separation were still alive, and the 
parties had little understanding of each other’s daily lives or logic. 
In regard to democratisation, the problem in the South African micro lending 
industry was that it still deprived loans from the poorest segment of the 
population. In order to create new lending capacity and reach the poorest of the 
poor, state-owned institutions started to finance new microcredit entrants 
(Baumann 2004a). The aim was to provide small loans to small business 
operators that would act as suppliers to the formal economy. Among the most 
active organisations was Khula Enterprise Finance (Khula), the wholesale funder 
to Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMME), established in 1996.  
Despite the good will, the strategy did not work well. In fact, the South 
African micro lending industry was in near chaos by the late 1990s. While the 
donors had in the past funded microcredit organisations directly, along with 
democratisation, money allocation occurred through governmental schemes. 
According to microcredit operators, inexperienced administrative officials did 
not have the capacity to handle the enormous backlog of work. From the lenders’ 
point of view, the situation was “untenable”: people were still trying to learn 
their new jobs, and had no idea how to manage microcredit.  
As micro lenders could no longer apply for funding from the government, 
they rushed to sign contracts with Khula Enterprise Finance. The problem was 
that while these financially fragile organisations depended on Khula funding, 
they could not comply with the strict contract terms, such as attaining financial 
self-sustainability within three years. As a consequence, a great number of 
                                                 
7 Nowadays the JSE Limited, previously the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the largest stock exchange 
in Africa. 
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microcredit organisations went out of business within the next few years 
(Baumann 2004a). Yet another challenge arose in 1999, when new regulations 
required micro lenders to register with a special regulatory body, the Micro 
Finance Regulatory Council (MFRC) (Daniels 2004, Porteous and Hazelhurst 
2004: 83−85), and again a year later, when the payroll deduction system as a 
money collection method was criminalised. Severe competition, and the new 
hard-and-fast regulations that generated extra costs and formalities together 
with the pressure to find new, cost-effective ways to collect repayments, finally 
forced many lenders out of the market (Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004: 83−85).  
According to microcredit operators, one reason for the difficulties in 
generating workable microcredit model in South Africa is the country’s twofold 
economy. While the so-called formal economy is actively integrated into the 
global market, millions of uneducated people only have access to unskilled jobs, 
or jobs in declining sectors. These economically marginalised poor must then 
survive through diverse informal activities: by running spaza8 shops, hawking, 
brewing traditional beer or selling second-hand clothes. In this respect, one 
could argue that Khula’s attempt to facilitate micro businesses that would act as 
suppliers to the first economy was doomed to failure. As Baumann (2004a) 
notes, there was no demand for such businesses since the actors of the formal, 
market-based economy could produce or import the corresponding items much 
cheaper anyway. Paradoxically, as Baumann (2004b) remarks, while the 
“informal” economy cannot compete with the “formal” one, micro entrepreneurs 
in the informal economy must buy the bulk of their groceries and business stock 
from the formal economy, which further limits the informal sector’s 
development potential. 
In addition to the long distances and sparse population, the dual economy is 
also used to explain why South Africa is a particularly difficult environment for 
microcredit organisations to attain financial sustainability; costs are high 
compared to Asian or Latin-American microcredit organisations. Operating in a 
country with “first-world” financial markets and a “third-world” social 
infrastructure, microcredit organisations must recover first-world costs from 
revenues from clients who can only afford loans on a par with third-world 
countries (Baumann 2004b, Ford Foundation 2005). While micro business for 
many of the poor in South Africa means small-scale hawking and production of 
special items, such as handmade soaps or dresses, according to MFRC statistics 
                                                 
8 Apparently, the word spaza was originally used as an adjective to mean “imitation” in the 
Johannesburg of the 1960s. Correspondingly, parents who could not afford to buy their children 
expensive footwear bought cheap copies of shoes that they called spazas. In South African street 
language, in Tsotsitaal, spaza might refer to something as “cheap” and of “poor quality” or something 
“not real” or “artificial”. Spaza might also mean somewhat the same as the Xhosa verb ukuphazamisa, 
referring to “teasing”, “distracting” or “offering a false story”. For more explanations, see Spiegel 
(2003: 214-223). 
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most of the micro lending is still accessible only to formally employed clients. 
Banks (8 registered) or other public or private companies (2,222) provide 97.5% 
of outstanding loans, while so-called Section 21 Companies or non-profit 
organisations (19) such as SEF, co-operatives (27) and trusts (70), comprise 
2.5% of the loans (MFRC 2006). 
After years of focusing only on the formal economy and its microcredit needs, 
in South Africa, the government has started to promote “development 
microcredit” as a democratisation strategy and as a linkage between the formal 
and informal economies. This strategy is in line with the predominant South 
African policy discourse, first introduced by President Thabo Mbeki in his 
“Letter from the President” in 2003, according to which poor people stay poor 
because they are trapped in a second economy and should thus be integrated to 
the “First-World” economy (du Toit and Neves 2007).  
In 2004 President Mbeki announced that an apex fund providing grants and 
loans to NGOs and other institutions targeting poor households would become 
operational by the end of the year. The design process started under the name 
“South African Microfinance Ethic Fund”, and in April 2006, The South African 
Micro-Finance Apex Fund (SAMAF) was finally established. This fund had a 
mandate to develop an effective network of self-sufficient and sustainable 
microfinance institutions, consisting of non-governmental organisations 
(NGDOs), Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs), Financial Services 
Cooperatives (FSCs), Cooperative Banks and private commercial banks. The 
primary purpose of the fund was to reduce poverty and unemployment, and to 
extend financial services more widely into semi-urban and rural areas (SAMAF 
2009). At the same time, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
established a special Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA), which 
supports informal economy interventions especially in rural areas, such as 
strengthening support for SMME’s access to finance, linking small scale farmers 
to retailers, and establishing information centres and creating partnerships with 
such bodies as Khula (SEDA 2009). 
In 2012, a new SMME finance entity, the Small Enterprise Finance Agency 
(SEFA), was launched; it is a consolidation of Khula, SAMAF and small business 
activities previously housed by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). 
The aim of SEFA is to fill the funding gap that is considered to inhibit the growth 
of small businesses. The lending instruments consist of direct lending to small 
businesses, wholesale loans to financial intermediaries and credit guarantees for 
businesses requiring bank finance (SEFA 2012). 
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Back to the root 
While microcredit has long been publicised as an efficient tool for empowering 
women with new business opportunities and lifting people out of chronic 
poverty, in recent years, this hype has been brought into question. The 
contemporary microcredit discourse tends to suggest that microloan impact 
rarely corresponds to presumptions (Bateman 2010, Karim 2011, Roodman 
2011). In this discourse, the social capital-oriented assumptions, in which poor 
women through social networking are able to deal with economic constraints 
and find their way out of poverty, exists as rhetoric, not as actual practices on 
the ground (Beall 2001, Bebbington 2004, Bähre 2007a; 2007b, Karim 2011, 
Mayoux 2006, Molyneux 2002, Rankin 2002). Although Bähre (2007a) focused 
on women’s conventional social networks and not on microcredit as such, it was 
especially his analysis of the ambivalent relations among neighbours and friends 
and solidarity networks as tensioned circles that has been verified by my study. 
According to these researchers, the risk is that the implicit assumptions 
about the resourcefulness of the poor act as a moral justification and a 
legitimisation of microcredit policies, and the actual role of solidarity networks 
is left to serve as an instrumental tool for microcredit institutions to attain their 
financial sustainability (Rankin 2002). Development agendas based on 
romanticised views of social capital and pro-poor development, where the 
responsibilities are shifted from governmental institutions to market-based 
mechanisms, or to the poor as “agents of their own development”, include the 
risk of a “privatisation of the economic crisis”, where the price for development 
is paid by the poor’s personal adjustments (Elyachar 2005, González de la Rocha 
2007, Kay 2006).  
In this context, the picture of hardworking, but joyful African women, 
dressed in beautiful colours, dancing under the blistering African sun, with 
harmonic community relations and horizontal norms of solidarity, which is also 
repeated in current narratives of microcredit, appears insufficient. Struggles and 
tensions tend to be omitted from such success stories. If we heard what these 
women discussed and debated, if we followed their actions and interactions, 
interpreted their thoughts and were able to read between the lines, and interlink 
this with the surrounding economic, social, political and cultural contexts, we 
could certainly get a much more complete picture of the underlying power 
struggles.  
In relating microcredit operations in Limpopo to the wider social structures 
and politics of microcredit my study challenges easy generalisations of harmonic 
community relations and horizontal norms of women’s solidarity groups as 
automatic contributors to poverty alleviation or financial sustainability. The 
following analysis of microcredit as an arena of negotiations and trade-offs in 
Limpopo reveals a much more complicated picture of how the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities between the microcredit organisation and microcredit 
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groups, together with the multifaceted struggles over authority and power, not 
only shape the ways in which different stakeholders confront each other; they 
also mediate the various actors’ social agency and opportunities to benefit from 
the microcredit programmes (Guérin 2006, Hietalahti and Nygren 2011). 
As my analysis will show, the social ties between the women engaged in 
microcredit programmes are mediated by complex webs of solidarity and 
conflict within the ambivalent politics of everyday life. Concerns over the 
liabilities and the challenges of repaying loans affect how the microcredit group 
members trust each other, how solidarity is shaped, how money is allocated, and 
how the businesses are operated (Hietalahti and Nygren 2011). While joint 
liability in group lending enables loans for the poor without financial collateral, 
loans are not available for everyone or without social collateral. Money and 
credit in all their dimensions are tightly embedded in the processes of social 
inclusion and exclusion (Bähre 2007a). Rapidly changing loyalties and the strict 
rules and responsibilities in the microcredit organisation, combined with 
different stakeholders’ multifaceted interests, further complicate the situation. 
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 Theoretical points of departure 2
 
THIS CHAPTER sets the theoretical frame for the study and introduces three 
approaches that have influenced my analysis: first, the promotion of microcredit 
as a tool of economic development, which is based on Robert Putnam’s 
conceptions of social capital; second, the interpretation of social capital as 
networks of everyday politics and institutional processes, which is inspired by 
the theoretical ideas of Pierre Bourdieu; and third, evolving practices of 
governance: the creation of a set of rules and procedures to govern microcredit 
clients to achieve selected goals, which is in the spirit of the concept of 
governmentality by Michel Foucault. 
 
 
Putnam’s formulations on social capital 
Despite the long history of financial self-help groups in different parts of the 
world, it was only in the 1990s that the group lending models were eagerly 
adapted to microcredit programmes. The rise of these programmes to become 
leading strategies of poverty alleviation within mainstream development 
institutions awoke researchers’ interest in the achievements and constraints of 
the group lending and savings models. In recent years, the discovery of social 
capital, in particular, and its rise to a mainstream position as a development 
strategy in the South has gained researchers’ attention.  
The increasing role of social networks in the promotion of economic 
development has close links to neoliberal economic policies and the idea of 
market-based mechanisms as efficient means of poverty mitigation (Bähre 
2007a; 2007b, Kay 2006, Rankin 2002). In these kinds of considerations, social 
networks became a form of “social capital” conceptualised as a “missing link” in 
development theory (Elyachar 2005, Grootaert 1998). This scene has 
represented microcredit programmes and the associated group-based models as 
crucial landmarks for revised approaches to poverty alleviation, in which the 
policy-makers’ focus has shifted from state-subsidised, small-farmer credits for 
men to financially self-sustainable microcredit institutions that target poor 
women as entrepreneurial actors and as agents of their own development 
(Meagher 2005, Molyneux 2002, Robinson 2001; 2002).  
Although social capital has its roots in Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of cultural 
capital (Elyachar 2005: 185), the emphasis on social networks as an important 
part of development strategies in mainstream agencies, along with strong 
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expectations of collective empowerment, is largely based on Robert Putnam’s 
(1993; 2000) conceptions of social capital. According to Putnam (1993: 167; 
1995: 65), social capital refers to “features of social organisation such as trust, 
social norms and moral obligations, and social networks that facilitate co-
ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit”; as well as to “social networks 
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (2000: 
19). The mutual trust involved in close social networks, such as rotating credit 
associations, creates, according to Putnam (1993: 167−177; 2000: 19−23), bonds 
of social cohesion, and mutual fairness that reduce transaction costs, facilitate 
co-operation, foster norms of reciprocity and encourage economic productivity. 
According to this logic, serving as social collateral in microcredit, social capital 
enables those who lack physical assets to access credit markets. It also reduces 
opportunism and strengthens the overall solidarity in communities.  
For Putnam, social networks represent the most important and intense form 
of horizontal interaction. While Putnam acknowledges that in reality networks 
are mixes of horizontal and vertical linkages (1993: 173), in his study of the 
performance of democratic institutions in Italy, Putnam argues that the regions 
in better-off Northern Italy succeeded in governmental reform and economic 
development particularly because of horizontal politics. While interregional 
solidarity, mutual assistance, civic obligation and trust were the distinguishing 
features in Northern Italy, the principal features in the poorer South were “the 
imposition of hierarchy and order on latent anarchy” (Putnam 1993: 130).   
An important part of social capital, according to Putnam (2000: 116−117), is 
altruism, considered as paying attention to others’ welfare and doing good with 
other people. The more involved a person is in social networks, the more friends 
she or he gets and the more likely she or he is asked to join new networks. It is 
precisely altruism that enables us, in Putnam’s (2000: 134−135) words, to “relax 
our guard a little”, which in turn reduces economic transaction costs and makes 
the economy more efficient. The key element is trustworthiness: “people who 
trust others are all-round good citizens, and those more engaged in community 
life are both more trusting and more trustworthy” (Putnam 2000: 136−137).  
According to this approach, social capital not only creates consensus and 
economic welfare, it is also self-reinforcing and cumulative by nature: the more 
social capital is used, the more it grows (Coleman 1988, Siisiäinen 2000; 2003). 
Thus, accumulation of social capital parallels virtuous circles, in which trust 
creates reciprocity and co-operation, and respectively, reciprocity and co-
operation produce trust (Putnam 1993: 167−171). The denser the horizontal 
networks and the higher the stocks of social capital within a community, the 
more likely people will be able to co-operate for their mutual benefit and gain 
the positive development objectives. 
Putnam’s role in the formulations of modern social capital-oriented theories 
has indisputably been crucial. As noted by Schuller et al. (2001: 13), the 
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revalorisation of social networks and civic engagement in development advocacy 
and business circles – after a period of their strong dismissal in the face of 
globalised market relationships – is in itself a welcome contribution. It serves as 
a reminder of the crucial role of social and political relationships in economic 
decision-making, thereby pointing out the tight articulations between the 
economy and society (McNeill 2004). Instead of considering the Southern poor 
as powerless victims of globalisation, Putnam-oriented social capital literature 
emphasises them as subjects who construct their livelihoods and life-worlds 
through their capability for social networking, which allows them to cope with 
economic crises and might even provide them a way out of poverty (Hietalahti 
and Nygren 2011).  
Recognition of social capital as a promising tool for alleviating poverty has 
also inspired several researchers who emphasise the importance of social capital 
in the microcredit business, associating the term with an accumulation of 
collective co-operative capacity. Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002), for 
example, have sought relevant ways to approach and measure social capital in 
the case of different development projects. According to them, limited access to 
credit is a result of limited information on borrowers’ credit risk, loan use, and 
truthfulness in repayment ability. Social capital in microcredit groups helps to 
diminish the problems of imperfect information and leads to more positive 
development results. Equally, Anderson et al. (2002), in their study of the 
impact of microcredit on common pool resources, found that increased social 
capital would lower the costs of collective action and hence the costs of 
managing common pool resources. By examining collectively liable groups of 
seed borrowers in Southern Zambia, van Bastelaer and Leathers (2006) 
concluded that social capital was strongly associated with improved repayment 
performance. Similarly, Dowla (2006) emphasises in his analysis how the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has managed to create trust, norms and networks 
that have fundamentally changed the lives of the members.  
At the same time, a number of studies have pointed out the problematic 
aspects of Putnamian argumentations on trustworthiness, solidarity and shared 
objectives involved in close social networks, and the operationalisation of these 
key arguments in mainstream development discourses. According to Wilshusen 
(2009a; 2009b), such studies largely fail to see that social networks are dynamic 
arenas of exchanges “where the meaning and practices associated with these 
exchanges are linked to particular cultural contexts”. Considerable criticism has 
also been directed towards the way how social capital has been taken as an 
inherent value and an unproblematic means to reintroduce a “human face” into 
global capitalism (Schuller et al. 2001: 13–14).  
According to many critics, the arguments in Putnam-oriented social capital 
literature of how helpful poor people are, even when faced with depressing living 
conditions, are based on romanticised views of the ability of close social ties to 
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generate trust and solidarity (Beall 2001, Bähre 2007a; 2007b, Maclean 2010). 
By overemphasising the resourcefulness of the poor, the real problems and 
constraints that they experience in their everyday lives easily remain unnoticed. 
This “myth of survival”, as González de la Rocha (2007) calls it, can at worst 
provide an excuse for governments to neglect the operationalisation of efficient 
social and development policies. According to several critics, by adhering to 
horizontal relations and failing to address issues of power and social inequality, 
and contextual economic and social changes, the concept of social capital, in 
fact, conceals more than it reveals (Bebbington 2004, Fine 2002, González de la 
Rocha 2007, Wilshusen 2009a).  
Simultaneously, van der Gaag and Snijders (2003) in their studies on 
attainability of social capital argue that only a small part of the potential social 
capital is actually mobilised. Most of the personal targets are, in fact, achieved 
through personal resources and not necessarily through the networks (Salminen 
2009: 145−146). Conversely, wide networks do not automatically provide a 
larger amount of resources. As Salminen (2009: 146) in his study on the role of 
social capital in local bonding concludes, the socio-economic support that is 
available through social networks is often fairly restricted.  
Concurring with the critical approach to social capital, feminist scholars call 
attention to the gendered power dynamics of social capital and social networks. 
In general terms, microcredit programmes have preferred to focus upon women, 
because while women are among the most disadvantaged section of the 
population in many countries, they tend to have lower earning capacity and less 
access to education, formal sector employment, and social security. 
Development impact is evaluated to be greater because women are considered 
more likely to spend a larger proportion of their earnings on household expenses 
that serve to benefit the whole family. Moreover, women are considered more 
conservative in their investment strategies and more responsible in repaying 
their loans than men (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005: 181−185, 
Hossain and Rahman 2001: 13−15, Putnam 2000: 94−95).  
In this context, feminist scholars call attention in particular to the gendered 
power dynamics of social networks and warn of the danger of taking these 
normative assumptions about women and their gendered roles as family 
providers and money savers for granted (Mayer and Rankin 2002, Mayoux 
2001, Molyneux 2002, Rankin 2002). According to these researchers, in the 
mainstream approaches to social capital, the concept of social capital is often 
considered in “gender blind” terms (Silvey and Elmhirst 2003: 866), neglecting 
the issues of power, hierarchy, difference and conflict within social networks, as 
well as intra-household gender differences. Such neglect, as Bebbington (2007: 
158) points out, may lead not only to poor analysis, but also to policy 
prescriptions that can “lend themselves to the reproduction of forms of social 
capital that are already part of the reproduction of these gendered norms".  
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On the same basis, Mayoux (2001, 2006) expresses concern about the way in 
which the apparently similar terms of “empowerment”, “poverty”, 
“participation” and “sustainability” conceal radical differences in policy 
priorities. Kabeer and Subrahamanian (1999: 356) warn against narrow 
conceptualisations, which feed into dichotomous models of change where 
women are judged to be either empowered or not empowered on the basis of 
how closely they conform to a particular indicator. While evaluations are always 
about making value judgements in relation to what constitutes a desirable 
outcome and what does not, it is essential to understand whose values a project 
is being judged on. On the same basis, Silvey and Elmhirst (2003: 866, 875) call 
for a more complete picture of social capital, where social networks would be 
analysed more broadly. According to these researchers, a greater emphasis on 
locally-specific, gender-differentiated studies of people's needs, roles, and 
responsibilities in regard to their livelihood strategies would better contribute to 
understanding women’s empowerment, as well as development outcomes more 
generally. 
 
 
Social capital within Bourdieu’s theoretical framework 
Differentiation between “objective” and “symbolic” forms of capital 
Based on these critical remarks and new theoretical formulations urged upon 
them, a number of sociologists, political anthropologists and political 
geographers have recently focused on social capital as networks of everyday 
politics and institutional processes. In these revised conceptualisations of social 
capital, many of these researchers have been inspired especially by the 
theoretical ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, which demonstrate the complex ways in 
which cultural practices and political power relations shape social interactions 
(Bebbington 2007, Cleaver 2005, Silvey and Elmhirst 2003, Wilshusen 2009a; 
2009b). According to these researchers, by drawing attention to issues of power 
and inequality, Bourdieu’s analyses of everyday interactions in broader 
institutional and political settings can reveal important aspects of the underlying 
struggles over authority and meaning, and thus offer new opportunities to 
incorporate social capital as an analytical category in development research 
(Hietalahti and Nygren 2011).  
Although Bourdieu has introduced the concept of social capital before 
Putnam, it is the rise of social capital to a mainstream position as a development 
strategy and the critical approach towards Putnamian interpretations on social 
capital that has encouraged a number of researchers to “discover” again the 
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Bourdieu’s theories of power and practice, and to utilise them in the research 
context of the global South.  
While an analysis that focuses only on the formal arenas of social interaction 
and a rational understanding of human agency is closely linked to Putnam’s 
theorisations, by expanding this analysis Bourdieu emphasises on the 
importance of often-overlooked negotiations and contestations occurring in 
informal and invisible arenas of political engagement (Wilshusen 2009a; 
2009b). While the Putnam-oriented perspective stresses collective values and 
societal integration, Bourdieu takes up the questions hidden beneath the 
surface, by paying attention to actors with multiple and often contradictory 
views and visions. Such a view may reveal important aspects of underlying logic 
beyond actions, not always recognised in the public record (Wilshusen 2009a: 
140). Within this framework, social capital is understood as both a product and 
the producer of the cultural and political economy, capturing both action-related 
power relationships and structural perspectives on power. Social networks, 
while giving certain actors access to particular resources, and thus reflecting the 
hierarchical relations of these networks, at the same time constrain the access to 
these resources from others.  
Bourdieu (1986) bases his theories on three elements of capital − economic, 
cultural and social – each of which shape individuals’ and groups’ opportunities 
and constraints and thus mediate the structures of social differentiation. 
Economic capital is convertible into financial assets and may be institutionalised 
in the form of property rights. Cultural capital refers to long-lasting dispositions 
of the mind and body or cultural goods. In contrast to the mainstream 
conceptualisation, social capital for Bourdieu (1977; 1984; 1989) represents both 
embodied forms of social networks and the power resources involved in such 
networks.  
On this basis, Bourdieu (1986) conceptualises social capital as “a resource 
that is connected with social networks of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition, embedded in specific 
historical, institutional, and cultural contexts”. As Wilshusen (2009b: 392) 
points out, social capital in Bourdieu’s sense is a wide set of relationships, “a 
sphere of formal and informal exchanges in which differentially empowered 
actors pursue other forms of capital”. Referring to more than just a network, 
such a conceptualisation helps to understand how relations of difference, power 
and authority are created and sustained, and how different actors are able to 
operate and benefit within these sets of relationships (Bebbington 2007).  
For Bourdieu (1985: 723−724), the social world represents a 
multidimensional space that is constructed of various kinds of capital, present in 
different social “fields”. These fields are complex, historically developed 
configurations, networks of relationships between actors with different 
positions. They can in a certain way be conceptualised as “arenas of struggle”, in 
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which actors, in the possession of various types of capital and with different 
forms of power, “play the game” with each other, struggle for different forms of 
capital, and attempt to further their own interests (Bourdieu 1985: 725, 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 125, Wilshusen 2009a: 393). Respectively, the 
different forms of capital, representing both power relations and power 
resources, are crucial elements in the definition of the positions of the actors and 
their possibilities of gaining various degrees of power within the social fields 
(Bourdieu 1985: 724). The social interactions between differently positioned 
actors then produce and reproduce relationships of inequality. As these power 
relationships change continuously, so does the configuration of the social fields 
(Wilshusen 2009a: 392−394; 2009b: 141−142). 
Given the different positions of various actors in the social fields, their 
opportunities to gain power vary. As the study by Kankainen and Siisäinen 
(2009: 269) on the importance of associations and social networks illustrates, 
those who are strategically in a good position may capitalise on their status 
through improved access to information, resources and control over others. 
Thus, individuals’ positions in a network and their opportunity to utilise the 
social capital involved are closely linked to each other. An analogical 
interpretation is that the role of social networks in poverty alleviation can only 
be understood and analysed in terms of the distribution of resources and power 
relationships (Bebbington 2007: 156−157).  
What ultimately differentiates Bourdieu’s ideas of social capital from 
Putnam-inspired mainstream thinking is the differentiation between “objective” 
and “symbolic” forms of capital. While individuals and groups are defined by 
their relative positions within a social space, in order to become effective, these 
objective differences and classifications must be transformed into symbolic ones 
by mutual recognition (Bourdieu 1985: 724−725). This means that the social 
positions of various actors and the distribution of different kinds of resources 
between them become socially effective, and legitimised, only through the 
negotiations over symbolic capital. While other forms of capital have their own 
modes of existence, symbolic capital exists only “in the eyes of others”, as 
felicitously stated by Siisiäinen (2000: 13). 
This means that the most successful clients of microcredit organisations or 
the most wanted members in microcredit groups are not necessarily those, who 
are simply rich in economic capital, but those who are the “most suitable” for a 
continuously changing business environment. While the proper effect of 
symbolic capital is fulfilled only if it originates from “material” capital (Bourdieu 
1977: 183), the decisive variables are often social and moral. As Bähre (2007a: 
86–91) notes in his study on financial mutuals of Xhosa women in South Africa, 
the financial situation does not necessarily coincide with the person’s feelings of 
solidarity, responsibility or other characteristics. In the Bourdieuan sense, it is 
the symbolic capital in particular that defines the value of the stakes that actors 
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pursue, and that gives significance to other forms of capital (Bourdieu 1977: 
179–183; Siisiäinen 2009: 39). In other words, individuals’ and social groups’ 
differentiation in terms of economic, cultural and social capital remain only 
potentialities, unless they are transformed into meaningful differences, 
mediated by symbolic capital. As social capital is, according to Bourdieu, 
governed by the logic of knowledge and acknowledgement, it acts – and should 
always be considered − as symbolic capital.  
Given the symbolic dimension of social capital, that for Bourdieu thus means 
the composite of the actual and potential resources that are involved in more or 
less institutionalised networks, based on mutual recognition, such a view 
provides opportunities to analyse both the differences between potential and 
actual resources involved in social networks, as well as the volume of such 
resources. Basically, the “amount” of social capital that individuals or a group 
actually hold depends on the network they can effectively mobilise, and on the 
composition of different forms of capital – economic, cultural or symbolic – they 
are able to reach through their contacts (Bourdieu 1985). This perception brings 
up the following questions: what kind of resources are embedded in and 
achievable for the networks? How, on which terms and by whom are the 
different forms of capital transformable into others? To answer these questions 
in the field of microcredit, we must first explore the kind of social networks 
people are involved in; how these networks operate; and what the role of 
microcredit is in the composition of various social networks and economic 
instruments within the existing structures.  
In order to demonstrate the complexity of social practices, Bourdieu (2000: 
19) developed the concept of habitus, “a set of dispositions, reflexes and forms of 
behaviour that people acquire through acting in a society”. The term is 
important because it suggests how human action shapes and is greatly shaped by 
the broader structural and cultural bounds and unconscious principles in 
particular social contexts (Bebbington 2007: 156, Wilshusen 2009a: 392). In 
contrast to the neo-liberal view of rationally behaving individuals that draw on 
strategic, value-maximising economic calculations in their decision making, 
Bourdieu’s (2000: 19) conceptualisations are based on the idea that people’s 
actions and practical strategies are greatly structured, although not totally 
determined by wider political-economic processes and structures of social 
difference, such as class, gender, or ethnicity (Bebbington 2007: 157, Wilshusen 
2009a: 392−393). These structures of difference are then characterised by 
distinct distributions of capital that, in turn, define actors’ historically evolving 
positions within social settings and shape the opportunities of different 
individuals within the social fields. Habitus, together with the different forms of 
capital, is thus central to the agents’ ability to strategise and operate effectively 
in these fields; it defines a person’s “sense of the game” (Bebbington 2007: 156). 
 THEORETICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE | 39 
Microcredit as networks of everyday politics and institutional processes 
The fundamental idea of group lending is that member clients can gain access to 
group resources and may transform them into other forms of capital in other 
social fields. The groups and the “centres”, as the constellation of local groups 
participating in repayment meetings are often called in South Africa, can be 
considered as tension arenas, which are created, reproduced and changed by the 
relational positions of various actors (Bourdieu 1985, Olivier de Sardan 2005: 
137−138, 185). 
Although clients are encouraged to form the groups on their own “so that the 
potential borrowers can use their information to find the best partners”, as 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005: 89) point out, formation of the 
microcredit groups is haphazard and not “rational” in the strict sense of the 
word. On the contrary, economic, social and political circumstances create 
different conditions and probabilities for the group formation.  
Given the differentiation between “objective” and “symbolic” forms of 
resources and power, the Bourdieuan representation of group lending leads to 
the view that the "group on paper" can only have a theoretical existence. 
According to Bourdieu (1998: 121), this is a reproductive circle of social order: 
the harmony that becomes fixed between subjective and objective categories 
creates a picture of the world as a truism, taken for granted. Indeed, from such a 
point of view, nothing seems more natural than a group of laughing South 
African women under the blistering sun, gathered together in the microcredit 
meetings. In this picture, a somewhat artificial social construction appears 
almost natural and universal (cf. Alanen 2009: 185). In other words, the social 
capital associated with microcredit group appears to be "natural" and self-
evident, even if it is historically constructed and a result of numerous 
institutional ambitions.  
However, the group not only survives through the support or management by 
the upper level agents, such as organisations, state or donors, but requires 
continuous "team play", group work and a "sense of group" for its unity and 
coherence. The formation of the “sense of group” is a much slower and more 
interactive process than often suggested. The microcredit groups in my study 
can be compared to Alanen’s (2009: 187−188) view on family ties: at best, a 
group may serve as a place in which “shared logics and the ways of thinking as 
well as everyday practices, such as assisting, exchanging gifts, gathering together 
and cultivating a friendship, create norms and codes of behaviour”. This, in turn, 
builds and reinforces the sense of group; piecemeal dedication and solidarity; 
and in the long run the “group habitus”.  
While South African people have relied on a variety of networks of social 
support, including various forms of stokvels, money transfers, food sharing, 
money lending, helping with child care, informal burial societies, formal funeral 
associations, various post banking services, and diverse networks with friends 
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and neighbours for decades, instilling solidarity and reciprocity into individuals’ 
habitus as an institutional process has hardly happened automatically. As 
illustrated by Nygren and Myatt-Hirvonen (2009), social networks are not 
simply there to be utilised; establishing trust relations takes time and effort. 
Interesting questions are to what extent can microcredit mechanisms create 
the feeling of trust, solidarity or team play within the group? What is needed for 
the esprit de corps? To what extent are groups formed because there simply is 
no other option? In order to answer these questions, one must understand the 
actors’ habitus: “a set of assumptions, habits, taken-for-granted ideas and ways 
of being” through which different actors understand the world (Bebbington 
2007, Bourdieu 1977). While habitus refers to adjustment to changing 
situations, it also clarifies the understanding of one’s own position in relation to 
the others’ positions (Bourdieu 1989: 17, 19). The realisation of one’s own 
habitus occurs through choices that actors face and make in the social fields. The 
adjustment thus depends on how compatible an individual’s habitus is with the 
prevailing positions and power in the social fields (Salminen 2009: 147).  
The question thus is to what extent the instilling of the microcredit group 
into the members’ habitus is parallel to these historically-developed processes. 
Shared values, solidarity and reciprocity should not be automatically associated 
even with the voluntary-based networks and associations, nor with kin 
(Bourdieu 1977: 33–38). In the approach I suggest, such links should not be 
taken for granted in any case. 
The same kind of conclusions have been made by Mayoux (2001) and 
Molyneux (2002), as well as by Bähre (2007b), who in his study on Xhosa 
immigrants in South African townships shows that ambivalent kinship and 
neighbourhood dynamics may in fact lead to reluctant solidarity. The control 
and distribution of money may bring serious conflicts, especially among the 
most vulnerable groups of people with few safety nets. Cleaver (2005: 904), 
reflecting on Bourdieu’s theorisations in terms of her work in Tanzania, 
emphasises that trust does not automatically emerge from repeated interaction, 
and the representation of the poorest is difficult to secure even through localised 
institutional structures. Social relations are fragile and constantly negotiated. 
By pointing out how actors engaged in struggle pursue their interests, 
Bourdieu ties habitus to another central concept of his analysis, “conflict” 
(Siisiäinen 2000: 10). What links these two terms together is the view that 
habitus reflects the changing positions of people within the society, which are 
formulated by conflicts built into the society (Bourdieu 2000: 19). This 
framework offers more careful tools for the analysis of social capital than the 
Putnamian approach, which operates theoretically on the level of social 
consensus, and thus easily leaves specific interests of different social groups and 
the conflicts between them unanalysed (Siisiäinen 2000; 2003). While the 
microcredit scheme offers an illustrative context for examining the different 
perspectives on social capital and social networks, the feasible theoretical 
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framework, as Bourdieu suggest, needs to offer opportunities for the analysis not 
only of the efforts for co-operation but of the social struggles involved. 
Given that everyday life is composed of consensus and conflict, what makes 
conflicts interesting as a research focus is the way the conflicting situations serve 
as a window to the complexities of the society and social life. They may reveal 
structures, norms and codes, or highlight the strategies and logics of actors or 
groups of actors. Thus, conflicts are valuable indicators of the way local 
communities and wider societies work, and how social changes occur (Bourdieu 
2000, Olivier de Sardan 2005: 189). If conflicts and political power relations are 
given only a scarce attention, poverty alleviation strategies relevant for 
microcredit programmes can be easily overlooked. These strategies include 
ambivalent community relations and feelings of solidarity, multifaceted 
decision-making strategies, and the often limited ability of the poor women to 
negotiate social relationships to their advantage (Guérin 2006, Hietalahti and 
Nygren 2011, Meagher 2006).  
In contrast to Putnam, who suggests that associational life is closely 
connected to altruism, for Bourdieu “pure altruism” and trust are considered 
fairly problematic. In fact, the concept of trust as such is lacking from Bourdieu’s 
discussion on social networks. While Putnam judges the terms “trust” and 
“interests” as exclusionary, Bourdieu notes the specific interests of certain 
groups lurking behind trust and “universal values”. In fact, he doubts whether 
altruism and common trust exist at all. Bourdieu’s theorisation thus rules out 
the possibilities of pure consensus and universal virtues. Even a sincere gift 
exchange for Bourdieu means an ideal type representation of a “real”, interest-
loaded gift exchange (Bourdieu 1977: 171–173, Siisiäinen 2003: 211−215).  
Although, as Rankin (2002) remarks, Bourdieu’s conflict-based theorisations 
on social capital and the social world are useful in critiquing the common use of 
these concepts in development debates, Bourdieu’s inattention to “disinterested, 
co-operative or solidaristic” action is a perceivable constraint and thus worthy of 
greater attention. As Bebbington (2007: 160−161) points out, “understanding 
the sources of co-operation is as imperative as making explicit the conflicts that 
are often hidden and buried in concepts and policy prescriptions”. The 
multidimensionality of social worlds unavoidably connects social networks such 
as credit associations with issues of trust, one of the key issues in Putnam’s 
conceptualisation of social capital. 
Correspondingly, by leaving another critical concept, conflict, largely 
untouched Putnam in turn ignores a central element that is needed for 
understanding the creation of a trusting society. As noted by Siisiäinen (2000), a 
trusting society is always based on negotiations and compromises between 
different kinds of interests. Thus, in order to gain more understanding on the 
struggles, structures and practices of poor people’s everyday lives and efforts to 
make a living, it is of essence to include both conflicts and co-operation in an 
analysis of social capital (Siisiäinen 2003: 213−215). 
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Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
The third approach to this study of understanding microcredit markets and 
forms of power is that inspired by Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
(Elyachar 2005: 91–95). The link between microcredit and governmentality has 
been made in a growing array of Foucault-oriented microcredit literature to 
examine the ways in which informal networks are being repurposed by formal 
sector financial organisations and NGOs (Cross and Street 2009, Elyachar 2005; 
2012, Karim 2011, Maclean 2010).  
According to these researchers, along with the notion of microcredit as a key 
development strategy to poverty reduction, poor women, representing “the 
informal economy”, have been integrated into the market as “projects” of market 
development (Cross and Street 2009: 9, Elyachar 2005), and thus constructed as 
new entrepreneurial subjects and agents of governing (Elyachar 2005, Karim 
2011). The problem in this kind of integration, however, is that the difficult 
realities faced by the poor in their everyday lives are easily undermined, and the 
ability of the poor themselves to operate as economic actors becomes easily 
romanticised (du Toit and Neves 2007). The risk is that the relationships, social 
practices and social networks of the poor serve only as an instrumental tool for 
microcredit institutions to attain their financial sustainability (Cross and Street 
2009, Rankin 2002).  
For Foucault (1978: 219–220), the term governmentality refers to “the 
ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit 
complex form of power, which has its target populations”; and to “the 
development of a whole complex of knowledges”. Microcredit can be compared 
to Foucault’s example of educational institution and the idea of “blocks” in 
which “the adjustment of abilities, the resources of communication, and power 
relations constitute regulated and concerted systems” (Foucault 1978: 338). In 
other words, the microcredit institution considered as an organisation with its 
own rules, norms and activities, as well as confrontations of various actors with 
various logics, interests, goals and power relations (Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 980, 
Olivier de Sardan 2005: 137–138; 185, Siisiäinen 2009: 41) constitutes what 
Foucault (1978: 338) calls “a block of capacity-communication-power”. In such a 
system, the rules of the institution govern its internal life. Behaviours of various 
actors are ordered by questions, rules, orders, answers, demands, training or 
classifications (Luoto 2001). These blocks then constitute Foucault’s concept of 
“discipline” (Foucault 1978: 339). 
In what follows, I draw on the work of Julia Elyachar (2005) and Lamia 
Karim (2011) in particular to discuss how microcredit is characterised by a 
number of techniques and disciplinary tactics that do this work of governing. 
Karim (2011: xvi–xviii; 6) has been examining the way that microcredit 
organisations in Bangladesh manipulate existing social relations to regulate the 
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actions and financial behaviour of clients toward NGDO-specified goals. She 
found that as techniques of governance, microcredit institutions operationalised 
traditional codes of honour and shame to manufacture “a culturally specific 
governmentality”; or what Karim (xviii) calls “the economy of shame”. For 
instant, if someone was unable to repay, the microcredit institution had the 
power to shame that person in public in order to make her lose face (Karim 
2011: 84).  
In the discursive field of development, as Karim (2011: xvii–xviii) explains, 
knowledge functions as a form of governmentality: It controls the subjects of 
development to act in accordance with the principles that “promote particular 
ends and visions”. By drawing attention to the production of knowledge, a 
Foucauldian-oriented analysis of truth and power in the representation of social 
reality can bring out important viewpoints on the analysis of multiple 
discourses, and “how a certain order of discourse produces permissible modes of 
being and thinking while disqualifying others and even making them 
impossible” (Karim 2011: 164). According to Karim (2011: 164), this kind of 
knowledge production is critical in understanding “how the NGO poverty 
industry is invented, reproduced, and entrenched as an institution and as a body 
of scientific ‘truths’ that, in turn, reorganises knowledge and resources, and 
prioritises particular research ideas as legitimate”.  
According to Elyachar (2005: 193), in the business of microcredit the concept 
of empowerment in particular has become a part of a new mode of governance 
and power relations, in which the individual is the primary agent of the 
governing; or “the self is both subject and subjected” (Elyachar 2005: 193). As 
Elyachar explains, microcredit, based on the idea that poor women are helped to 
help themselves, has been considered empowering because the debt goes 
directly to the grassroots. Similarly, lending NGDOs as “representative of the 
people” have been able to directly link the poor to the global market and 
transform those who used to remain in the informal economy into active 
subjects, “the agents of their own empowerment” (Elyachar 2005: 192–194). 
While the fundamental idea in this strategy is that the market is the one that is 
empowering, not the state, such transformation has subjected these people to act 
in accordance with the market principles of discipline, efficiency and 
competitiveness. In this process, social networks and practices that used to be 
seen as an obstacle to economic development have become a key ingredient of 
market success. What has followed, however, is that by appropriating the social 
networks for reproducing global markets without considering realities faced on 
the ground, poor women have in many cases become “dispossessed” of their own 
social capital (Elyachar 2005: 5–10, 192–195).  
In applying Foucauldian theories of power to microcredit, it is important to 
note that power for Foucault is hardly an all-encompassing element that 
determines the existence of individuals (cf. Luoto 2001: 90). According to 
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Foucault, the exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, 
individual or collective; rather it is “a way in which some act on others” 
(Foucault 1978: 340). This means that power exists only as exercised by some 
actor on others, only when it is “put into action”. For Foucault, there is no power 
that exists without aims and objectives (Luoto 2001: 27). This does not, 
however, mean that power results from an individual’s choice or decision; for 
Foucault, power is relational, context-related, and inseparable from knowledge 
(Luoto 2001: 13).  
It is also important to emphasise that for Foucault power always includes a 
counterforce, or what he calls “resistance”. Individuals have the chance to do 
otherwise or convert the language used. Accordingly, a microcredit programme, 
as any other development project, is never completely adopted by the “target 
population”. Clients also exploit the opportunities at their disposal to adapt the 
system to their own ends. While microcredit programmes are tailored for poor 
and low-income clients with the aim of empowering them through strengthening 
their financial assets and their power in negotiation and decision making, 
paradoxically, the programmes are also subjected to “side-tracking” and 
sometimes monopolised by certain groups or individuals anxious to exploit 
them. The possible outcome is rarely a result of one-minded discussion between 
all the people involved, such as a simple consensus between clients in a 
microcredit repayment meeting; it is rather a result of complex negotiations 
between financial strategies, governing rules, socio-cultural norms and political 
power relations (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 142−149).  
This means that while the microcredit organisation may pressure and shape 
the behaviour of its clients, it does not infinitely manage their behaviour. These 
client-subjects also exist in parallel social worlds with other rules that constrain 
and regulate their behaviour (Karim 2011: 36). The relation between a 
microcredit organisation and its “target group” is complex, and beyond the 
control of development planners (Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 981). This implies 
that the institutional change related to microcredit strategies is also a much 
more complicated matter than just implementing the “best practice”. In the 
context of access to resources and opportunities, “it is the ongoing bargaining 
over organisational forms and rules of the game in multiple political arenas by 
social actors, within the existing institutional arrangements, that will – or will 
not – generate changes to these very arrangements” (Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 
982). 
In order to understand power relations, investigating the forms of resistance 
therefore offers a good starting point. As Foucault (1978: 346) remarks, “most 
important is the relationship between power relations and confrontation 
strategies”. In this kind of analysis, it is not essential to investigate power as a 
concept as such, but rather as a practice, a form of power (Elyachar 2005: 93, 
Foucault 1978: 331). When analysing power relationships it is important to ask 
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what kind of strategic positions one is aiming to achieve through the governing 
practices and discourses (Luoto 2001: 122); where the practices of 
governmentality are located (Elyachar 2005: 93); or how the meanings of 
practices are interpreted and justified.  
All these conceptions require an analysis of microcredit and the associated 
social capital in terms of broader relationships of hierarchy, difference and 
power (Bebbington 2007: 158). As Guérin (2006), Nygren and Myatt-Hirvonen 
(2009) and Wilshusen (2009a) note, people’s decision making is directed by a 
constant struggle and balance between earning a living, gaining authority, and 
behaving in a culturally appropriate and socially loyal way. By conceptualising 
microcredit as an arena in which various types of actors, driven by more or less 
compatible goals, and endowed with different degrees of decision-making 
power, co-operate with and confront each other, I aim to reveal the complex 
social relationships, rules, and governing tactics interwoven in the microcredit 
programmes. This requires paying attention to the socio-political and economic 
processes that shape the opportunities and constraints that microcredit clients 
face in their everyday business strategies and other activities.  
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 Methodological choices 3
  
THIS CHAPTER presents the methodological considerations of the study. It begins 
by briefly introducing the research area, and continues with an overview of the 
fieldwork I carried out in four villages in Limpopo, South Africa. The chapter 
describes the methods used, the techniques including thematic interviews, 
participant observation and content analysis, and discusses the questions of 
positionality, power hierarchies and ethical issues. 
 
 
The setting: poverty and well-being in post-apartheid Limpopo 
The study area is located in Limpopo, the northernmost province of South 
Africa, and covers two rural and two semi-urban settlements on the eastern side 
of the province. All of these are within a few hours' drive from the town of 
Tzaneen where the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF), the microcredit 
organisation been analysed, has its head office. Wide variations in demographic 
composition, job availability, and economic performance divide the South 
African provinces, of which Limpopo is one of the poorest and least urbanised. 
People who identify themselves as Africans comprise 97% of the population of 
5.3 million, nearly 35% of them with no schooling. Industrial activities are 
limited to small mining operations that contribute a few percentages to the 
South African GDB (Lehohla 2006: 1−3, 47−48).  
The 400-kilometre journey from the Johannesburg airport in Gauteng, “the 
economic heartland of South Africa”, to Limpopo in the north, “a typical 
developing area”, reveals glimpses of the socio-politically and financially divided 
country. Luxury suburbs change to townships and poor villages; planted orange 
tree gardens to dry veldts and savannahs; White elite schools to the congested, 
Black rural schools. Villages are walled off from the highways, many of them 
without a name in the official maps.  
Amidst the dry hills, the subtropical Tzaneen area looks like a tempting oasis. 
While Tzaneen is one of the largest commercial centres in Limpopo with a 
population of 30,000, within only a few dozen kilometres radius of the town, 
hundreds of thousands of people live in a totally different world.  
In times before the White settlers came to the district, the area was known as 
Tsaneng, a northern Sotho word for the term “gathering together” (Tzaneen 
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District 2010).9 Under apartheid, land settlement and industrial policies 
enforced economic migration and deprived rural African villagers of local 
investment and the opportunity to accumulate assets (Sorensen 2006: 1−2). 
Today, the fertile soils are mainly cultivated by White farmers. Despite the 
liberalisation of agricultural markets in the 1990s, the heritage of the racially 
based rural commodity markets is evident; Black commercial farmers are 
exceptional (Francis 2002: 548).  
The region is still burdened by diverse developmental challenges. Great 
inequality in the distribution of income and wealth characterises the living 
conditions, combined with high rates of poverty and poor infrastructure. 
Extreme poverty blights the rural areas especially. The streets – or rather dusty, 
potholed roads – wind past the small houses and shacks. Services are limited to 
a health clinic, primary school and a small, often Indian- or Chinese-owned, 
shop. Banks and post offices, markets and other services are available only at a 
taxi-drive distance in the urban and semi-urban settlements. Health services are 
poor. In 2003, health spending in Limpopo was R637 per capita,10 which is 
almost 30% below the national average (Lehohla 2006: 45). The stratification is 
bound up with the long-lasting effects of an inferior educational system and the 
inequalities in civic rights and political power (Francis 2002: 531, Sorensen 
2006: 1−2). 
In the Tzaneen region, as elsewhere in Limpopo province, earning a decent 
living is difficult for the majority of the population. Nearly 72% of the working 
age population of Limpopo were unemployed in 2004 and approximately one 
third of those employed were working in the informal sector (Lehohla 2006: 2, 
61). Women’s participation in the informal labour and product markets has 
increased in recent years, although the businesses and jobs in which they are 
engaged are precarious. Overall, as earnings are small, hardly enough to feed, 
house, and clothe a family, the poor have to engage in a variety of economic 
activities, income sources, and intermittent jobs. 
As a result of urban industrialisation and poor employment opportunities in 
the rural areas, many Limpopoans have begun to look for employment 
opportunities elsewhere. The movement of members across households or 
across geographical distances has become an increasingly important survival 
strategy (cf. Lee 2009: 47–48). In my research sites, many men worked as 
seasonal labourers on farms or plantations during the harvest season. Some men 
                                                 
9 According to the local myth it was King Makgoba himself who described the area as Tzaneng, naming 
it after a local African tribe. Another explanation is that the name of Tzaneen originates from the 
northern Sotho word tshaana, which means “small basket” in English, and describes the way the town 
on the valley floor is surrounded by hills. According to my research assistant, however, in reality the 
name of Tzaneen originates from the Tzonga word tshangeni, which means “cattle crawl” in English. 
Over time the name became “Tzaneen” since, according to my research assistant, “White people could 
not pronounce it properly”. 
10 EUR 1.00 = ZAR 10.2584 (29 April 2012) 
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drove taxis, others worked in the mines and towns of Phalaborwa (115 km from 
Tzaneen) or Johannesburg (420 km). Yet, labour migration is typically long-
distance: Many migrants, in the hope of improved livelihoods, better facilities, 
and better employment opportunities (HSRC 2005), head to Johannesburg, 
Durban (800 km) or even as far as Cape Town (1,860 km). In Gauteng, whose 
population is growing approximately 4% (376,000) per year,11 and which is the 
most attractive migration destination in South Africa, a quarter of immigrants 
are from Limpopo, attracted by the hope of a better future that the success 
stories promise. Young migrants in particular have become “transients”, which 
in the Limpopoan case means moving back and forth between Limpopo and 
Gauteng in search of work (Francis 2002).  
In addition, many of the men who had migrated to urban areas had 
established a new family, “abandoning” their old lives, and leaving their wives to 
be single parents and heads of the household. In the two rural settlements of my 
research area approximately 50−55% and 60−65% of the households of working 
age groups were headed by women; in the semi-urban settlements the figures 
were 30−40% and 45−55%.12 Household-heads aged 60 and over were more 
often women than men, especially in rural areas. Many women were forced to 
entrust their children with their mothers in rural villages and move to semi-
urban settlements or towns to look for work. Some of those who attended 
informal associations or microcredit groups worked as maids in Whites’ homes 
or were busy with their daily businesses and thus obliged to leave their children 
alone at home.  
Overall, the population pyramid displays very young population in Limpopo. 
In 2001, children in the age group of 0−14 years accounted for 39% of the 
population, while people aged 70 years and over accounted for less than 4%. 
About 29% of the population were in the age group of 15−29 years, while 14% 
were 30−44 and 7% aged 45−59 years (Lehohla 2006: 12). These figures parallel 
the age structure of my particular research sites. In 2001, children in rural 
research settlements accounted for an estimated 40% of the population and in 
semi-urban settlements for over 30% of the population. Approximately 30% 
belonged to the age group of 15−29 years, while 10% in rural and 15% in semi-
urban settlements were in the groups of 30−39 or 40−59 years. People aged 60 
and over accounted for less than 1% of the population in all the research sites 
studied. Of the interviewed SEF clients, approximately 12% belonged to the age 
group of 24–39 years, while 58% were 40–49 and 21% aged 50–59 years. People 
aged 60 and over accounted for 9% of the interviewed clients. 
                                                 
11 Estimated in 2003. 
12 These figures are based on the databases of the “Stats SA Super Table”. 
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Women in their everyday duties: collecting and carrying water. 
While 80−90% of the dwellings in the semi-urban settlements of my research 
area were houses, in the rural areas half of the population lived in huts, shacks 
or other precarious constructions. Many households lacked electricity and used 
candles as the source for lighting. In semi-urban areas most people had piped 
water in their yards or houses; in rural villages several households had to rely on 
community stands. Once a day, women and children walked a few hundred 
metres to fill plastic canisters, and carried them home on their heads or by 
wheelbarrow. In most remote villages in Limpopo, many households had only 
recently attained access to clean drinking water, and the latrine was often shared 
with the neighbours; in semi-urban settlements, approximately two-thirds of the 
households had flush toilets. As telecommunications have improved in recent 
years along with the large investments in information technology everywhere in 
South Africa, cell phones were common in both semi-urban and rural areas. 
Approximately 70% of the interviewed women or some of their household 
members had their own cell phones. 
 
 
Fieldwork and the main sources of data 
I carried out relatively short but intensive field research in Limpopo between 
May and July 2007. By that time I had already visited South Africa several times, 
and done wide subsidiary reading including newspaper articles, statistical 
material, research articles and books. I had visited the University of Stellenbosch 
as an exchange researcher, visited in various villages of Limpopo and the 
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township of Kayamandi in Stellenbosch, written my Master’s thesis in 
Economics on microcredit repayment mechanisms in Limpopo, and published a 
number of newspaper articles and radio broadcasts on microentrepreneurship 
and livelihoods strategies in townships and in rural South Africa. During these 
trips and the actual fieldwork I met a variety of people in villages and towns: 
businessmen and -women, researchers and organisational activists, rich farmers 
and vinedressers, poor hawkers and ranch workers. While everyday interaction 
and informal conversations with all these people provided valuable information 
about livelihoods, traditions, attitudes and entrepreneurship in South Africa, the 
primary information of this research is based on thematic interviews and 
participant observation carried out with the clients and staff members of the 
Small Enterprise Foundation in 2007. In addition, a content analysis of the 
relevant development reports and reviews of SEF’s operations was carried out.  
I selected − with the help of the SEF staff − the research sites on the basis of 
their microcredit history, level of urbanisation, population composition, and 
livelihood profiles. I first met the clients in the repayment meetings and then 
asked if they were willing to participate in the interviews. As often is the case in 
interview studies, there was an element of self-selection included. In line with 
the theoretical framework, I tried to select interviewees belonging to different 
credit groups and socio-economic positions, and representing different types of 
households and business ventures. The informants were from various age 
groups with various roles within the groups and centre meetings, and different 
histories concerning the duration of membership at SEF. 
In total, I interviewed 50 SEF clients, consisting of 16 participants in a 
Tšhomisano Credit Pragramme (TCP) in a rural settlement and 34 participants 
in a Micro Credit Programme (MCP) in rural and semi-urban localities.13 I 
interviewed most of the informants twice, and also conducted some group 
interviews, which often turned out to be amusing circles of gossip and rumours. 
Of the 50 interviewees, 49 were women. This is because 99% of the SEF clients 
are women, which made finding more male members difficult.  
The main topics in the interviews focused upon the clients’ economic 
activities, credits obtained from SEF, financial strategies, and participation 
various microcredit programmes and informal organisations. Other important 
topics included business and selling strategies, such as price formation, 
marketing, stocking, and investing. Considerable attention was also paid to 
people’s decision-making strategies and forms of networking, including the 
social rules and practices related to client selection, microcredit group 
formation, monitoring, knowledge-sharing, and trust-building. I also gathered 
information about the everyday lives of women. This included stories of their 
family and work histories; love affairs, sorrows, hopes and wishes; business 
                                                 
13 See more detailed description of the programmes in section 4.1. 
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successes and everyday tactics of survival. The questions were designed to 
encourage respondents to tell me in their own words about their activities and 
experiences. I thus aimed to capture the dynamic interplay of economic 
activities, social relations and cultural practices within the people’s livelihood 
strategies. 
The inhabitants of the research villages represent the southern Sotho 
(Sesotho), northern Sotho (Sepedi) and Shangaan (close to Tsonga) languages. 
Given that only two of the fifty interviewees spoke English, and I do not know 
Sotho or Shangaan, all the questions were interpreted into the local languages 
and vice versa with the assistance of two interpreters − one regular, and one 
who deputised for him on a couple of days − both of whom were Shangaan by 
origin. Obviously, these language arrangements, and the fact that none of us 
shared a mother tongue with each other meant that some nuances of the 
narratives were missed, thus shaping my interaction with SEF clients. I could 
not chat with people as freely and easily as I would have liked to, and I depended 
greatly on my assistant’s help, which significantly influenced the interview 
situation at times, such as when my assistant refused to interpret a traditional 
healer’s magical stories for me. After a few minutes discussion he begrudgingly 
agreed, but as a religious person, he still wanted to be sure that I understood 
that “these stories were bad” and “not true”. 
Despite these issues, I felt that I was able manage the interview situations 
and at least to a certain extent even follow the interpretations sometimes. All the 
numbers and business-related words in Sotho and Shangaan languages originate 
from English or Afrikaans, which is related to German, the basics of which I am 
familiar with. I also learnt a couple of the often repeated questions and answers. 
Sometimes I realised that my assistant did not interpret everything or that he 
tried to phrase the answers in a more formal way than the interviewees did: if a 
client said she took a loan of 100 rand from a loan shark and paid 130 rand back, 
the interpreter might use the wording of “30 percent interest”, for example. 
Those clients who understood some English sometimes asked the interpretator 
to correct his translation.  
To understand the logic of the microcredit business from the point of view of 
credit providers, I also interviewed 15 SEF staff members, 8 women and 7 men, 
from management to fieldworker level. The main topics in these interviews 
related to SEF’s aims and strategies, organisational structures, and the principal 
achievements and challenges of microcredit as a strategy for poverty alleviation. 
Other key questions consisted of the objectives and practices of SEF’s incentive 
mechanisms, the rules and responsibilities included in the microcredit 
programmes, and the means to manage conflict situations. I also asked the staff 
members about their experiences concerning the clients’ business strategies and 
skills, credit needs and logic of decision-making, as well as the role of social 
networks and cultural rules.  
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The staff members represented a heterogenous group of “Boer”, “British” and 
“African” South Africans, as well as foreigners from different parts of the world. 
These interviews were all conducted in English, which was the native language 
for one of the 15 interviewees. The interviews took place at SEF headquarters 
and branch offices or at an interviewee’s home. The staff at headquarters lived in 
middle or upper class settlements in town, while the fieldworkers lived in rural 
villages. I made friends with some of the SEF staff members and met them 
occasionally in the evenings. 
I recorded all the interviews by dictaphone and filmed some of the repayment 
meetings with the permission of all the participants. After the fieldwork, I 
transcribed all the interviews and entered them into a database for further 
analysis. Being aware of the power position that a researcher has on the 
interpretation of information, as well as how the data are incorporated into the 
theoretical and empirical analysis, I recognise that my own subjectivity may 
have had an impact on the findings (Mullings 1999: 347−348). Therefore, the 
circumstances and context within which the fieldwork was conducted and the 
analysis was carried out throughout my study are described in detail.  
Besides the interviews, a content analysis was carried out of the available 
reports and reviews concerning SEF operations. These documents provided 
valuable information on the mechanisms for controlling operational costs, 
incentives for motivating staff members, means for ensuring high loan 
repayment rates, and strategies for achieving financial and organisational 
sustainability. This study also used the information gained from 600 
quantitative surveys on clients’ livelihood strategies in the Limpopo area, 
collected by a special SEF survey team in June-July 2007. Since the gathered 
information, however, was not intended for this study, and the data were 
somewhat fragmented, I only used them to corroborate my own findings. 
Specifically, the survey offered data in the following issues: women’s (i) 
membership in various informal credit and savings networks; (ii) utilisation of 
other microcredit organisations; (iii) debt ratio; (iv) average savings rate; and (v) 
average loan amount. SEF also provided me with some helpful guidelines and 
graphs on the loan sizes, businesses, motivations and bottlenecks of the 
programmes and their impacts on clients’ livelihoods. I have utilised these 
guidelines as background information for my own, more ethnographic-oriented 
analysis. 
The information provided in the interviews, surveys and documents was 
complemented and cross-checked by the methods of participant observation and 
informal conversations in women’s homes or in market places. The same hold 
true when visiting the SEF’s branch offices and attending the repayment 
meetings. The information gained through participant observation was written 
down in my field diary. Through involvement in the daily activities of the people, 
participant observation can provide access to information that would otherwise 
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be difficult to obtain, such as the social positions people occupy, their 
relationships with one another, and the discrepancies between what they say 
they do and their actual behaviour (Nygren 2004: 192–193). In this study, these 
methods offered valuable ways to gain information about the women’s business 
opportunities and constraints, as well as the social rules and political power 
relations involved.  
I had an opportunity to regularly attend SEF loan repayment meetings in 
four different centres. This opportunity was especially crucial for the successful 
conduction of this research, because these meetings offered important 
opportunities to observe how different actors co-operated, contested and 
confronted each other. Social networks and political power relations are difficult 
to study through interviews that tend to present idealistic views. Sometimes 
interviewees tend to give answers they think will make a good impression on the 
inverviewer and interpreter. In the repayment meetings and conflict situations 
in particular, the incentives, logics and motivations of various actors were more 
easily revealed and the actual practices on the ground exposed from the rhetoric. 
As participant observation and interviews depend on the researcher as the 
primary tool of data-collection, critical self-reflection during my fieldwork was 
necessary for detecting any potential bias. This required serious consideration of 
the nature of my relationship with research informants, recognising existing 
hierarchies and power relations, as well as considering the way the knowledge 
generated would be returned to the field (Scheyvens et al. 2003b: 167−168, 
Wacquant 1992: 37). While a longer period in the field would have undoubtedly 
provided a richer and deeper understanding of everyday politics in Limpopoan 
villages, and undoubtedly of the deeper relations of kinship, ethnicity and 
religion, which are important to more comprehensive understanding of social 
networks, I am convinced that even the short-term fieldwork provided me with 
important information of the nature of microcredit operations in Limpopo and 
of the everyday lives of the women involved. 
My initial plan to carry out participant observation of SEF clients in market 
places, and to conduct all the interviews in their homes proved challenging. 
First, it was not always easy to find the women’s houses, especially when SEF 
management advised me not to bother their staff with this issue. Thus, several 
interviews were carried out wherever the interviewee felt comfortable: at the 
official meeting points of villages, such as under the biggest tree; in the school 
yards; or at the SEF repayment meeting sites. Second, as the concept of “market” 
is multifaceted, the term “market place” could not be limited in this study only to 
the physical space in which a market operates. In the context of Limpopo, 
trading is a complicated mixture of debts, claims, orders and objects under 
exchange, and the selling areas vary from homes to public pay points. During the 
fieldwork I realised that this study should, therefore, consider the “market” as a 
social institution, as a form of practice rather than just a physical place, where 
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business strategies are strongly mediated by social norms, cultural conventions 
and political power relations. In terms of Elyachar’s (2005) notions on “markets 
of dispossession” in Cairo, the main difficulty in analysing the microcredit 
market was that, in fact, there was no “market” such as microcredit rhetoric 
tends to suggest. The Limpopoan microcredit business was a reliable business, 
the market was about creating social relations, and the successful clients were 
those who were able to create markets. 
The methodological choice, which greatly relies on thematic interviews and 
participant observation but also utilises content analysis of relevant documents 
and the questionnaire survey as a data source, parallels the theoretical 
framework of the study. This view focuses attention on the issues of power and 
inequalities and on questions easily concealed under the surface, and broadens 
the focus from the formal, “objective” arenas to more informal and invisible 
arenas (Wilshusen 2009a). While the quantitative data and content analysis 
provided information about livelihood structures, organisation policies and the 
potential resources associated with social networks, qualitative interviews and 
participatory observation helped to differentiate between the Bourdieuan 
“objective” and “symbolic” forms of resource use and control, therefore 
providing an important means to explore the vertical disparities and power 
relations between and within the different groups of actors (Bourdieu 1985: 
724−725).  
Participant observation in the meetings and in everyday social interaction 
was especially important for understanding the different actors’ multifaceted 
identities and roles, and the social norms and positions of power involved. These 
arenas were fruitful scenes for explaining an array of strategies, from 
negotiations to manipulations, which could be observed in the social 
interactions of different actors, as well as in multifaceted personal and 
professional ambitions and struggles over authority. These situations revealed at 
least some of the discrepancies between what different stakeholders wanted to 
tell a foreign researcher and the everyday reality of the actual events and 
experiences. 
By exploring the social relations and institutional arrangements interwoven 
in the women’s business operations, my aim was to understand the decision-
making mechanisms and the opportunities and constraints that people faced 
when gauging their possibilities of managing microcredit and of operating a 
microenterprise. The diverse forms of creativity, social co-operation and 
“hidden” economic capabilities that clients possessed were carefully considered 
herein, together with the social tensions, cultural norms and political power 
relations that mediated their opportunities to benefit from different business 
ventures (Hietalahti and Nygren 2011). This kind of framework is especially 
relevant when the main interest lies in processes on the local level. On the global 
scale “the Southern poor” easily appear as a homogeneous group, and the 
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differences between the possessions of different resources insignificant. As 
Siisiäinen (2009: 40−43) notes, at the local level, these differences may be 
remarkably relevant and can reveal important differentiations between the 
actors in the social fields.  
The fact that my research questions dealt with delicate issues of people’s 
incomes, livelihood tactics, and personal wishes and hopes made it challenging 
to carry out the interviews in a culturally adequate way. Some of the women 
were reluctant to give details about their sales and earnings, partly because of 
the overall economic and political volatility, partly because of the fear of 
sanctions included in the microcredit programmes and the associated rules of 
group monitoring. In economically volatile and fragile life situations, money is 
considered a highly intimate issue, especially when talking with a stranger.  
Identifying women’s business activities and estimating their earnings was 
further complicated by the daily variability of their market activities and 
earnings. Some of the activities were so sporadic that their significance might 
easily have been underestimated. Many of the women did not calculate profits or 
savings in strict monetary terms but rather estimated them in loose descriptive 
phrases, such as “I earn something” or “My income is little”. Nor did all the 
women differentiate between profits and revenues. The public sector workers’ 
strike in June 2007 did not help the situation. With close to a million 
participants, the strike closed the schools and clinics, which meant that some of 
the principal selling places, the school and clinic yards suddenly had no 
customers. Confronted with such a sudden economic shock, micro 
entrepreneurs were worried about where to find new selling places and markets, 
which ruined their business plans and calculations for weeks. It is also worth to 
note that probably a longer period of fieldwork would have helped to develop the 
techniques necessary to get more accurate income data. 
Overall, people were fairly open about their life situations and loan histories. 
Most informants also commented on their microbusiness experiences and what 
they had heard from others. These narratives often took the form of gossip, 
especially in regard to questions about potential conflict situations. While 
women sometimes assured me that there were no problems within their own 
microcredit group, they were eager to tell about the problems that “they had 
heard about from other groups or other centres”.  
Since I needed to follow the microcredit meeting schedules and drive back 
and forth from one village to another, I normally spent two or three days a week 
in one village, and visited two or three villages a week: interviewing people and 
visiting their homes, farms or market places. Every now and then I spent a day 
at the SEF head office. In the evenings I supplemented my field notes, made 
preliminary analyses of the material gathered and prepared myself for new 
meetings and new interviews. 
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Because of limited time and financial resources, I had to work long days and 
use my time as efficiently as possible. Early on, I was too rushed to ask the 
“right” questions and to collect “enough” data − at the expense of richer data and 
more comfortable interview situations. Even if many women were eager to be 
interviewed, sometimes they simply became tired of the interview and wondered 
why I wanted to ask those kinds of questions. “Don’t you want to hear something 
more interesting for a change?” an interviewee asked me once. As the research 
questions should also be focused on issues of interest and concern to the 
interviewees (Scheyvens et al. 2003b: 182), I began to think if these encounters 
could be made more relaxed. As soon as I realised it was possible to carry out 
interviews coherently without trying to control everything, I started to hear 
colourful stories about weddings in the neighbourhoods, about stocking trips to 
Johannesburg and the “magic powers” of traditional healers. In the end, these 
narratives often best revealed the way social hierarchies or power asymmetries 
were structured and reinforced in people’s minds. Gradually I began to realise 
that the same kinds of narratives were being repeated and not much new 
information was forthcoming. I knew then I had reached a saturation point in 
my research project: I started to have “enough” interviews. 
 
 
Ethical issues  
Confidentality and reciprocity 
Conducting research in a development context generates a number of ethical 
issues that need to be considered at all stages of the research process (Scheyvens 
et al. 2003a: 139,  Sumner and Tribe 2008: 41). These issues became concrete in 
many ways especially during my fieldwork, in the interview situations, in the 
interaction with research participants, as well as when managing and analysing 
the data.  
As the participants must consent to be interviewed, I tried to pay attention to 
the way I introduced myself and described the purposes of my research as well 
as the estimated time for the interviews in order to make sure that the 
informants had an understanding of the interview situation and the research 
project in general (Israel and Hay 2006: 60−67, Scheyvens et al. 2003a: 
142−143). It is difficult, however, to determine to what extent the research 
participants understood my role as a PhD student or the aims and the purposes 
of the research (Scheyvens et al. 2003a: 142). Sometimes interviewees asked if I 
could hire them as assistants or if I could take them to Europe with me. Some 
were enthusiastic about my visit, others were happy to help with my study even 
if they did not believe it would give them anything in return. Many women found 
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the interviews educational (Scheyvens et al. 2003a: 156−157). The question of 
what happened after I left the villages was beyond my control (Scheper-Hughes 
1992: 24). Did their chatting and wandering around with me have any 
consequences for them? Did they read approval or disapproval in my questions 
or my reactions to their stories? Did they or their relatives use the situation to 
pressure or blackmail each other? Did the selected interviews only strengthen 
the prevailing hierarchies among the clients or other villagers (Scheyvens et al. 
2003: 149)? By interfering in these women’s lives, how did I influence the “rules 
of the game”?  
In the same breath, I am cautious of not over-emphasising my role in the 
lives of those I have studied. This was brought home to me when a letter arrived 
in my university mail box in January 2010. I had promised to send some photos 
that one of the SEF clients had asked me to take of him – a client who was not 
amongst my informants, however. When I saw the envelope from South Africa in 
my mail box, I was thrilled: “Ooh, he was so happy that he even sent me a thank-
you letter!”. I ripped open the envelope. “Dear Sir!” the letter started, “you 
remember you visited South Africa and met one legendary man. I have a 
problem. My business building is falling apart, and I have no money to meet the 
repairs. May you please help me…” Apparently he had no clue who I was; just 
one of those many researchers or relief workers he had met in recent years. 
The question of giving something back became concrete in the field one day 
when two interviewees came to ask for money as compensation for the time they 
had sacrificed for several interviews they attended. A large number of studies 
deal with reciprocity and gift giving, especially related to anthropological 
fieldwork. As interviews should not be “bought” (Scheyvens et al. 2003a: 157), I 
decided not to give any money. Giving money might encourage interviewees to 
invent or distort their answers toward what they think the interviewer wants to 
hear; or it might create envy among persons who were not interviewed. I wanted 
to somehow compensate for the time the informants had spent on the 
interviews, however, and after consulting SEF volunteers I brought some cold 
drinks and snacks to a centre meeting. It proved to be a huge mistake. Many of 
these women were trying to earn their living by selling coca cola cans and 
snacks, which meant that I had basically destroyed their income for that day. 
After this event, I decided to give the women mugs after the interviews, which 
proved to be a solution that everybody was content with. There was always a 
shortage of dishes, and they were typically mugs, plates and pans that women 
bought from Chinese and Indian sellers at Christmas time with their carefully 
raised stokvel money. In addition, I tried to help by giving them lifts or repairing 
the meeting places. 
In an effort to establish research circumstances that minimise any potential 
harm for research participants, I also tried to comply with confidentiality and 
safety issues. To protect people's privacy and to avoid hampering their lives, I 
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have changed the names of the informants – both SEF clients as well as the staff 
members – to pseudonyms, and prohibited the access to my field data. The 
names of the villages and SEF branches are also presented in pseudonyms, 
although identifying these settlements may be possible for somebody with an 
interest in doing so. Given the fact that I had chosen the research sites with the 
help of SEF staff, and met clients in the meetings where the SEF staff members 
were present, it is questionable how effective these pseudonyms really are. 
Another question is to what extent I should be concerned about 
confidentiality and pseudonyms. As van der Geest (2003: 16−18) in his article 
about the fieldwork dilemmas in Ghana points out, it is difficult to specify strict 
rules on how to proceed with these issues. After encountering people’s 
disappointment that their real names had not been published and their concern 
that after their  death “they would sink into oblivion” (2003: 17), van der Geest 
began to ponder whether he had been too careful. Scheper-Hughes (1992: 19) 
also mentions that her informants enjoyed seeing their names in published 
journals. As the ethical rules are subject to cultural variations and to topics of 
the study, the researcher’s own strict ethical standards − peculiar to European 
and North American researchers – may in fact turn into ethical paternalism in 
fieldwork (van der Geest 2003: 17−18). One should also note, however, that 
nowadays, especially with the advent of the internet, it is difficult to foresee all 
the possible consequences of interview data becoming public, which is an 
important argument for an ethical requirement to preserve anonymity despite 
interviewees’ wishes. 
Gendered choices 
Since SEF is targeting its services to women in particular and since I am female, 
gendered questions also play a role in this study. A vast literature exists on 
microcredit and poor women in the global South who have managed to improve 
their living standards through business and credit. Just as the romantic notion 
of microcredit as a “magic bullet” for sustainable development lacks coherency 
(Bähre 2007a, Molyneux 2002, Rankin 2002), so do generalisations about 
women and their gendered roles. Southern women are seen as a constituted, 
coherent group (Mohanty 1991: 56−60), who construct their livelihoods through 
social networking, which somewhat automatically provides them a way out of 
poverty. As there is a distinction between the acts of solidarity among group 
members and the mental picture attached to these poor South African women, 
my analysis will be illustrated with context-related examples when discussing 
the lives of women in Limpopo. 
I would not ignore the fact, however, that women and men of Limpopo have 
adopted some gendered behaviour or habitual codes. People spoke largely in 
gendered kinship or ethnic group phrases (cf. Isotalo 2005: 29−30). For 
example, in my discussions with SEF clients, women used the terms “man” and 
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“woman” or “husband” and “wife” when referring to African people; others were 
“Indians”, “Chinese”, “European” or “Whites”. Many interviewed women 
adhered to gendered categories by referring to African men as “swigging lazy-
bones” and women as “responsible” and “hard-working”. As my position in 
relation to different research informants changed over time, it varied in clients' 
discussions, too. It shifted from being the “outsider” to the supposition of a 
“shared subject-position” (Isotalo 2005: 29); from someone who comes from a 
completely different world to an "insider" who “well knows what men are like”. 
Many women faced subjection to men in their daily lives and were less able to 
access resources than men. At the same time, however, these women 
demonstrated remarkable strength and a sense of humour. These characteristics 
are also illustrated in many South African sayings, such as: "If you empower a 
man, you empower a human being. But if you empower a woman, you empower 
a nation." An amusing one was in a text that I saw on some bumper stickers and 
announcements: “Women who seek to be equal to men lack ambition.” Humour 
helped women to escape the reality; at the same time it worked as a method of 
resistance, or a “weapon of the weak” (Scott 1990), when no other means of 
defence were available. 
The fact that most of the SEF clients were women challenged me to interpret 
my research material from a gender perspective. Gender analysis in this study 
implies focusing on the socio-political processes in which a microcredit 
organisation and its clients are engaged. My aim was to explore the relationships 
of women and men, as well as among women themselves, and to understand the 
solidarities and inequalities in the relationships by asking who does what; who 
has what; and who decides. As a woman, I might have been able to capture some 
special features of the women’s gendered trajectories of life and business 
strategies – although it should not be assumed that the same sex of the 
researcher and participants automatically gives greater insight into the situation. 
Most of the material is based on women’s narratives and experiences. In this 
sense, I am only able to reveal the women’s side of the story.  
From a gendered perspective the choice of a male research assistant for a 
study that focuses on poor women in rural South Africa might seem odd. While 
it is often suggested that female interviewees feel more comfortable with and 
speak more freely to a female researcher (Scheyvens et al. 2003b: 170), I did not 
consider it a huge problem that my research assistant was a man. Instead, I felt 
that the lack of a shared language was a much bigger constraint in the 
interaction with SEF clients. In the beginning my plan was to employ a female 
reseach assistant. I met two candidates, but they both became employed on 
other assignments before I started the interviews: one by the government, the 
other by SEF. When I met Bryan, I was impressed by the way he encountered, 
treated and talked with people. This extrovert African man seemed to get along 
with everybody, with me and my interviewees, and he was highly skilled at 
putting everybody at ease in more or less charged situations.  
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Bryan and I represent the same age group. His family belongs to the Black 
middle class; to the radical wing. His mother has a degree from a South African 
university. The family had managed to become wealthy in the agriculture 
business and bought a house in the White area of the town, which was fairly 
sensational even in the early 2000s. On the other hand, Bryan knew the villages; 
he had grown up in one of my research settlements, which he still called “home”. 
Bryan is a warm and funny person, and it is largely to his credit that the 
interviews were sometimes so hilarious and – dare I say – empowering. It is not 
every day that poor women in rural South Africa can so openly have a good 
laugh at their “lazy husbands” with an African man who laughed with them and 
understood them. 
Presuppositions, changing positions and power imbalances 
At an early stage of my research process, I had to ask myself who I was as a 
development researcher and what my personal abilities could achieve. What 
were the relevant questions to be asked and why? These questions were 
associated with a list of issues that shape every research process from design to 
implementation, analysis and the final writing: personal skills, research 
traditions and policies, funding, supervisor’s instructions, and field research 
conditions.  
Organising a field trip to the “other side of the world” requires certain efforts, 
but I managed to arrange everything fairly smoothly. I received a travel grant 
from the Nordic Africa Institute, and a room at the SEF volunteers’ house for a 
couple of weeks. SEF was also helpful with many other practical issues: they 
provided maps, names, phone numbers, statistics and reports that I needed and 
asked for. After staying for a few weeks at an apartment for volunteers in 
Tzaneen, I rented a tiny cottage from an Afrikaner couple on the fringe of the 
town. They had three adult daughters, all married and living in different parts of 
the country. They ran a guest house, and employed a few servants and a 
gardener. My room, with a kitchenette, bathroom, tin roof and no heating, 
became my home base for the rest of the field work period.  
As commonly known, South African hospitality and friendliness are 
remarkable, and the host-family was no exception. The family treated me like a 
guest of honour, invited me to have a nice cup of Ethiopian “child-labour-free” 
coffee, and was eager to hear about life in Finland. The host showed me how to 
barbeque, or braai as they call it in Afrikaans, the most tender meat. During 
those evenings I heard stories about exciting hunting trips to the North; learned 
how to cope with grasping authorites at the border of Mozambique; and was 
advised on how to best protect myself from the haphazard violence so common 
in South Africa. Taking into account the difficult history of the country, I needed 
to consider their counsel carefully. Even though my host family admitted the 
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apartheid regime was oppressive, I soon realised they felt somewhat 
uncomfortable with the present situation, too: “In the past, you could keep your 
gates and doors open and walk on the streets. Now they [Africans] loudly make 
their claims; you simply cannot go anywhere without a gun”, the host explained. 
When I visited Tzaneen for the first time in February-March 2003, it was 
uncommon to see White farmers walking anywhere, even in the town centre; if 
they for some reason did, they always carried a handgun. Bryan, my African 
research assistant, told how his father had bought a house on the fringe of the 
Whites’ area at the turn of the decade. According to him, in those years it was 
impossible for him as a young Black boy to walk on his street after five o’clock in 
the evening:  “Otherwise I would have been shot [by Whites].”   
Safety measures determined my interaction with people, moving from place 
to place and my place of residence during the fieldwork. Because of the 
invisibility and randomness of violence and crime, safety is an issue everywhere 
in South Africa (Bähre 2007a: 16−20). People talked much about violence and 
crime. This talk was somehow slanted and full of exaggerated truths, 
reproducing a constant ambience of threat (Kekäläinen 2006: 8−9). In fact, it 
was sometimes difficult to differentiate between an immediate threat and 
apparent paranoia. When travelling South Africa, tourists, commuters, students 
and researchers are frequently advised not to walk anywhere; not to go to 
townships or Black-populated villages; not to drink too much alcohol; to keep 
doors and barred windows carefully closed; and even to arm themselves.  
It also seemed that Whites and Africans had different understandings of the 
risks and dangers, and how one should manage them. As Bähre (2007a: 17) 
describes his experiences in a South African township, while Whites could 
sometimes be considered as paranoids, for Africans it was a “matter of fact” that 
certain places and situations had to be avoided. In villages, SEF clients 
continually warned about places where “the Whites should not go”. Violence, 
crime and robberies worried the clients, too. Break-ins, robberies and conflicts 
over money with kin were very common. To diminish risks, clients tried to break 
routines by using various routes, and especially if carrying money, changing 
clothes or bags during the day. This information of potential risks and dangers 
was valuable in my field research. It provided a picture of women’s tactics to 
protect themselves from various risks and dangers in their everyday lives. At the 
same time, this information helped considerably in establishing the research 
circumstances that minimised risks – not only for me but for all the research 
participants. After all, I was often assumed to be like “all the Whites”, someone 
with a great deal of money. Little by little, when it became normal for me to go 
around, attend repayment meetings, savour traditional beer at a SEF clients’ 
beerhouse or go to church or other social events, I suppose I managed to allay at 
least some of these suspicions. 
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My position in relation to different groups of research participants varied: I 
was “equal” with some of the SEF head office staff members but clearly at a 
lower level in the hierarchy than some of the staff members in SEF management. 
A shared language notably made interaction with SEF staff easier than with the 
women in villages, in relation to whom the power divisions were starkest. As 
power relationships between the researcher and the informants influence how 
knowledge is interpreted and represented (Mullings 1999, Scheyvens et al. 
2003b), it was especially important to carefully consider how I presented myself 
and the purpose of my study. While no researcher can consistently remain an 
“insider” or an “outsider” (Mullings 1999: 340), I tryid to influence the image the 
research participants had of me. Sometimes I had to assure people that I was 
more “professional” than I actually felt in order to justify my research. 
Sometimes I tried desperately to make villagers “forget” that I was a PhD 
researcher and in this way soften the unvoidable power imbalances.  
In spite of all the geniality, I encountered many warnings, dismay, lousy 
jokes and even discrimination when I told some Whites about my research work. 
The first incident happened at a cafeteria in Tzaneen where I would enjoy lunch 
or a cup of coffee every now and then. The owner began to ask what I was doing 
in South Africa and I told her about my research. “You go to the villages? 
Really?” she said with a sense of aversion. I was still starry-eyed and anxious to 
express how much I enjoyed being in this beautiful country, chatting with people 
and doing my work. “I guess it must be fruitful, if you happen to like that kind of 
work”, she said contemptuously. The final falling-out happened when I brought 
my African companion, a SEF client from a nearby village, to the cafeteria, after 
which she personally never served me again. My Finnish Midsummer party, a 
barbeque for some friends, ended somewhat similarly. The landlady thought it 
was a nice idea, especially because it was midwinter in South African terms, and 
she kindly arranged for salad and wine to be served. The atmosphere changed 
when the couple I rented from realised that I had invited an African man and an 
ethnic Bangladeshi girl to the party without informing them. Subsequently, for 
the remaining two months, they avoided me. I never saw them again.  
It was only afterwards that I realised how the first mental pictures of the 
country – the people I happened to live or talk with or the choices I made, from 
the research question to the first interactions in the research sites – had shaped 
my social personality in the field. As a researcher I was more than an individual 
with my own history, world view and personal motives (Löytty 2006: 24). I had 
to discover myself over and over again, many times painfully. I also realised that 
it was not my task to decide how people in South Africa see and define my role, 
status or intentions, no matter how strong my intention to "do good" or to "give 
a voice to the unheard". Positioning myself as a “White woman” or a “European” 
would have been useless also because these terms had a different meaning for 
me than they had for the people in the Limpopoan villages or SEF offices. 
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Indeed, I was a captive of my "real" and assumed habitus, with multiple 
positionalities. In South Africa I was “European”, “rich”, “woman”, “White”, 
“insolent”, “kind”, “on the wrong side”, “on the right side”, “young”, “adult”, 
“foreigner”, “well-educated”, “SEF staff”, “Nordic academic”, “development 
worker”, “self-seeker”, “altruist”, “insider” or “outsider” − the list is endless and 
changeable. Understanding this helped me realise that the same process occured 
among research participants themselves. Different groups of actors portrayed 
each other as “the other”, defining the others as “insiders” or “outsiders”, “rich” 
or “poor”, “trustworthy” or “unreliable”. All of these terms meant different 
things to different people; they projected prejudices and reflected predominant 
power hierarchies between the various groups of society. 
 
 
Who can speak? 
When my fieldtrip was about to end, one of the SEF managers came to see me 
and said that they were looking forward to reading my research findings. “So, 
when are you going to give a lecture and teach us?” he asked. Maybe he was just 
being ironic, but for me it was a startling question. He continued by asking about 
Finland’s history, ethnic relations, religion and language. “You know, you cannot 
really understand the present if you don't know the past, can you?” he implied. 
He was absolutely right, and this prompted me to reflect on the problem of 
knowledge and the justification of my own research. 
The question of who can speak for others has been discussed in several 
contexts. To quote Rahnema (1997: 395 in Sumner and Tribe 2008: 31), “Who 
am I to intervene in other people’s lives or organisations’ operations when I 
know so little about any life, including my own?”. Perhaps in my case the SEF 
manager tried to signal that I should liberate the “truth” from its Western 
cultural presuppositions. While I certainly agree, for me such signals reveal that 
easy generalisations and assumptions are directed not only towards Southern 
women but also towards “Northern, privileged academics”. Obviously it is of 
significance whether the author of this study is a Finnish scholar who visited 
South Africa a few times; a Boer from Tzaneen; or a Black scholar from Limpopo 
University. But can we make deductions about whose voice is “the most 
authentic” or who would be the most justified to speak for the Limpopoan 
women from such a vague grouping? 
In an ideal world, the informants should be able to speak for themselves. In 
real life, they often cannot. If we do not have a right to talk to people from “other 
worlds”, can we not at this moment question the existence of the field of 
development studies altogether? While not taking the discussion any further in 
this direction, I will note the importance of considering how the research is 
relevant and for whom (Staeheli and Nagar 2002: 168). As Raju (2002: 177) 
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points out, differences exist – but this should not prevent committed research 
that cuts across the boundaries between “developed” and “developing” countries. 
Instead, she calls for the legitimacy of various forms of knowledge. According to 
Staeheli and Nagar (2002: 169), various forms of knowledge should be 
integrated into a research practice “that is democratic in its very construction 
and expression, not just in its goals”.  
While I am conscious of the limitations of my research as an ethnography in 
strict anthropological terms, especially because of the limited time of the 
fieldwork, my study and my attitude towards carrying out research is 
ethnographically oriented. Ethnographic writing is contextually, institutionally, 
and historically situated, which makes it challenging to consider one’s own 
position in relation to the knowledge that is discussed and produced (Alasuutari 
2001: 82−83, Löytty 2006: 24), and in relation to the framework on which the 
analysis is based (Sumner and Tribe 2008: 31). While trying to understand and 
demystify “other” cultures, the aim is also to make familiar cultural practices 
look more unfamiliar, less common and self-explanatory (Alasuutari 2001: 82).  
In the production of knowledge about Limpopoan women and SEF 
microcredit operations, I am aware that I cannot profess universal truths on 
issues that are open to a variety of interpretations (Scheper-Hughes 1992: 23, 
28−30). Thus it has been essential to continuously separate what informants 
said from what I heard or wanted to hear them to say; what I observed; my own 
ideas, the theoretical ideas developed by others; and the kind of voice given to 
the different actors (Sumner and Tribe 2008: 42−43). There is also room for 
serious consideration of how to provide a fair and justified picture of each 
participant’s concerns and opportunities. 
Since fieldwork is a continuous social process featured by unexpected events 
and encounters during which choices must sometimes be made very quickly 
(Heikkinen 2008), decision making in regard to the whole research arrangement 
requires flexibility. This holds true for ethical decisions, too. While I might not 
subscribe to the universal “Kantian code”14 of ethics in research (Scheyvens et al. 
2003a: 140), I have tried to consider my ethical choices carefully throughout the 
research process. In regard to my fieldwork period, my hope is that I managed to 
show respect towards different people and cultures and that I was able to 
recognise and lessen the power imbalances between me and the research 
participants.  
While it is clear that I would not have been able to carry out my study 
without all the research participants’ help, striking a balance between the 
complexities of obligations and interdependencies is not easy (Scheyvens et al. 
                                                 
14 According to this ethical model, the principles of research must be adhered under all circumstances: 
there is no ethical relativism, no flexibility in ethical decisions; and ethical rules are universal with little 
opportunities for ethical decisions based on situational and personal circumstances (Scheyvens et al. 
2003a). 
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2003a: 147). While SEF encouraged an attitude of objectivity in order to 
enhance the quality of research, I did not always feel free of “hidden 
obligations”. Research consists of connections and engagements with different 
research participants, and sometimes I found myself weighed down by the 
desires and pressure of each group of actors. Even so, I am not ready to 
compromise and weaken the analysis by searching for results that would satisfy 
everyone (Scheyvens et al. 2003a: 147). Instead, my aim is to offer a true 
description of events and actions as I have perceived them (Scheper-Hughes 
1992: 25). 
Equally important is the question of accountability, the independence of a 
researcher and the ownership of the research. Whose voice counts? Who 
controls the research process? Who owns the research output (Sumner and 
Tribe 2008: 41−46)? As the research process can also be considered an act of 
power, SEF undoubtedly has better opportunities to control my research results 
than the clients in the villages do. While it is easy to emphasise the story of the 
“less-powered” ones, at the same time, I hope to do justice to SEF, and to 
illustrate how, as an microcredit organisation and thereby as a part of the 
“development machinery”, SEF also struggles with the “mainstreaming”,15 trying 
to find ways to balance between its mission to help the poor and the never-
ending financial pressure from the markets and donors. The criticism presented 
in many parts of this study should be understood as a critique of the microcredit 
rhetoric and microcredit mechanisms per se, and not necessarily of the 
organisation itself. 
It is also worth noting that I write from my own socio-economic, ideological 
and cultural positions, so the picture I paint and the theoretical arguments I 
reflect are coloured by and constructed from this configuration. The results of 
my research do not lay claim to universal truth, and the analysis presented in the 
following chapters does not illustrate all the aspects of these women’s lives or 
organisation’s practices. As Scheper-Hughes (1992: 25) notes, I can only try to 
show “the ways I work in the field, and this way offer the reader a better position 
to evaluate the claims made and the conclusions drawn”. 
 
 
                                                 
15 By this term I refer to the mainstream development thinking in recent years: (i) to the prevalent 
“financial systems approach” to microcredit, in which one the main considerations is to eliminate 
ineffective subsidies and provide services on a financially sustainable basis to a large number of poor 
people, as well as (ii) to the Putnam-oriented thought on social capital, which regard social capital as 
networks of trust and reciprocity that can enhance co-operative goals and at the same time reduce the 
costs of economic transactions.  
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 Microcredit as an arena of struggle  4
 
THIS CHAPTER challenges the simplistic stories of microcredit in which poverty 
is presented as the lack of access to credit, and in which clients achieve a 
renewed purpose in life after joining a microcredit organisation (Karim 2011: 
171). The following analysis of microcredit as an arena of negotiations and trade-
offs reveals that microcredit business is a much more complicated system than 
creating markets around the needs of the poor. The analysis encourages focusing 
more attention on power relations and liabilities within social ties as well as on 
hidden work involved in women’s everyday struggles to earn their living. 
In contrast to the Putnam-oriented considerations of women’s social 
networks as solidarity, microcredit groups and centres in Limpopo appeared to 
be complex and contradictory rather than harmonious sets of social frameworks 
(Bähre 2007a; 2007b, Rankin 2002). The group loan system and joint liabilities 
promoted various anxieties and ambivalent attitudes towards solidarity lending 
within the microcredit groups, particularly when people were struggling with 
scarce resources. Bourdieu’s ideas of social fields as a tensioned arena (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992: 125, Wilshusen 2009a: 393), became concrete in many 
ways at the repayment meetings in particular. Basically, these meetings provided 
forum for strategies ranging from negotiations to manipulations in the social 
interactions between the organisation and its clients, as well as power struggles 
over authority. Strict rules and responsibilities of the organisation promoted 
tensions among poor women, who had little power to negotiate the terms of 
their loans with the microcredit organisation (Karim 2011).  
Although no financial collateral was required, this does not mean that 
lending was unconditional. Different systems of collateral had been created in 
order to ensure that clients repay the loan. High levels of repayment did not 
necessarily mean that the poor clients were successfully lifting themselves out of 
poverty; the repayment rates were high also for reasons of shame, social 
pressure and future microloan availability (Bateman 2010, Karim 2011). By 
appropriating these procedures as part of the disciplinary toolbox (Foucault 
1978), the microcredit organisation institutionalised such forms of behaviour 
(Karim 2011).  
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A micro entrepreneur about to cook chicken soup in her bistro.  
 
The Small Enterprise Foundation 
The story begins  
The story of the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) began in 1992 within the 
context of “poverty and absolute nothingness”, as Tatu, a member of SEF 
management, described women’s living conditions in rural African villages at the 
time. By starting its operations at a little house farm in one of the rural villages, 
SEF aimed at helping poor women to meet their needs through small loans. In 
those days, rural villages offered few basic social services for their inhabitants, 
much less any type of financial services. Lack of cash was a continuous problem; 
most poor people were desperately dependent on state transfer payments. The 
aim of the first SEF microcredit project, the Micro Credit Programme (MCP), 
was to help the poor to increase their incomes and savings through micro loans, 
which in the beginning amounted to 400 rand16 per client. According to the 
establishers of the SEF, even such loan made a difference:  
 
 
                                                 
16 400 ZAR = 34 EUR (24 February 2013) 
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About 15, 16 years ago there was nothing. People really couldn't have an 
access to any type of finance or anything. Maybe there was more work at that 
time for those who were working. But at that time, there was a great need. 
And when we started giving these loans, the first loans were 400 rand per 
person, then 500, and then it went on. And that little bit of money was a lot 
to them.  
Tatu,17 member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 11 July 2007 
In the villages women always had their hands full of work. Taking care of a 
family was their main worry. They looked after the children and old people while 
their husbands were away – if they had a husband at all. As such work was not 
profitable in financial terms, and women were obliged to make a living however 
they could, an opportunity for a loan to start a business meant a small 
revolution. The first women as loan takers started to occupy themselves as 
farmers and dressmakers. They established tax-shops, small grocery stores, and 
started to bake and sell bread. According to Tatu, the everyday life practices, new 
businesses and the ability to earn their own money made the women happy: 
 
They were working very well. And you saw people grow, you could see it 
happening. They grew so well and so fast.... And you saw how happy they 
were and how they thought themselves important by doing this, by taking the 
loan and being able to pay. They were very proud of that. And we saw how 
much they appreciated what we were doing for them.  
Tatu, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 11 July 2007 
SEF also grew fast, and its programmes soon spread around Limpopo. Today, 
with its 87,273 active clients in the Limpopo, Eastern Cape, North-West and 
Mpumalanga provinces, SEF is one of the biggest microcredit organisation in 
South Africa (SEF 2012: 1–3).  
SEF has two credit programmes targeted at the poor: The original Micro 
Credit Programme (MCP), and the Tšhomisano Credit Programme (TCP),18 
which started in 1996, and which currently makes up 77% of SEF’s clients (SEF 
2011: 3). According to the SEF’s own evaluation, the TCP clients are the poorest 
of the poor. The evaluation is based on the utilised Participatory Wealth Ranking 
system, where the income level of R920 per month functions as a poverty line 
for a household with five members (SEF 2008: 3). In MCP, clients need to have 
at least six months’ business experience prior to the loan being granted, while in 
TCP no previous business experience is required.  
                                                 
17 The names of the SEF staff members have been changed to pseudonyms. 
18 Tšhomisano is a northern Sotho word and means “working together” in English. 
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In theory, the principles in the TCP and MCP programmes are the same. In 
practice, however, TCP loans tend to be smaller, and as TCP clients are defined 
as less experienced in running and managing businesses, the field staff members 
are supposed to dedicate more time to support TCP clients in problem solving 
and business planning. The maximum loan size for new clients without business 
experience is 700 rand; subsequent loans are based on individual and group 
performance in regard to saving, repayment and attendance in the meetings, as 
well as the existing business size, measured by the stock, savings, cash, debtors 
and capital expenditure.  
Similar to most of the microcredit organisations, the Small Enterprise 
Foundation focuses its programmes on poor women, because with lower 
income-generating capacity and less access to education, formal sector 
employment and social security benefits, they are considered to represent a 
more disadvantaged section of the population (cf. Hossain and Rahman 2001, 
Hossain et al. 2011). An important reason for SEF to focus on women was also 
that women are considered to be more responsible in terms of productive 
investments and loan repayments and they usually share their incomes with 
other household members, thus distributing the benefits of microcredit more 
widely within the family. Currently, 99% of all the SEF clients are women (SEF 
2011). Typical business operations include fruit, juice, beer, tobacco and 
vegetable hawking, selling new and used clothes, running of small grocery shops, 
or dressmaking and other kinds of sewing jobs. 
The mission of SEF is to “work aggressively towards the elimination of 
poverty” with a vision of a “world free of poverty” as a driving force beyond its 
operations (SEF 2012: 2). By stressing poor people’s own responsibility in 
finding pathways out of poverty, SEF emphasises the role of clients as 
committed agents in fostering feasible forms of income generation and social 
empowerment. What is left to SEF is to create an enabling environment by 
ensuring that each client received an appropriate loan: neither too big to handle, 
nor too small to prevent the flourishing of the business. A member of SEF 
management explained this mission as follows:  
 
What SEF is for is to support people so that they can change their own lives. 
To give them an appropriate sum of money and hopefully to create a group 
environment that is supporting them, so that they can create a business, grow 
in a business, and be successful. 
Josef, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 13 July 2007 
Such a strategy is in line with the idea of supporting the entrepreneurship of the 
disadvantaged, where the poor who were previously considered as passive 
receivers of aid are now seen as creative agents of their own development. “We 
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don’t give women bread but flour, and teach them how to bake and turn it into a 
profit-making business”, as the popular global slogan of microcredit rhetoric 
declares.  
SEF has adapted the principles of its group loan system from a stokvel type of 
lending strategy − networking with friends and neighbours for financial and 
social support − and institutionalised them through a strict group formation 
policy. By joining a group, clients are supposedly able to have access to group 
resources and transform them into other forms of capital (cf. Bourdieu 1985). 
SEF required no financial collateral; according to SEF rules, the group of 
borrowers functioned as the collateral for SEF. In other words, repayment was 
based on joint liability among the members of the microcredit group. A new 
group typically consisted of five persons whose businesses had to be of a similar 
size. If one member failed to repay the loan, other members contributed for that 
person, so the group as a whole could continue its activities. The rule was that 
clients as a group first repaid the loans to SEF, and after that, claimed 
outstanding debts from those in the group who did not pay on time. This made 
group formation a precondition for a well-functioning microcredit organisation. 
In order to make the group loan system work, SEF based its services on strict 
rules and monitoring, and encouraged its clients to establish groups with 
persons whom they trusted and whom they would be willing to help in the case 
of need. Clients could not be family members but they had to know each other 
well, and live within “calling distance” from each other. The group formation 
process was routinized so that before getting the loans, the groups had to go 
through a specific group recognition process, in which, besides answering a list 
of practical questions, members had to be able to show where their group mates 
lived.  
Microcredit hope 
In the eyes of SEF clients, the microloan was seen as a chance for a better 
standard of living. Women decided to join SEF’s programmes when they heard 
success stories about clients who had managed to build or renovate a house or to 
pay their children’s school fees with the help of a microloan. Their mission with 
microcredit was to assure themselves a more secure future, if not for themselves, 
at least for their children or grandchildren. “I was having financial difficulties, so 
I decided to join SEF”, Lorah, SEF client from Mosetsana, explained to me.19 
“We would get specific money for buying the stock. That’s why we joined”, or “I 
realised that I was able to take the kids to school”, said many others. 
                                                 
19 The names of the SEF clients, SEF staff members, research villages and SEF branches have been 
changed to pseudonyms.  
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What made SEF especially valuable in the eyes of its clients was that the 
services came in the form of cash. As Davina, SEF client from rural Pekenene 
engaged in the bed-clothing business explained, it is money that matters: “If you 
are poor, the most important thing is money. That’s what you need. It’s money 
that can transform your life.” Equally significant for women was that SEF 
provided credit without a need for financial collateral. While Limpopo was full of 
so-called “un-bankable” households (Baumann 2004b), the situation for African 
women was especially troubled. Although bank services were expanding even to 
the most remote villages, and cash points were becoming increasingly common 
in both semi-urban and rural settlements, this did not solve the problem of 
unavailable credit services. The micro savings and credit for the poorest were of 
little interest to the commercial banks, because of high risks and transaction 
costs. While many commercial banks offered special stokvel accounts, the strict 
terms and prices of the services were too high for the poorest. For many poor 
African women in Limpopo, SEF was their first encounter with a formal system 
of loan and savings. The transition from an informal economy into the western-
style bank world appeared to them as a leap into the unknown. In a certain 
sense, SEF – although it represented a “formal world” institution – was able to 
ease clients’ entry into the official financial services by bringing these services 
into the villages, within the clients’ reach. 
What clients also appreciated was the SEF repayment plan: loans from R500 
to R10,000 to be paid back within 4−10 months with an interest rate of 16−40% 
(SEF 2006). Such loan terms sounded reasonable compared to the loan sharks, 
the mashonishas, who were often the only option in rural villages – and with 
whom women always compared SEF services. With the exception of some 
interviewed women, most clients did not complain about SEF interest rates. This 
was because in the social world of SEF clients, only two forms of interest existed, 
that of the microcredit organisation and that of the mashonishas (Karim 2011: 
82–83). In absolute terms the interest rate surely was high, and there was no 
guarantee for SEF clients that they would be able to take care of the repayment, 
not to speak of their responsibilities in the case of their group members’ 
default.20  
The fact that the SEF loan could be paid in a series of bi-weekly or monthly 
payments made it manageable for clients. With mashonishas the price for a 300 
rand loan for a month was 150 rand, to be paid all at once. The mashonishas 
asked for identity documents or bank cards as collateral. At the end of the month 
they withdrew the money from the client’s bank account, or if there was not 
sufficient coverage in the account, they came to the debtor’s home and 
confiscated furniture or other items of sufficient value. Many had difficulties in 
paying their debts to loan sharks in time; thus there were few other choices but 
                                                 
20 However, it is also important to note herein that the reason for arrears hardly was the high interest 
rate alone.  
 72 | MICROCREDIT AS AN ARENA OF STRUGGLE 
to take a new loan. As the interest of the loan was compounded every month, the 
sum of the debts easily accumulated to amounts difficult to repay. In this 
respect, it is not surprising that most interviewed clients considered SEF as a 
good and helpful organisation. “SEF is basically an extra hand”, Lina from 
Mosetsana, characterised SEF’s role in her life and livelihoods. Bina, SEF client 
from Pekenene, lauded that “having SEF, you have peace of mind”.  
 
 
Microcredit rules and ambiguous loyalties 
It became soon clear to me during the interviews that instead of giving and 
keeping the peace among clients, microcredit group loan model also promoted 
various anxieties and tensions among them. Rather than being based solely on 
solidarity and close ties with neighbours, as Putnam’s (2000, 2003) arguments 
on social capital are often interpreted, women’s associational life and 
involvement in microcredit programmes in Limpopo were complex and also 
entailed involuntary solidarity; the same kinds of implications have been 
illustrated by a number of other researchers (Bähre 2007a; 2007b, Cleaver 
2005, Lee 2009, Maclean 2010, Mayoux 2001, Molyneux 2002, Rankin 2001).  
Limpopoan women made a clear distinction between people whom they 
considered as family members, neighbours, friends or community members, 
accompanied by explanations of whom they would be ready to help. These 
characterisations were further differentiated through various social and financial 
associations and microcredit programmes. Some women based their stokvels on 
a long-term friendship and were ready to take risks for others. Some others 
belonged only to communal burial societies whose members they hardly knew 
and with whom the rules of reciprocity did not exist.21 In many cases, stokvel 
members and microcredit group mates were specifically “neighbours” or 
“friends”: those “who lived nearby” or people who were known well and trusted. 
Sometimes women established microcredit groups with people they hardly 
knew; in those cases forming of a group was just a requisite for getting a loan.22  
In general, good neighbourliness was an important relationship in the lives of 
Limpopoan women. Neighbours were people from the same street or nearby, 
with whom one interacted more or less on a daily basis. Neighbours helped each 
other in many ways, by cooking, going shopping in town together or watching 
each other’s houses when the dwellers were gone. They were important sources 
of social capital and crucial in business development and everyday survival. 
                                                 
21 It is also worth to note that the interviewed women typically joined or established a stokvel only 
when they had a regular income.  
22 See more in chapter 5.  
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Rahma, SEF client from Leloba, described the system of reciprocal favours as 
follows: 
 
Rahma: Every month we come together. Then we talk, we do this and that, 
we help each other. If somebody, a friend or a family member has passed 
away, then we go there and work and help with everything, doing catering 
and everything.  
Interviewer: If you are needed somewhere else, is there anybody who can 
help you? 
Rahma: Yes, I ask the lady from the house next door. If my customers come I 
tell her that this one you’ll give to this person and so on. And they pay her, 
they give her the money and when I come back, she gives me the money. 
That’s what I also do when she’s not in. She’s cooking, I serve the people, and 
they pay me.  
Rahma, MCP client in Leloba, 5 July 2007 
While it was common to ask a relative to help by giving money and consider 
such a transfer as a gift, not a loan, such a system was not conceivable among 
neighbours, however. If money was involved, women always considered the aid 
as a loan and expected the money to be paid back, sooner or later (Nygren and 
Myatt-Hirvonen 2009). Altruism, which according to Putnam (2000: 117) is an 
important sign of social capital, and would facilitate co-operation, foster norms 
of reciprocity as well as encourage economic productivity, could not be taken for 
granted. As SEF clients described the prevailing features of reciprocity: 
“Everybody takes care of their own family”; “If you take a loan, you must pay it 
back”; “I help my family, not the neighbours or the poor.”  
In the interviews, women demonstrated ambivalent attitudes towards joint 
liabilities and requisites for solidarity lending. People spoke of their microcredit 
group members as “sisters” and emphasised the necessity “to help a fellow 
member when she gets in trouble”, while at the same time remarking that “you 
can’t trust anyone”, “you don’t help anybody else except your own family” and 
“you shouldn’t involve other people in your problems”. These comments 
implicate that people had few financial means for solidarity. As Bähre (2007a: 
172) describes the situation in the solidarity networks in Cape Town, there were 
too many fellows with severe problems and too little money to help them, while 
people also needed to take care of themselves. The contrast between the 
idealistic speeches of solidarity, and the suspicions circulating over who benefits 
from which businesses and on what grounds, was a striking characteristic of the 
everyday politics of microcredits (Hietalahti and Nygren 2011). 
Concern over liabilities and loan repayments complicated the women’s 
solidarity towards each other and influenced their willingness to participate in 
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collective actions. Stiffened competition and household expenditures caused 
pressure, and increased suspicion towards neighbours’ businesses and 
intentions directly affected the opportunities of SEF clients to maintain 
reciprocal social networks. Groups experienced a range of repayment problems, 
and clients complained about untrustworthy group members. In these cases, 
solidarity appeared only as a rule of the programme: “That’s what they have told 
us; that we must help each other”, as some clients formulated the matter.  
Although the SEF microcredit groups were supposed to be formed on the 
basis of existing trust relations with friends and neighbours, in reality, many 
women joined a group simply by replacing somebody else. A number of 
interviewed women told me how they first followed centre meetings from a 
distance, and when someone left a group, they offered to replace that client: 
 
I used to come here time and time again, not belonging to any specific group 
… until I got to know people who later formed this group. 
I started by knowing a person who left the group. I got interested. I used to 
come around; from a distance you are not able to learn anything, but when 
you come around, that’s when you get more information. Then I joined them 
around April this year. 
Group interview of three MCP clients in Pekenene, 21 June 2007 
Consequently, the rules for group formation remained somewhat artificial and 
the composition of the groups was at great risk of becoming fairly 
heterogeneous. In this respect, formation of the group in many cases was not 
very “formal”. Instead of being able to “use their information to find the best 
partners” and “exclude the risky ones”, as Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 
(2005: 89) describe the ideal of group formation, for Limpopoan women group 
formation was often a more haphazard process. The multifaceted struggles to 
earn their living forced SEF clients to be flexible in the search for model group 
members. Clients could not always be too selective; an urgent need for credit 
sometimes pressured the groups to accept nearly anyone as a member, even 
persons they hardly knew. Although SEF designated strict rules for group 
formation, such rules applied only to new groups. If the composition of the 
groups changed later, it happened informally among clients: SEF did not provide 
an official group recognition process and training for new replacements who 
entered the group. In these cases, business training was the group members’ 
responsibility. 
Many of the SEF clients interviewed regretted that it was difficult to get 
sufficient information on each person’s background. Clients did not always know 
what their group members’ economic situation was. People not only tried to hide 
their financial situations, but their situations also changed within short periods 
of time due to unemployment, sporadic earnings and claims from household 
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members and other relatives. The situation was further complicated by various 
rumours circulating about those who would be useful for the microcredit group 
and those who would only cause problems.  
SEF fieldworkers were aware of clients’ problems in group formation, but did 
not interfere except by trying to clarify the rules to clients. As Lineah, one of the 
branch managers, explained: “We only tell them to go and form a good group. 
Some women, who just want the money, pick new members here and there, then 
they come and take the money and we experience the problem later.” SEF firmly 
believed, however, that clients eventually made reasonable choices. Thandi, one 
of the development facilitators, observed that clients did not approve of anti-
solidarity or criminality in their communities: “If somebody is tsotsi [gangster], 
clients don’t approve her. They say no, you must go and look for the right 
people; we don’t want her, because she’s tsotsi.”  
Unfortunately, not all clients were honest people. The haphazard group 
formation process, burdened by the pressure to find a new member quickly, left 
room for individuals who were looking for quick earnings, who managed to 
infiltrate a group and get a loan, but who then took a taxi to Johannesburg and 
disappeared, leaving the others to repay. The problem was that if one member of 
a microcredit group proved to be insolvent, the other members first had to pay 
on her behalf, find a new member to replace her, and only then were able to 
apply for a new loan. Firm establishment of the group could take a few loan 
cycles, months, even years. The slow progress in suitable group formation 
became evident in many interviews: 
 
Sara: There have been members who have left. So we need to find members 
to replace them. 
Interviewer: Why did these members leave? 
Sara: Most times we find that people who have left us, they took SEF money, 
and their businesses didn’t go well. Then the only thing to do is to renounce 
your membership because you aren’t able to pay. 
Interviewer: Did they just leave or did you make them leave? 
Sara: If it’s a serious case then... we all have to raise money to cover for this 
person. If this happens repetitively, you don’t have a choice; you just make 
the client leave. 
Sara, MCP client in Pekenene, 8 June 2007 
We started in 2005 with some people, and my group was not working very 
well. We had two members who were not paying. For four months we were 
busy covering and paying their arrears. After that we expelled them and took 
new members.  
Anna, group interview of three MCP clients in Pekenene, 7 June 2007 
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A sense of frustration at the problematic group formation was apparent in 
clients’ group names. Although the clients’ expectations and hopes for the 
microcredit groups were reflected in group names such as “Gathering”, “Grace”, 
or “Love Each Other”, sometimes these expectations remained only fantasies. No 
wonder groups often decided to change their name when defaulting clients were 
replaced, as if it were a sign of a new beginning and new hope. Ironically, group 
names included “Battle” or “Sorrow”.  
Considering the SEF clients’ vulnerable socio-economic situation, liabilities 
shared within the group, and the fact that issues over money were not openly 
discussed even with close relatives, it was fairly surprising that the women 
entrusted the sharing of their business affairs to persons whom they barely knew 
(Bähre 2007a). Clients entrusted their money to other group members even if 
they knew they might not get it back. The ambivalent relations meant that trust 
could never be established completely and clients co-operated without 
completely trusting others (Bähre 2007a: 172). Some SEF clients in the 
interviews stated that they did not like to talk about or deal with other people 
over money, but because they were poor, “they had no choice” (cf. Collins et al. 
2009). As Bähre (2007a: 172) remarks, co-operation sometimes occurs without 
trust because it is the only option. 
Challenges in group formation, loan repayments and clients’ other struggles 
were reflected in high drop-out rates in SEF programmes. As it became clear in 
the interviews, most of the groups had had replacements at some point. This 
observation is in line with SEF statistics, according to which drop-out rates from 
SEF microcredit groups are relatively high: In June 2012 the figure was 17.6% 
(SEF 2012: 6); in 2007, when the fieldwork of this study was carried out, the 
figure reached 21% (SEF 2007: 5).  
At this point, it is worth noting that the high drop-out rates do not 
automatically indicate clients’ over-indebtedness or dissatisfaction with SEF as 
such. Sometimes women simply wanted to take a break from their businesses or 
found new employment opportunities, and the group had to recompose itself. 
However, based on the interviews, and according to SEF’s own evaluations, the 
most common reasons for leaving the group were lack of interest, getting 
robbed, a spouse who opposed a group loan, or problems with loan repayments 
(SEF 2008: 6).  
While high drop-out rates indicate many membership changes in the groups, 
they also imply another serious problem in group formation. New members with 
smaller starters’ loans, and possibly no business skills and assets had to 
guarantee the larger loans taken by long-term clients, which further increased 
the disproportion between clients. As typical of microcredit, a number of 
repayment problems in the interviewed groups were caused by mixed income 
levels and internal inequality. In heterogeneous groups the income gap between 
better- and worse-off clients could grow markedly, causing envy and the risk of 
free-riding. 
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This is characteristic – and unavoidable – of a group loan system that 
implements fixed, generally accepted rules only regarding liabilities that clients 
as a group, as one unit, have to the organisation. In this kind of system joint 
security operates only at the institutional level, between the organisation and the 
group; among group members no uniform code for repayment and 
reimbursement exists. This means that there is no clear code on the terms under 
which financial obligations to the organisation are covered and shared among 
clients; how and when reimbursement to group members takes place; what will 
be done if a member cannot pay her share of the reimbursement; or whether 
there are interests or fines involved.   
Although flexibility of rules may – sometimes even more efficiently – lead to 
the desired end result, it makes it easier for the rules to become objects of 
exploitation. It is surprising how little notice it is paid in the microcredit 
programmes to the contradiction between the requirements of the strict rules 
and the limited abilities of women to follow these rules amidst the adverse group 
mechanisms and the struggles over power.  
 
 
Different systems of collateral 
Social disciplinary technologies in loan recovery  
In the SEF microcredit system, loan applications, loan repayments and group 
formations were approved at repayment meetings that in Limpopo were called 
“centre meetings”. A minimum of two – but typically from 8 to 12 – microcredit 
groups formed a “centre”, which was responsible for arranging the repayment 
and savings meetings, the idea being that through meetings people would learn 
to make informed decisions and feel socially committed to obeying the rules. 
Each centre had to meet every two weeks, and was run by clients who had been 
elected to act as the centre leaders – chair, secretary and treasurer – together 
with the help of the development facilitator, DF. No absence was allowed 
without an apology and a good reason. If a group member was absent from the 
meeting and did not pay, the other members either went to her to ask for an 
explanation, or they paid on her behalf and then pressured her to pay 
afterwards.  
Centre meetings generally proceeded according to a specific agenda. 
Typically, one meeting took for one and a half to two hours. Each meeting 
started with a prayer or a hymn and the clients pledged to repay the loans and 
help each other. After a roll call and savings and repayments collection, clients 
paid possible transport fares and fines; penalties were imposed in the form of 
fines for coming late, for absence, for noise-making, for ring of the telephone 
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and for general disorder. Typically, the collected money was divided between the 
clients at the end of year or used for travelling expenses for those who deposited 
repayments and savings in the bank in town. In Lamune, clients bought plates or 
chickens at the end of the year. Those who did not follow the rules could not 
benefit from the pot of money. As clients explained: “If you are unable to pay the 
fines, at the end of the year you won’t get any plate. You don’t get anything from 
us”. After the fines, clients made new loan applications and went through loan 
utilisation checks. After skills development and training, the minute book was 
signed and clients said the closing prayers.  
While SEF provided fairly strict guidelines for these meetings, each centre 
had an opportunity to write its own constitutions, codes of conduct and 
functions. The idea was that the development facilitator would intervene only 
when consulted in order to ensure that SEF guidelines were correctly followed 
(Sorensen 2006: 3). In practice, however, development facilitators actively 
controlled the successful completion of the programme.  
SEF had created different systems of collateral in order to ensure that the 
clients would repay their loans. Typically this was done by applying strict rules 
and using various social disciplinary technologies: public reprimand in the 
centre meetings or extending repayment liabilities to husbands or other 
relatives. The prevalent usage of fines is another example of the disciplinary 
rules among SEF clients: if the clients did not obey the rules, they were 
punished, which is typical for a political covenant based on strict monitoring. 
How these punishments were operationalised varied between centres and 
between the authorities. In some centres, rules and arrangements were 
negotiated, while in others there was no room for clients’ own interpretation, 
even when the clients felt that the rules or procedures did not follow the letter of 
the law or the code of good manners. Repayments were enforced by detailed 
monitoring and by simply refusing to let anyone leave the centre meeting until 
all the money was paid. My field diary notes describe the main events of one 
such meeting as follows:23 
 
There were supposed to be 55 people in the meeting but only 30 of them 
actually arrived. Two of the groups had problems with their repayments. A 
client who was supposed to deposit her instalment at the post-bank, never 
arrived. The other four arrived, and claimed that this person “had lost the 
money”. Two of the group members went after her; DF told them to do so, 
because the money had to be found. Because of this, the meeting was 
postponed for approximately 20 minutes, and everyone simply waited. DF 
and the chair who were running the meeting continually enquired after the 
money; they put strong pressure on the group. Other groups also interfered 
and said that the missing woman should pay the money immediately so that 
                                                 
23 Originally written in Finnish. 
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the meeting could continue; and if she was not able to pay, SEF should do 
something about it. What finally happened was that the two clients who went 
after the member “who had lost the money” never came back to the meeting! 
Thus, the remaining two who were still there were forced to pay the missing 
money, and that’s what they eventually did. 
Field diary notes, centre meeting in Lamune, 4 June 2007 
This description is not unique; there were problems and interruptions in several 
meetings. During the fieldwork for my Master’s thesis, I attended a centre 
meeting in which the development facilitator had invited a shouting, cane 
waving man to make sure that women repaid their loans. Ironically, this centre 
meeting was held in a local court house; as the development facilitator described 
it, “the place where the criminals get what they deserve”.  
In the practices on the ground, the group leaders played a crucial role; they 
were the development facilitators’ right-hand women. According to SEF rules, 
each group selected a leader among themselves. The role of the group leader was 
to control financial responsibility, discipline and attendance at the meetings. 
The leader helped other members in loan-related issues such as delivering the 
slips, filling in the forms, and making loan proposals to SEF officers. This means 
that as the group leaders and the centre chair were more involved in money 
collection and bookkeeping, and more in touch with SEF fieldworkers, they were 
also better aware of SEF rules and operations as well as clients’ savings and 
financial positions.  
In a certain sense centre meetings thus strengthened existing power relations 
by giving increasing authority to the centre leaders, who were often already in a 
more privileged position than ordinary clients. As the social interactions 
between differently positioned actors may reproduce relationships of inequality, 
those who were in a good position might capitalise upon their status through 
improved access to information and control over others. In Limpopo, group 
leaders were in a key position and they also used this position to strengthen their 
social status. The differentiation between various positions became also clear in 
the interviews with “average” clients, who considered group leaders as 
“supporters” and themselves as “just members” without any specific tasks in the 
group.  
This said, it is equally important to note that despite their higher position 
among SEF clients, group leaders and other persons with responsibility in the 
centre also mentioned many drawbacks in their position. Although the group 
leaders and centre leaders typically enjoyed various advantages in the form of 
economic and symbolic capital, not all clients were willing to take on leadership. 
These tasks meant extra work without any direct financial compensation. The 
reluctance became well illustrated in a centre meeting in Pekenene, in which 
none of the clients were willing to accept the post of centre secretary. After a 
 80 | MICROCREDIT AS AN ARENA OF STRUGGLE 
short but intense dispute, the centre literally forced the client who had 
previously acted as secretary to continue in the assignment; she had no other 
choice.  
These positions also required a delicate balance between the loyalties felt 
towards peer-clients and the requirements related to the leaders’ duties. Perhaps 
because of this situation, these leaders had typically adopted various social 
positions. In the interviews, this was illustrated in the way they on the one hand 
emphasised their role as front-runners, and on the other hand pointed out the 
difficulties they faced due to poverty, poor education and general insecurity.  
As the authority among clients was centred on group leaders, centre chairs 
and better-off clients, and as the rules were continuously re-negotiated, they 
were not internally coherent but instead subject to various conflicts and power 
plays. The paradox of such a system emerged during conflicts in particular, yet it 
was the responsibility of the clients and the fieldworkers to manage these 
situations. The flexibility made it possible for group leaders and development 
facilitators to operate and interpret the “rules” in a variety of ways. These 
included creating rules arbitrarily or making clients pay in the centre meetings 
in one way or another. It was not unusual for the chair of the centre meeting to 
humiliate those members who could not pay or who came to the meeting late by 
publicly reprimanding them. As I describe in my field diary notes from one of 
the meetings, the greatest pressure in that meeting came from centre leaders:  
 
The chair seems to have an “interesting” attitude towards “ordinary” clients, 
who act fairly submissively; these ladies surely have assumed the authority. 
They sit on their chairs in the front, keep giving orders and sigh loudly every 
time somebody has problems.24  
Field diary notes, centre meeting in Lamune, 4 June 2007 
The strict rules created not only tensions but also mistrust towards SEF staff and 
centre chair among the clients. At best, their role was to help in problematic 
situations or in training the clients, and at worst, in abusing their position and 
institutionalising the humiliation of the clients in order to force them to repay or 
improve their savings. In the interviews group leaders justified their actions by 
referring to their responsibility to “sort out the issues”. As one of them 
explained, it was important to take an authoritative attitude towards clients in 
conflicting situations: “I intervene and say: ‘You! Sit down! Get together and 
stop these arguments!”  
Development facilitators asserted the significance of repayment meetings by 
referring to them as the “only places where the problems could be solved”. 
Thandi, one of the development facilitators, stressed strict discipline in the 
                                                 
24 Originally written in Finnish. 
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meetings; otherwise the vicious circle of moral hazard dilemmas would take 
over: “If a member runs away, the group typically starts to have problems. They 
don’t come to meetings, they do not save, and they have repayment problems. If 
the group stops coming to meetings you have to confront them and ask why. If 
you ignore it, they stop saving and they will have repayment problems.”  
For development facilitators, taking an active role in the loan recovery 
processes was encouraged by economic incentives. If one group member failed 
to repay her loan instalment, the other members put pressure on her to recover 
the money. If they failed, the branch manager put pressure on the development 
facilitator to ensure that “SEF guidelines were correctly followed”. If the 
development facilitator failed, it affected his or her salary. There was thus much 
pressure on each group of actors involved in the SEF loan recovery process (cf. 
Karim 2011: 89). 
For clients, the possibility of getting future loans was an incentive to repay 
their loans. As typical of microcredit rules, SEF contracts were self-enforcing in 
that subsequent loans were based on earlier individual and group performance. 
The loan amount depended on the savings, arrears, business value and 
involvement in the repayment meetings. The clients were encouraged to save a 
small amount of money on a two-week basis as part of the membership criteria. 
Before the disbursement of the first loan, the groups had to open a group savings 
account and demonstrate their ability to save. These savings along with the 
repayment performance affected the group ranking in creditworthiness within 
the next loan cycle. If a client did not save at least three times during the loan 
cycle, was in arrears more than once, was absent from the repayment meetings 
four or more times and if her business value had decreased, she or her group 
might not receive a higher loan – or a loan at all. 
Despite SEF pressure on the clients to save, relatively few clients were able to 
contribute to the savings account, and the average size of deposits was low: 
according to the interview data, in the rural villages of Pekenene (MCP 
programme) and Mosetsana (TCP) clients saved an average of R10–20 and in 
semi-urban settlements of Lamune and Leloba (MCP) an average of R20–40 a 
month. 
The better-off clients, who would have been able to save more, typically used 
separate accounts for personal savings. This was partly because they wanted to 
differentiate their personal items from the “business savings”. On the other 
hand, they did not want other clients or the development facilitator to discover 
how much money they had deposited into their bank accounts. Even if SEF 
savings were personal, they were deposited in a group account and also served as 
collateral for the loans. Although the agreement of all group members was 
required to withdraw the savings, if some group members could not pay, others 
could withdraw the money to cover her debt. Some MCP clients from Lamune 
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told me that the development facilitator also utilised this information as 
leverage: “She knows our books. She knows that we have money.” 
Although SEF adjudicated the loan applications, the final loan application 
procedure was largely in the hands of peer microcredit groups; they could 
recommend adjusting the next loan either up- or downwards. This caused 
tensions between groups, as the following quotation illustrates: 
 
Elli: We had a problem in the past when I fell sick and could not work much. 
It affected our repayments. When we requested for a loan, they refused to 
give us the amount we wanted in the meeting; you know the system where we 
go aside and they decide. This was because we had some problems with past 
repayments. We got money but not the amount we wanted, we got less. But 
then, we sat down as a group; I know it’s not good to have these kinds of 
problems, so if we are ever going to have problems, it will not be because of 
late repayments or anything like that anymore. So we are working on that. 
Interviewer: How did you feel about it? 
Elli: Well, it’s a bit painful. I mean if I requested for a thousand now, and 
after that would need even more … Unfortunately it happened that the other 
people got mad. 
Elli, TCP client in Lorraine, 27 June 2007 
No wonder SEF clients were really struggling to keep their repayment records 
clean. As they described in the interviews, eventually there was always someone 
who paid: this could be a husband, mother, sister or neighbour. Although SEF 
clients received their loans individually, and the group members primarily took 
joint liability for the loan repayment, this rule thus existed as rhetoric. The loan 
repayments were hardly the concern of an individual or a single group alone. As 
a last resort, the centre, community and kin operated as social collateral for SEF 
microloans. This unwritten rule was institutionalised as a common practice by 
SEF management as well. As a member of SEF management explained: “Usually 
the husband has to know that the wife is taking a loan, so if he’s happy with it, 
then he is also partly responsible if she doesn’t pay.”  
Complexity of rules and responsibilities  
Despite the dilemmas that emerged every now and then, most of the interviewed 
women claimed that their microcredit group had no repayment problems. This 
did not, however, mean that the groups did not have to struggle to get the 
repayments. Many groups had difficulties in paying the loans; it was just that 
such problems were usually managed privately before the centre meetings and 
beyond the reach of the SEF registers.  
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In practice, SEF clients tried to assure good repayment records in the groups’ 
own meetings before the official centre gatherings. Successful repayments at 
these group meetings were of great concern for SEF clients. As a SEF client in 
Pekenene explained, her group always came to her house one or two days before 
the centre meeting. If a group member could not pay, the others were informed 
beforehand in order to find ways to cover for her. In this way clients could also 
avoid possible public shaming: “When we go to the meeting, no-one gets 
embarrassed”, this client explained.  
Nevertheless, even clients’ own meetings could not always solve the problem 
of defaults. At worst, some clients went as far as they utilised the methods of 
loan sharks in order to get their money back. As a MCP client in Lamune 
explained, if a group member did not pay her debts, she eventually went to her 
house and took anything saleable: “Then I take the money to the Post Bank. 
That’s how I get repaid”, she explained her loan recovery methods. 
From the SEF’s point of view, the group loan system worked fairly well 
anyway. Despite the problems, SEF believed that the clients had the means to 
pay back the loans, as Maria, a branch manager explained: 
 
Branch manager: The problem that we come up with is when you find that 
the members are not paying well. And when you do some follow-ups you find 
that the member doesn’t have any money to pay. Even if you can force her to 
pay or ask her to pay, you really see that there is no money. 
Interviewer: So what do you do then? If you see that there is no money? 
Branch manager: Many times our members promise us, even though we see 
that there is no money, that “I take this and I will do this.” And then they pay 
it back.” 
Maria, branch manager in Hlare, 13 July 2007 
The women’s promise that they would keep their word and find the money from 
somewhere to repay the loan was enough for SEF. Social pressure usually 
guaranteed that the women would find the missing amount of money in one way 
or another.  
When I asked where the limit for compromises was, SEF management 
defended its strict rules for negotiations: “Clients know the rules. If they don’t 
follow them, it’s their problem, no compromise.” According to Tatu, a member 
of SEF management, for this reason SEF wanted to encourage the group 
solidarity system and press the clients to consider carefully with whom they 
wanted to establish the group: “I know that if somebody defaults, the group is 
stuck with her and her debt. That’s why they have to be careful in the first place”, 
he reasoned. Given the SEF clients’ vulnerability to violence and crime, when I 
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asked who was responsible in the case of robberies, the line was more difficult to 
draw. Tatu eventually took a fairly conventional outlook on the issue: 
 
If they get robbed and clients are involved, then they have to pay the money 
back, no compromise. If it happens outside the SEF, they would find means 
to get the money back. So I think we shouldn’t compromise. But if you know 
it wasn’t their fault and it was somebody else, then perhaps you could write it 
off. But you have to be very careful, because usually they know. They have a 
very good setup in their villages and they know. They lived without these laws 
before and they can live without them now. Because they have their own law. 
Their own tribal laws and their own village laws. 
Tatu, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 11 July 2007 
Strict rules are definitely necessary to prevent opportunities for misuse and 
manipulations. However, such rules should not reinforce existing uneven power 
relations or leave the clients at the mercy of “their own” laws. While the formal 
rules of SEF microcredit operations were largely determined by the organisation, 
and the contract between clients and SEF was made according to these formal 
procedures and requirements, in SEF microcredit practices written and 
unwritten rules paralleled with each other (Bourdieu 1977, 1984).  
Justifications for SEF not to intervene in conflict situations were partly based 
on essentialist views of African women, their culture and their communal way of 
life: “They have their own laws, they’ll solve them anyway”. As Elyachar (2005: 
200) describes the informal methods of debt collection in the context of Cairo, in 
this kind of case culture becomes a mechanism of financialisation. This is 
possible because of the fundamental distortion in the microcredit joint liability 
system: joint solidarity is formally defined only at the institutional level. 
These arrangements were based on the arguments that expenses for the 
organisation would increase too much and achieving financial sustainability 
would become too difficult. Such arrangements only tend to be more propitious 
for the organisation’s interests than the clients; especially if the organisation 
failed and neglected to solve the problem that created conflicts among the 
clients. By pressuring the clients to solve “their own” problems in informal ways 
and at whatever cost, the organisation not only required absolute solidarity 
between the clients but also defined the level of the “acceptable sacrifice” for 
clients, thus entering into the grey area of what I would call responsible lending.  
At the same time, while the idea of joint liability was based on the 
assumption that women were capable of monitoring each other’s businesses, 
little attention was paid to the hidden costs that were placed on clients’ 
shoulders: the time and effort that clients spent on looking for new group 
members, delivering repayments to the bank, or monitoring each other’s 
businesses. This is an example of the “gender blind” conceptualisation of social 
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capital, which implicitly assumes that women have the will and time available 
for building an associational life in microcredit programmes (Bebbington 2007, 
González de la Rocha 2005, Maclean 2010, Mayoux 2001, Molyneux 2002, 
Rankin 2002). 
What this also means is that often negotiations and control over the rules 
which the clients were expected to obey were strategically transferred to the 
“hidden stages”: clients’ own meetings and centre meetings, and thus were at 
least partially beyond SEF management’s reach. Therefore, these negotiations, 
which Scott (1990: 18–23) calls “infrapolitics” or Wilshusen (2009a) “offstage” 
interactions, hardly followed any strict procedures or regulations, but were 
flexible and the object of a continuous redefinition.  
Such processes of responsibilisation and discipline of microcredit clients can 
be seen as processes of domination and appropriation of social networks, or 
what Elyachar (2005) calls “dispossessing” the poor of their own social capital. 
As Mayoux (2006), Maclean (2010) and Rankin (2002) suggest, while the 
construction of social capital may appear favourable at an institutional level, 
claims about women’s empowerment are less consistent.  
The quotation above also illustrates what Olivier de Sardan (2005: 73) calls 
the persistent and prevailing myth of the traditional community spirit, which 
exists in mainstream microcredit literature and in Putnam-oriented thought on 
social capital. According to this view, when people engage in communal 
networks, they develop a framework for common values and beliefs that 
becomes a “moral resource” or the “glue that holds a community together” 
(Putnam 1993: 169). Such essentialist views cannot be automatically considered 
as the rule in SEF management’s thinking, but during the discussions with SEF 
management, simplistic explanations referring to women’s “business nature” 
and “communality”, typical of social capital-oriented microcredit rhetoric, were 
presented: 
 
Black people are very group oriented people; they are not like individuals; 
they are very communal. And I think when you do these things with another 
person, and you have somebody’s trust, you are most likely to do it with 
somebody else than on your own. Knowing how Black people work, I think 
they feel comfortable when they have somebody supporting them.  
Lefty, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 10 July 2007 
In the discussions with SEF clients very few accused SEF rules of being too strict 
or hard to follow. Even if many clients complained about the group loan system, 
they did not find SEF rules problematic as such. “Rules are rules”; “People are 
the problem, not SEF”; “SEF needs its money”, were typical utterances among 
the clients. This does not mean that clients would not have struggled to follow 
the strict rules or that they would not have shown any opposition towards SEF. 
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They simply did not want SEF to interfere in their personal problems. The 
clients had also internalised the discourse which the development facilitators 
used when explaining and justifying various operations, clearly illustrating the 
role of discourse as a form of power (Bourdieu 2005, Olivier de Sardan 2005). 
As Ebrahim (2003: 10–14) in his study on the relationships between NGDOs 
and their international donors formulates it, discourse not only refers to how the 
issue is described, but also to how it is thought about and practised. Following 
Foucault’s (1980) ideas of knowledge serving as a tool for domination, experts in 
particular fields are the ones who frequently produce, maintain and control 
assumptions and “truths” about the discourse.  
“There was nothing free for these clients” 
Although there was not much clients could do about the processes of 
responsibilisation in microcredit programmes, these processes did not occur 
without resistance among clients. The constant refrain from clients in the 
interviews was the responsibility of clients to arrange the centre meetings as well 
as to pay the rent for the meeting place. According to the SEF rules, the centre 
leader had to find a place to meet as well as run the meetings. Because the rents 
for more official meeting places were high, the meetings were often organised in 
“any place decent enough”, such as under the most popular tree of the village, or 
in the school yard. Most of the women strongly criticised such arrangements, 
particularly for the lack of security. Repayments were either made in cash at the 
meeting or each group deposited its own share in the SEF bank account and 
brought the receipts to the meeting. The amount to be paid by a centre could 
reach 20,000 rand, and it was the clients’ responsibility to deliver the money 
safely to the bank, which could mean 30 kilometres of stressful travel by minibus 
taxi. Vulnerability to thefts, assaults and other crimes affected how people dealt 
with money matters and organised their business affairs.  
Fieldworkers also criticised the poor meeting conditions. Maria, a branch 
manager in Hlare, sighed: “Just under the tree! When it’s raining, it’s bad. If we 
can get proper facilities, then it’s going to be fine. But clients paying the rent, 
maybe 40 or 80 rand, it is not fair. Because it is lots of money for them.” The 
representatives of SEF management had no plans to change the meeting system. 
Although they understood the clients’ and fieldworkers’ concern, according to 
SEF management it would have been too costly for the organisation to arrange 
more official meetings.  
Sometimes centre meetings were even organised at clients’ homes. I had an 
opportunity to participate in a few of them: these meetings took place in Leloba 
every two weeks, in the yard and home of Subira, a barkeeper and mother of a 
teenage boy. The first time I attended these meetings, it rained, and some two 
dozen clients tried to crowd into the living room of the two-room house. Subira 
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and other chair members took care of the money transactions in the kitchenette, 
while the others waited their turn at the end of the small yard, under the plastic 
shelter, where Subira ran her beer businesses. The development facilitator did 
not appear until the end of the meeting. It might be misleading to even call this 
happening a “meeting”, especially from the point of view of a rather uninformed 
outsider. However, repayments were eventually made and the notebooks 
updated. When I asked Subira later in the interviews how on earth they 
managed to handle the situation, she simply replied by giving an illustrative 
example of the “game of microcredit”: “We take care that everything goes well in 
the books…. One client was not able to pay her loan; we paid on her behalf, but 
did not tell that even to her.” 
It is no wonder that under these circumstances, SEF clients had doubts about 
the aims and intentions of SEF and the resulting effects on their microcredit 
operations. It was sometimes difficult for clients to understand why the 
organisation did not “deposit its own money”, “organise its own meetings” or 
“provide sufficient business training” for clients. The following client’s 
complaints concern these matters: 
 
Josephine: SEF doesn’t provide this for us. We had a community hall before; 
we used to meet up there. The challenge was that some people avoided 
paying the rents; it would have been fifteen rand per group. It was 
disorganised. Then we tried to come to the market place there on the taxi 
rank. [Interpreter: Eih!] But the taxi ranks are not safe; that’s when we 
moved here and you can see it’s not very convenient. This is a big challenge 
for SEF. And I think that we should not be the ones to take money back to 
SEF; collecting and depositing money should be their problem!  
Josephine, MCP client in Leloba, 6 July 2007 
Yet, according to clients’ logic, a SEF loan was “SEF’s money”, centre meetings 
were “SEF’s meetings” and the responsibility for SEF training belonged to SEF, 
no matter how much the SEF staff tried to explain that the money borrowed 
belonged to the clients, that the centre meetings were supposed to be organised 
by clients in order to encourage their empowerment or that skilled clients were 
supposed to train other group members. As Karim (2011: 71) describes, in the 
financial culture promoted by microcredit organisations “nothing was free for 
these women”. If clients wanted to have proper facilities in their centre, they had 
to pay for it themselves.  
Despite women’s continuous demands that SEF should arrange a proper 
place for business meetings and run them less often, most of the clients felt that 
they had no control over the issue. Subira, who had offered her two-room house 
as a temporary meeting place without any compensation, explained the matter 
as follows: “There is little you can do, rules are rules, and otherwise there 
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wouldn’t be any loans.” She had been considering leaving SEF and joining 
another organisation called Get Ahead, because they did not organise repayment 
meetings. “But Simo [development facilitator] advised me to stay because he was 
afraid that he would not find a substitute for a person like me.”  
Not only many clients felt that they had no possibility of influencing SEF 
rules; they also criticised the rules for being unreliable. As the following 
discussion between a development facilitator and clients illustrates, sometimes 
the new rules were set fairly arbitrarily and justified by fairly questionable 
arguments: 
 
Development facilitator: If you don’t fill in the forms and return them as 
soon as possible there will be a 30 rand fine. [Clients start complaining] 
Development facilitator [shouting]: You know what these papers are. I’ll lose 
my job if you don’t return these forms. If I give you forms and you don’t fill 
them in, I cannot give you any money. 
Client: Not all of us can read and it’s difficult to fill in these forms. It’s not 
right to give us a penalty. 
Development facilitator: There are two groups who didn’t pay in time at the 
last meeting. If something like this happens, they have to pay a 50 rand fine. 
Client: I’ve never heard about such a rule. 
Centre meeting in Mosetsana, 26 June 2007 
According to SEF management, the meetings offered important opportunities 
for fieldworkers to help the clients and monitor savings and repayments. This 
tactic, according to which SEF transferred many of the training responsibilities 
from the organisation to the clients, and forced clients to shoulder additional 
transaction costs without any economic compensation, seemed, however, to 
respond better to the lenders’ concerns over the organisation’s financial 
sustainability than to the clients’ hopes for assistance and empowerment. As 
Rankin (2002) notes, such strategies transform microcredit groups and their 
relations of solidarity into instruments for diminishing the costs of screening 
and monitoring. Microcredit organisations promote this tactic in the name of 
supporting the entrepreneurship of the disadvantaged, where the poor who were 
previously considered as passive receivers of aid are now seen as creative agents 
of their own development. The problem is that such arrangements considerably 
increase the responsibilities, while not necessarily the rights of the clients 
(Hietalahti and Nygren 2011).  
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Centre meetings as arenas of struggle 
The bright image of harmonious African women doing business together and 
helping each other became tarnished time after time especially in the centre 
meetings in Lamune. In my second visit in this village I came to witness the way 
that discipline and public shame were instrumentalised by SEF microcredit 
operators; tactics that Foucault-oriented Karim (2011: xviii) calls “the economy 
of shame”. On that specific morning the centre meeting left an impression of 
ambiguity; it did not negate the significance of the repayment meetings in the 
SEF microcredit operations, but neither was convincing that these meetings 
were free of problems, conflicts and manipulation. The clients were bursting 
with pent-up anger and frustration. The most surprising for me was that instead 
of being run by the development facilitator, the meeting was led by Ben, the 
“trouble shooter” at SEF, who had been called to the centre to restore order. 
After the roll call, the meeting was suddenly thrown into chaos by disputing 
clients. Two clients complained that they were not transported to the meeting as 
agreed and thus refused to pay the transport fee. Some in the group had not paid 
the transport fee in the previous meeting, which made others complain about 
the ineffective system of fees. A client who was supposed to come and pay her 
fines was missing, which made her group members angrily demand: “We want 
the money! Why doesn’t she come and pay?” They even tried to call her, but she 
never answered. Again, only 30 clients of a total of 55 arrived at the meeting, 
and only a few of those absent had forwarded the required letter of absence to 
the chair. The clients calmed down only after Ben, the trouble shooter, finally 
raised his voice to them: “I’m not convinced of the way this centre works. I’ve 
been working for SEF for a long time, but I’ve never seen behaviour like this. I’m 
ashamed of you all!” Ben ordered the clients who had not paid their transport 
fees to pay them immediately. In order to get the control over the situation, Ben 
used various rhetorical manoeuvres:  
 
I’m not satisfied with the level of attendance. Many of the clients are missing. 
SEF doesn’t like that. This centre doesn’t work well. I am happy about the 
way you are saving. But there are still some groups who don’t save. SEF will 
give you money only if you save. There will be no money if you don’t save. Is 
this clear? Come to the meetings! Save! If you don’t bring any savings to 
three meetings, your loan application will be rejected. There is no reason to 
go and say bad things about SEF; that SEF wouldn’t give any money. You just 
have to save first.  
Ben, trouble shooter in the centre meeting in Lamune, 18 June 2007 
When reminding the clients to repay their loans on time, Ben particularly 
frowned upon clients’ behaviour in the presence of a foreign visitor: “If you have 
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problems with your repayments, it would be better not to mention them in front 
of our visitor. You are giving a bad picture of us. You have to think more 
carefully about what you say. Every family has its own problems. You cannot 
solve them in public.” Such a command had a powerful effect on the clients, as I 
noticed later. In the interviews clients judged the shameful behaviour of the 
fighting parties and repeated Ben’s rhetoric when blaming groups for the general 
disorder: “you should not bring your problems to SEF!”; “rules are rules!” and 
“there’s no team spirit!”  
At the same time, Ben cleverly used the presence of a foreign visitor to 
strengthen his role as a moral guardian. As a foreigner who was going to tell 
these people’s stories to a wider audience – and undoubtedly to SEF – I was told 
various versions of events by both clients and Ben in the interviews, in the 
meetings as well as in the informal conversations. Similarly, I was sucked into 
the power plays interwoven in the everyday actions of microcredit operators. 
Ben, as many others, tried to fill me with information and insights that he 
apparently hoped or assumed I would pass on to the “upper levels” at SEF: “If I 
talked with the managing director, I would tell him that…” or “You must 
understand that a good development facilitator would never.…”  
When Ben began to ask group by group how their businesses were doing, the 
meeting dissolved into chaos. Josephina gave a long speech describing the 
damaging relationships among her group members. One of them, Anna, who 
had a close relationship with Winny, the development facilitator of the centre, 
seemed in particular to be a troublemaker:  
 
This member does not come to the meetings. I’ve visited this member, Anna, 
several times, but Winny always turns the problem upside down. Everybody 
knows that she borrows huge amounts of money, but never pays on time. She 
might take a loan of 5,000 rand; she does save but does not pay the loan on 
time. We always have to pay for her. And because of this, we cannot get new 
loans.  
I don’t understand the reason why I’m not able to get a new loan. Winny has 
promised to solve this problem. But as a friend of Winny’s, Anna knows more 
than others. Winny always asks us to solve our problems within the group, 
while she favours one of the members, the one who is the problem. And Anna 
has money, she is able to buy items for stock, she’s able to go shopping at 
Indians. Once I saw her, and she ran away! 
We are all business women! Winny is behaving like the money belongs to her. 
But it’s not her money! It’s SEF’s money! I don’t want to attend these 
meetings anymore because of this problem. When SEF started, it was 
supposed to help our businesses; now this all affects us as well as SEF’s 
businesses.  
Josephina, MCP client in the centre meeting in Lamune, 18 June 2007 
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It was easy to sense that membership in the SEF microcredit programme did not 
constitute any type of feeling of togetherness among these group members in 
Lamune. In this light, the social capital-related assumptions about solidarity and 
team play among poor women as a self-evident element seemed ironic. It was 
also evident that group solidarity did not arise simply by the order of the 
organisation or upper level actors; as Rankin (2002) suggests, it is a much more 
demanding and deeper social process. Instead of creating feelings of trust or 
team play, in this case, the microcredit mechanisms were producing heightened 
tensions and reluctant solidarity among the clients.  
It was also noticeable that while criticising their own failures, clients were 
also criticising Winny, the development facilitator, for failing to follow the 
expected rules of trust and open communication: features that some researchers 
associate with the greater reliability of microcredit programmes in comparison 
with other financial tools of the poor. Collins et al. (2009: 26–27), for example, 
despite their creditable investigation of the portfolios and money management 
of the poor, rather gullibly tout microcredit organisations as especially reliable 
by stating that microcredit officers “didn’t demand bribes” and “took the clients’ 
transactions seriously”. In Limpopo, however, reliability did not always 
materialise as intended.  
On that quarrelsome day in Lamune, Ben, as a representative of SEF and a 
substitute for Winny, the development facilitator, was surely in an unpleasant 
position. On the one hand, he had to create an image of a trustworthy 
organisation and personnel to the clients – and to me. On the other hand, he had 
to make sure that the clients would begin to follow the rules so that the work of 
the whole centre would not be endangered. In this situation, he decided to 
appeal to the central element of the microcredit programmes, team work and 
communality:  
 
It is difficult for me to speak on behalf of Winny. People should get their 
loans on time. I am sorry, this is not SEF. SEF always loans money to reliable 
clients. I can see that you are angry, and usually there is a reason for that. But 
on the other hand, it is difficult to solve problems if people are only fighting. 
There is no team spirit, there is no communal spirit. If everybody works on 
an individual basis, the system does not work.… The group cannot function 
without a communal spirit. 
Ben, trouble shooter, in the centre meeting in Lamune, 18 June 2007 
Ben suggested a group meeting at the SEF office to manage the problems 
together. However, there was a new turn in the events. Winny, the development 
facilitator, who had apparently been listening to the discussion round the corner, 
entered the meeting place and closed the meeting by saying: “The real problem 
is Josephina who is terrorising her group and the whole centre. It is a lie that I 
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am a friend of Anna’s. I am tired of doing stupid follow-ups and other things. 
These group members complain that Anna gives money to her mother. But that 
is not a problem if she’s able to repay her loan, is it? If there is somebody who 
wants to leave the group, that is no problem. I can even take the case to Tzaneen, 
to the head office. Josephina did not take the loan even if I offered it to her. 
Josephina is the person who is causing dissension in the group, not Anna. This is 
Josephina’s problem. She’s the one who is always complaining!” 
The centre meeting that had continued for over two hours concluded with 
these words. Many clients seemed to be confused over the situation. It was 
difficult to determine, what the truth actually was. When I met these women 
later, everybody had an opinion on how and by whom the problem should be 
solved, and who was to blame. After a month, I eventually managed to have a 
word in private with Winny, the development facilitator. She was reluctant to 
talk about the meeting, and was not willing to give answers even to basic 
questions. When I asked about the problematic meeting, she simply answered 
that she had “solved the problem”: Josephina, the client who had been 
complaining about Anna, had been expelled from her microcredit group. The 
problem was thus solved and the group and the centre could continue its 
activities – until the following problems and show-downs occurred. 
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 Everyday politics of microcredit  5
 
THIS CHAPTER challenges the idea of microcredit as a “magic bullet” in poverty 
reduction by demonstrating the diversity of women’s income-generating 
activities and noting that coping with poverty is hardly a matter of a new 
financial instrument alone. As the analysis will show, the rhetoric of 
microfinance conflicts with the lived realities of the women whose economic 
activities were constrained by various social obligations and responsibilities 
(Karim 2011: xvi).  
In Limpopo, women’s financial affairs were inextricably intertwined with 
their livelihood portfolios based on irregular streams of formal and informal 
incomes. Financial, social and cultural norms and practices strongly shaped the 
ways clients operated their micro-businesses. Income loss was continuously 
present, and clients’ businesses and possibilities of influencing their life-
situations were often inhibited by this continuous vulnerability.  
Although the group lending model enabled loans for poor women without 
financial collateral, it did not mean that loans were available to anyone. Under 
the political covenant system, which tied the loan terms to the behaviour of 
borrowers and strict monitoring, money and credit in all their dimensions were 
tightly interwoven with the processes of social inclusion and exclusion. While 
certain actors were given access to microcredit, others’ access was constrained 
(Bähre 2007b). The high-fliers were those who were able to utilise various social 
networks as well as regular incomes in the household. Bolstered by various 
power symbols, they took advantage of their social status. 
 
 
Women’s everyday strategies for living 
Diversity of income-generating activities and livelihoods strategies 
While microcredit was critical in the sense that it provided poor women with the 
most important thing that they needed, that is, money in cash, joining a SEF 
programme did not mean that the clients’ lives would have changed in an 
instant; neither did it mean that everybody’s dreams would have come true, as 
heavily hyped microcredit rhetoric sometimes suggests.  
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In fact, we should not expect microcredit to be an all-embracing solution to 
the problem of global poverty; nor should we forget that some people join 
microcredit programmes in order to get money to survive, not necessarily to 
“end poverty” (Ferguson 2008: 281–282). Although microcredit had brought 
considerable changes in the livelihoods of Limpopoan women, coping with 
poverty and progress in business were not simply a matter of a new financial 
instrument. In fact, the stiff competition, poor customers, constant worries over 
loan repayments and few opportunities for strategising in their businesses 
caused some clients to feel discouraged in their everyday struggles to become 
“proficient business women” or “agents of their own development”.  
In order to understand the way poor people in Limpopo try to improve their 
lives through different financial instruments and social networks, it is important 
to consider the management of money and cash flows as a fundamental part of 
their everyday lives. As Collins et al. (2009: 4), who have studied financial tools 
and money management methods among the poor in India, Bangladesh and 
South Africa, remark, “If you are poor, managing your money well is absolutely 
central to your life – perhaps more so than for any other group”.  
Managing money is difficult in particular if there is little of it (Collins et al. 
2009). For Limpopoan people, poverty was an everyday struggle for survival, 
which no single activity alone could assure. Poverty left women unable to pay 
their children’s school fees or to buy proper food. The challenge was to make 
sure that there was something to eat every day, and not just on the days they 
earned (Bateman 2010, Collins et al. 2009). The SEF clients sold and saved to be 
able to repay their loans, whatever the financial circumstances of their 
households. Poverty created vulnerability to unexpected financial shocks; 
sickness, robbery or funeral costs could create an economic collapse overnight.  
Rather than consume every rand as soon as it was earned, SEF clients tried to 
manage their money by saving when they could and by borrowing when they 
needed to through various social networks and financial instruments (Bähre 
2007a, Collins et al. 2009). In fact, it was fairly surprising what a large number 
of formal and informal financial and social instruments were at their disposal. 
From my interview data, I was able to find a total of 19 different financial 
instruments to help women cope with poverty: a) bank account in a bank or post 
bank; pension; funeral plan; loan from microcredit organisation; saving in a 
microcredit programme; insurance; retirement or savings annuity; and credit at 
the town's furniture store in the formal sector; and b) stokvel savings; burial 
society; one-on-one lending or borrowing; credit at local spaza, informal 
convenience shop; stokvel lending or borrowing; loan from mashonisha; saving-
in-house; operating as mashonisha; selling on credit to customers; and 
remittances from household members. Besides these, a number of other social 
arrangements existed, such as food sharing, helping with child care or delivering 
stock items (cf. Collins et al. 2009).  
 EVERYDAY POLITICS OF MICROCREDIT | 95 
In general, the economic activities of SEF clients were tightly interwoven 
with the households’ livelihood portfolios based on sporadic streams of formal 
and informal, regular and irregular income. A household member might have a 
regular or seasonal wage from a full time job; another may run a small business 
and get remittances from relatives living elsewhere; a third may get a grant or a 
pension from the government and save money through a number of stokvels. Or 
all of these instruments may be used by a single person. Many of the households 
I studied were running several activities simultaneously, these activities being 
closely interlinked with each other. Hectic forms of decision-making and 
intermittent business operations were partly a response to the overall economic 
instability and political volatility in which people were forced to struggle to earn 
their living through an array of activities and business ventures (Hietalahti and 
Nygren 2011).  
In this heterogeneity of economic activities, it is difficult to consider 
microcredit and micro businesses as “magic bullets” for development and as 
something isolated from people’s overall struggles to earn a livelihood. Although 
microcredit brought reliability as well as regularity to the financial lives of the 
SEF clients who otherwise would have to interact with not-so-reliable financial 
partners such as mashonishas, it did not mean that the uncertainty of their 
financial lives would have been eliminated. Nor did it mean that the new 
financial partners – the other group members, customers or representatives of 
SEF – would have been as reliable as the clients would have liked them to be. As 
described earlier, solidarity did not always materialise as intended, and various 
kinds of tensions emerged between SEF clients sharing liabilities. Also, the rules 
were changed sometimes arbitrarily; development facilitators did not always 
arrive at the repayment meetings in time, nor were the loans always disbursed as 
promised.  
Importance of conventional social networks 
While microcredit provided an important element in the financial lives of poor 
Limpopoan women, the significance of their conventional social networks as a 
survival strategy had not diminished (Bähre 2007a). Just as South African 
women had depended on various social networks and associational ties for 
decades, the social and financial aspects of the lives of SEF clients were also 
interwoven with a variety of organisations: burial and funeral societies, credit 
and savings networks, stokvels,25 and Christian women’s groups. As revealed in 
the interviews, these associations provided motivation for those who did not 
                                                 
25 In the study area, people use the term stokvel in various ways. For some, stokvel refers solely to 
savings associations, for others to both credit and savings clubs. Some people consider stokvels 
particularly as burial societies, while for many the term means all kinds of financial mutuals: credit and 
savings associations as well as burial and funeral societies. 
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have the willpower or other opportunity to save on their own. The various clubs 
gave SEF clients the chance to meet their commitments at the end of the year, to 
provide funeral costs or to make sure that they were able to pay the school fees 
in January. Typically each society was designed for a detailed purpose and the 
savings were timed for a specific date or event, such as for Christmas, for funeral 
or for school fees.  
The most important associations for women during the time of this research, 
if measured by participation activity, were burial societies: they were the 
societies that “no one could miss”. The burial societies of various types were 
informally administered through a group of women or the whole community. In 
a group system, a small group of people paid a fixed amount to a member 
affected by a death in the family or alternatively saved a certain amount on a 
monthly basis, typically 20−50 rand a month. A member in need received a fixed 
amount of money from the pool in the case of the death of a relative. 
Contributions were kept either in bank accounts or in a secretary’s strongbox. 
The fee for communal burial associations, which might have as many as 2,000 
members, was typically 2−3 rand a month.  
Considering the long history of burial societies as a part of South African 
people’s financial and social lives, the fact that Limpopoan women had a very 
special relationship with these societies was not a surprise. Since the 1950s, 
burial societies have been “the most stable, the most widely spread and popular, 
and the most serious of the women’s efforts” (Brandel-Syrier 1962 in Lee 2009: 
137). As Verhoef (2001: 267) explains, in various communities caring for the 
dead by means of a funeral is of exceptional spiritual importance. Given the 
importance of funerals and that arranging them is fairly expensive, funerals are 
a crucial spiritual, social and financial factor in women’s lives, and affect the 
lives of the poor in many ways (cf. James 1999a; 1999b). In my interviews with 
SEF clients it became evident that the social pressure involved with buying the 
coffin and arranging transportation as well as providing the meal for guests, who 
might number hundreds of relatives and community members, was a financial 
burden. Lee (2009: 138) describes in detail how competition between 
neighbours for the best coffin or for the most food often stretches the social and 
financial obligations to the utmost.   
Another popular association for women were formal funeral societies or 
funeral plans, town-based companies, which provide for individuals and their 
families. These companies have a long history. Various insurance companies in 
South Africa have offered funeral services since the 1930s and managed to 
develop their operations via the existing informal burial societies (Verhoef 2001: 
289). In my research area, joining a formal funeral society was becoming 
increasingly common, especially in semi-urban villages. One explanation could 
be members’ morally hazardous behaviour in the informal burial societies. 
Despite the high moral obligations in regard to funerals, given the importance of 
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being buried with honour and pride, people sometimes stopped paying into the 
common pot after they themselves had benefitted, causing conflicts between the 
members. Another significant issue was the efficient marketing of the funeral 
companies. While everybody belonged to at least one communal burial society, 
some clients contributed to five or six different types of funeral and burial plans. 
This suggests that women wanted to gain greater security by joining several 
associations, each of them having a certain role in covering funeral expenses 
(James 1999b: 60). Moreover, the social and cultural pressure to arrange an 
appropriate funeral was substantial. 
Despite the extensive supply and popularity of funeral services, many clients 
still preferred to provide for funerals only through informal burial societies (cf. 
Verhoef 2001: 277). As many of the SEF clients explained, not only were their 
services expensive, the rules and terms of the formal sector funeral plans were 
also sometimes unclear. For some, operating in the informal sector and using 
informal burial societies was simply a more familiar and cheaper option. People 
were not always sure whether the funeral plan would cover all the expenses, and 
for whom in the family. Funeral plans did not allow bending the repayment rules 
either, whereas the agreements of the informal burial societies were often 
flexible to some extent: In the case of an emergency, the payments could be 
postponed, but continuous defaults would certainly have led to exclusion from 
the association.  
Some women in Limpopo were also actively involved in Christian women’s 
groups, typically with the Zion Christian Church (ZCC), whose practices were 
strict and under the firm control of charismatic leaders (Anderson 1999). The 
rules of its associations were harsh. The church, for example, forbade women to 
join any other informal savings societies, making women believe that the other 
societies were all involved in alcohol consumption and dishonest acts. Typically, 
SEF clients considered the religious ZCC members as honest and helpful 
business women. In addition to strong social loyalties, high moral obligations 
and the culture of forgiveness governed the church members’ micro businesses 
and attitude towards possible defaults in the businesses and microcredit groups. 
In addition to these arrangements, many women participated in various 
credit and savings associations, which in this study are referred to as stokvels. 
Stokvel savings associations refer to what are universally known as ROSCAs 
(rotating savings and credit associations) or ASCAs (accumulating savings and 
credit associations). The idea in such arrangements in Limpopo is that the 
members either contribute on a monthly basis into a pot of money that is 
distributed as a whole to each member in turn; or the money is saved until the 
appointed time, when the lump sum is distributed between the members. 
Stokvel credit associations operate on somewhat similar principles as the 
microcredit-related village banks. In these associations, members put money 
saved into the same pot from which they can borrow money at a certain interest. 
 98 | EVERYDAY POLITICS OF MICROCREDIT 
In the end, the money with interest is distributed between the members. In the 
“business-version”, members first save a certain amount of money and then 
begin to lend money to other group members and/or non-members. The profit, 
that is, the income from the interest, is typically distributed to members on a 
yearly basis.  
Some of these business-oriented stokvels were surprisingly lucrative. One 
such stokvel business was run by Bertha, MCP client from Leloba, which is a 
semi-urban settlement near Tzaneen; in fact, her group was a representative of 
well-functioning credit association. As for many other older generation women 
in Leloba, Bertha’s involvement in stokvel was based on many years’ friendship 
and trust relations with friends and neighbours. It all started when a couple of 
women came to visit Bertha and asked whether because of her social status and 
strong character she would join and become the leader of a new stokvel credit 
association in the neighbourhood. In a group interview, Bertha described the 
success of her stokvel group and stokvel business; indeed, her credit association 
was exceptional among microcredit groups: 
 
Like now, we have ten here. We contribute 500 per month, and raise that 
money up to 20,000. Only we group members can borrow from it; we borrow 
the money, and we use it, and we bring it back. If you take 2,000, you have 
four or five months [to pay]. We have our own interest rates.... So we raise 
this money by taking loans and bringing it back with interest. In December 
all the debts must be paid. This adds up to a nice amount. 
Bertha, group interview of four MCP clients in Leloba, 4 July 2007 
Some women, such as Bertha, created a long-term involvement with various 
societies along with friends whom they had known for long, which meant 
simultaneous membership in many associations with the same group members. 
This suggests that while women were satisfied with the composition of the group 
and they interlinked with each other in multiple ways, they aspired to increase 
their incomes and gain greater security through membership in several 
associations. They also aimed to strengthen the moral capital through more 
demanding obligations (James 1999b: 60). As Guérin (2007: 559) suggests, 
utilising various stokvels simultaneously might be a sign of the will to create 
discipline; to save and use stokvels as an incentive to earn income. The 
drawback of such a system is that as women’s social and financial lives are 
closely entangled with each other, their businesses become highly conditional on 
other members. If one stokvel member fails, it affects many associations 
simultaneously (Bähre 2007a, Lee 2009: 149–153). 
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Social mapping of SEF clients 
SEF divided clients into two groups by using a special Participatory Wealth 
Ranking (PWR) method (van de Ruit et al. 2001, Sorensen 2006): the 
“wealthier” clients already operated a micro-enterprise and participated in the 
original Micro Credit Programme (MCP); “the poorest” were starting their 
businesses under the Tšhomisano Credit Programme (TCP). The programme 
itself, however, was not the major determinant of the opportunities for success. 
Despite such a ranking system, these two programmes did not, in fact, differ 
markedly from each other. Sometimes TCP clients had bigger loans or 
businesses than their better-off peers in the MCP groups; sometimes TCP clients 
were able to save more than MCP clients; sometimes general living conditions 
were favourable for TCP clients. Both programmes consisted of clients and 
groups who were able to expand their businesses and to “turn the game to their 
own ends” (Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 980–981), while others only marginally 
benefitted from available resources. In this respect, I rejected the strict 
programme-related approach when analysing the possibilities for success in the 
microcredit businesses of SEF clients. 
While it was largely up to SEF clients’ skills and financial bases how they 
balanced between the demands of everyday life and the financial opportunities 
provided, the ability of women to use credit in a lucrative way also depended on 
the wider political-economic processes and social structures (Bebbington 2007: 
157, Meagher 2006, Wilshusen 2009a: 392–393). As will be shown in the 
following analysis, differently positioned people had access to different 
resources and sources of negotiation power, and the conditions under which 
credits were granted, accessed and controlled had a considerable impact on the 
distribution of benefits and constraints within the SEF microcredit programmes 
(Meagher 2006).  
I made a general social map of SEF clients, conceptualised as “the poorest” 
and “the better-off” clients, which is presented in Table 1. The table illustrates a 
rough generalisation of the composition of various capitals, as well as their 
transformability and recoverability. As shown in the table, in the success stories, 
SEF clients’ flexibility and responsiveness to arising opportunities in the new 
livelihood strategies were important. In Limpopo, the successful clients 
“understood business”, and they were innovative in creating new strategies and 
establishing new businesses. Most importantly, clients who were involved in a 
range of social and financial networks, and who could rely on regular incomes in 
the household were in a better position than those relying solely on their 
microcredit businesses. These clients were also able to save, and to manage their 
incomes, savings and investments more systematically. Consequently, the 
better-off clients were more capable of protecting themselves against financial 
shocks through savings and assets, and more likely to be able to diversify their 
businesses. They were able to keep their stocks updated, which meant that they 
were not at great risk of running out of stock and were in this way better 
equipped to prevent their businesses from falling into financial straits.  
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TABLE 1. Characteristics of SEF microcredit clients 
 
 Better-off Poorest 
Starting point 
and income 
sources 
More diversified businesses. More 
experience in business. More 
expensive selling lines. Larger loans in 
the beginning. Often someone else in 
the family who brings extra income. 
Little experience in running a business 
and limited business skills. Need for 
training in how to run a business. 
Selling low price commodities. 
Sporadic business activities. Smaller 
loans in the beginning. Mainly women-
headed households with no other 
income in the household. 
Business 
opportunities 
and finance 
Better opportunities to diversify and 
to improve their incomes. 
Usually not many opportunities to 
diversify or improve incomes. At risk 
of running out of stock. 
Social impact and 
well-being 
Able to make changes in life. More 
opportunities to create new business 
ideas.  
Few opportunities and abilities to 
make changes in life.  
Vulnerability Less vulnerable, being somewhat able 
to protect themselves against financial 
shocks. Able to meet basic needs. 
Vulnerable, having no savings or 
assets to protect them against 
unexpected expenditures. Need to 
rely on help and loans from relatives 
and friends (if available). Difficulties in 
meeting basic needs. 
Social networks Involved in a range of social and 
financial networks. Ability to rely on 
help from friends or relatives.  
Burial society. Few other networks. 
Access to 
services 
Better access to public spaces in town, 
markets, services and information. 
Poor access to urban markets, services 
and information. 
Biggest problems Unreliable group members. 
Economically poor customers. 
Saturated markets. 
Income insufficient to meet the basic 
needs. Unreliable group members. 
Economically poor customers. 
Saturated markets. Over-
indebtedness. 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2007 
 
While the businesses of the better-off clients consisted of beer and textile 
hawking, traditional healing and phone services, the poorest SEF clients 
concentrated on fruit, juice, tobacco, and vegetable hawking, thus on sectors 
with a low level of profitability and tendencies of oversaturation. Approximately 
29 % of the interviewed clients in rural MCP programme, 27 % in rural TCP 
programme and 65 % in semi-urban MCP programmes can be characterised as 
“better-off”. 
The poorest SEF clients often faced serious financial problems, including 
difficulties in providing for food security for the family or meeting their basic 
needs. The poorest of the poor had difficulties in saving or creating assets for 
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protection against unexpected expenditures, at which point they had to rely on 
the help of relatives – if anyone was able to help. The most vulnerable SEF 
clients were often deficient even in their basic business skills. Many of them had 
started a tiny business of selling small items at home, without a clear plan of 
how to run the business. Many of these clients had limited possibilities of 
separating their incomes from debt claims and guaranteeing their future stocks 
was difficult. If they ran out of items in stock, the only recourse was to wait for 
the next loan cycle. Sometimes these women struggled with managing their 
loans and businesses along with their other responsibilities. There was also the 
constant risk of food on sale spoiling or customers not paying.  
Better access to information, employment opportunities, market places and 
services provided a better starting point for the wealthier clients than the poorer 
ones. Semi-urban areas provided more business opportunities for the women, 
including markets for goods for wage-earning, solvent clients. In rural areas, 
women mostly operated small businesses either from their homes, hawked from 
door to door or sold in school yards.  
Despite the striking diversity in clients’ abilities and opportunities to run 
their businesses, on a broader level, basically all clients shared the same 
concerns about the lack of money (Guérin 2007: 553). Poverty for SEF clients 
was constant, and it could easily strike even those who were generally self-
sufficient and “better-off”. According to interviews, in many cases, 
improvements in income were relatively small and achieved only in the long 
term. To give a perspective to this issue, according to SEF statistics (2012: 3), the 
average business value of the clients before the second loan is approximately 
R1,100; in the fifth round the figure is an average of R1,700. 
Successful women could not escape the day-to-day struggles either. Clients 
worried constantly about irregularity and insufficiency of income. They ran their 
businesses in risky environments, in which the loss of income was always 
possible. These worries come out in the following story of Brooke, who in 
addition to her clothing business sold fish, cold drinks, fruits and donuts, “fat 
cooks”, to support herself and her four children. She joined the SEF MCP 
programme in Pekenene in early 2006, after which she had been able to expand 
her businesses, to establish a tax-shop and to build a four-room house. Every 
morning, she got up at three o’clock to cook and bake. In the daytime, she ran 
the tax shop. In the early hours, before four o’clock in the morning when the 
men left for work to nearby farms she had already baked heaps of donuts to sell. 
“If you don’t wake up early enough, you are going to lose money,” Brooke 
explained and continued: “They pass my place, and take these early confections.” 
After this, she started knitting, “because you cannot afford to go back to sleep”. 
At sunrise, she began her main business: selling drinks, fruits, vegetables and 
knitting products. Neighbours came and bought during the day. “In the evening, 
those who come back from work come to my place and buy.” After six o’clock in 
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the evening “you just close the gates, go to sleep and wait for the next morning”, 
Brooke described. 
The everyday concerns were driven by the pressure to meet daily needs and 
long-term community obligations, and hardly any source of living available for 
the poor in Limpopo could be considered secure. Although many of the 
informants experienced some improvement in their financial situation and life 
conditions, credit and possible economic returns often dwindled between the 
new stock supplements and the daily household costs. The biggest problems 
were irregular incomes, narrow profit margins, stiff competition, poor 
customers, and difficulties with loan repayments. In Limpopo, only a few of the 
wealthier clients felt that their businesses and livelihoods were sustainable; and 
in the interviews even they were cautious about giving such an impression about 
their businesses. 
Similarly, the different financial instruments available to women coping with 
poverty, combined with stories of stokvel successes, may easily give the 
impression of a vibrant and versatile associational life. However, while some 
women coped with poverty through diverse sources of income and social 
networks – which in many cases was the secret of some SEF client’s success in 
Limpopo – the diversity of the livelihood strategies of SEF clients should not be 
over-emphasised. Only the most successful clients were effectively able to 
diversify their businesses or benefit considerably from various credit and savings 
associations. In fact, according to Francis (2002) and Slater (2002), diversified 
livelihoods and income sources could also be a result of falling incomes, not 
necessarily a sign of innovativeness and business growth.  
Typically, stokvels were part of the complex set of livelihood strategies from 
which women tried to choose the most available and the most suitable. As 
described above, women often established stokvels or joined microcredit 
programmes as a solution to a specific problem, and not necessarily for a long-
term profit-making purpose. Stokvels for savings purposes were rare. In 
Limpopo, the interviewed women typically joined or established a stokvel only 
when they had a regular income. Some women said that they were able to take 
part in stokvels only when they were working. Typical monthly contributions 
varied between R45–100; the investments topping R200 were exceptional. None 
of the poorest clients interviewed belonged to stokvel credit and savings 
associations. While basically everybody belonged to at least one communal 
burial society, it is equally correct to claim that many SEF clients belonged to 
one or two communal burial societies, contributing 2–5 rand a month, but no 
more. While some better-off clients were able to save as much as 100–200 rand 
on a monthly basis, most of the poorest saved typically 20–50 rand a month.  
According to the interviews, in some cases the use of various instruments was 
somewhat periodic. As Lee (2009: 148) notes, women also practiced selective 
membership for a few years, and then dropped out if their income fell or if they 
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had a bad experience. Sometimes SEF clients used stokvels as a fall-back for 
microcredit. They established stokvels to support those who had problems with 
their SEF loans: clients whose businesses had been discriminated against, who 
had been robbed, or who had failed for one reason or other. Many women 
admitted that group savings enabled them to keep money out of the reach of 
men “who would use it for beer, tobacco, gambling and other women”, reflecting 
the women’s attempts to challenge male-dominated intra-household relations. 
Irregularity of income obliged some clients to join other microcredit 
programmes, such as Get Ahead or Marang, to pay the loans derived from SEF. 
Some clients were successful in this kind of merry-go-round, while others ended 
up in a circle of debt having to apply for a new loan to pay off an earlier one. 
While these are illustrative examples of the logic according to which women 
manage money through various financial instruments, at the same time these 
examples support the idea that microcredit is inseparable from people’s overall 
economic activities and struggles for a livelihood.  
 
 
Tightly intertwined financial, cultural and social affairs 
Personal ambitions and social obligations 
In order to explore which women were able to improve their financial situation, 
and which women only sank more deeply into over-indebtedness, it is essential 
to analyse microcredit in its political, social and cultural contexts. Yet the 
distinction between the financial and social components in the SEF clients’ lives 
proved to be artificial in a situation where economic activities, social relations 
and cultural conventions were intrinsically interwoven in people’s efforts to earn 
their living from fragile business ventures and shifting social alliances. Although 
SEF clients’ everyday business operations were not formally regulated, in the 
logic of decision-making among the poor households in Limpopo, economic 
affairs were tightly intertwined with social rules, cultural norms and political 
power relations.  
To get a sense of how SEF clients managed their money and created different 
livelihood strategies, I tried to identify their business operations, to estimate 
their earnings and expenditures and to listen carefully to what they had to say 
about their financial circumstances. Such features proved to be difficult to judge, 
however. Market activities varied from day to day and earnings were sporadic 
and typically concealed from other people, not to mention the foreign visitor 
whom they did not know well. As women’s businesses were structured through 
social hierarchies, the first lesson learnt was that in order to understand the 
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financial lives of these women, I needed to look at their broader life situations 
and social logic directing their businesses. 
What greatly regulated the rhythm of women’s economic activities were the 
pension days, whether this meant running small businesses, participating in 
credit and savings associations, contributing to burial societies or dealing with 
mashonishas. As Francis (2002), Slater (2002) and Lee (2009) describe, traders 
tended to outnumber pensioners outside “pay points” on pension days. In my 
study areas, too, women put their wares on sale at the pay points on the days 
pensions were paid. Mashonishas rushed there to collect debts and funeral 
society representatives arrived to advertise for new customers and to collect 
membership fees. According to SEF clients, pay days were the monthly peak 
times for their businesses. Clients tried to co-ordinate their debt claims on 
customers and match their own payment schedule to the time schedule of pay 
days. Even SEF microcredit repayment meetings and loan disbursement dates 
were sometimes re-scheduled so that SEF clients would have time to collect their 
claims from their customers, or do the stocking and then hurry to the pay points 
to pursue their businesses.  
As typical of small businesses, SEF clients’ businesses were seasonal; success 
depended greatly on weather conditions, days of the week and annual rhythms. 
Aileen, who was selling fish, sweets and African beer in Lamune, told me that 
she was able to earn 720 rands in revenues each week, most of which was made 
during the weekend: “From Monday to Thursday about 70 rands, but on Friday 
as much as 650 rands.” According to Lulu, who regarded such regularity as 
typical of the beer business, the workdays had a certain rhythm: “On Wednesday 
I put the ingredients together; on Thursday and Friday it’s the same thing, and 
on Saturday the beer is ready. Weekend is the time when people drink.” 
Typically, December and January were the slowest months for business 
activities. Jamila, traditional healer from Lamune described how she tried to 
manage the seasonality by saving all year long in order to survive over the slow 
months: “In December people are busy buying things for their families, and in 
January they are paying the school fees. That’s why I save as much as I can. I do 
it to avoid the Christmas seasons, because it’s not a good time for business.” 
Characteristic of the business strategies of poor women was a complex 
dialectic between the personal aspirations of livelihood improvement and the 
collective norms of co-operation. In addition to domestic needs, people fulfilled 
a myriad of communal duties and social rules of reciprocity, assisting at funerals 
and weddings and taking care of the grandchildren and disabled relatives. 
Adjusting their business duties with their social responsibilities was sometimes 
difficult. If there was a funeral at home, it was considered inappropriate to 
operate a business and attend meetings for a period of four to six months. 
During this time the other group members took care of the loan repayment or 
they sought a person to temporarily replace this member. “She’s got problems; 
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once they’re over she’ll give us our money back”, these group members explained 
in the interviews. Correspondingly, if a wedding was to be arranged, women 
helped in the preparations and were thus unable to run their businesses. If a 
child became seriously ill, the mother usually ignored her business activities for 
a while. 
A distinctive factor in financial security for SEF clients, in particular for those 
who participated in textile or other high-priced businesses, was debt claims. 
Owing to the expensive products, the customers of SEF clients were able to buy 
only on credit. The collection of debts thus regulated the women’s businesses. 
Because of the blurred boundaries between domestic and commercial activities, 
SEF clients typically used any remaining cash to pay for various household 
needs. While they insisted that the SEF loan was to be used only for business, in 
many cases, cash management consisted of a complicated set of incomes and 
expenditures, and the repayments, expenditures and debts were paid from any 
available source of income, such as microcredit, stokvels, debt claims from 
customers, pensions, child benefits or remittances from relatives.  
Social relations were a driving force in the women’s strategic decision making 
in business and finance. Prices were often settled together and nobody was 
allowed to raise the price without permission from the others: “It’s one price”; 
“You can’t change the price”; or “You have to agree with everyone”, SEF clients 
explained in the interviews. Sometimes prices were so low that they hardly 
covered expenses. Business strategies, selling areas, and time schedules were 
often settled together. If two neighbours were running a beer house next to each 
other, they might even decide on the days when each could run her business in 
order to avoid direct competition. Within a microcredit group, one member 
might sell underwear, the other blankets, and buying these items from each 
other at a certain price would just circulate money within the group (Elyachar 
2005, Guérin 2006, Hietalahti and Nygren 2011, Maclean 2010).  
Far from being practised harmoniously, however, price setting was not 
always decided smoothly. Kanai, MCP client in Lamune, explained how the 
intense competition in the saturated markets forced clients to cut prices: 
“Sometimes you find that there are four women in line who are selling the same 
item.… There are just too many people who are selling cold drinks; we are not 
selling at the same price, we are fighting over the prices.” Considering the 
market as a social institution, sales places and selling communities were 
determined not only by women’s economic capabilities but also according to 
each client’s social status. This was illustrated by Kanai, who had recently lost 
neighbourly help and become excluded from the whole selling community. 
Kanai had had a stall on a remote road. As Kanai explained, because women in 
the area considered the location of Kanai’s stall as the best, and because “she had 
colonised it wrongly”, all the sellers nearby moved their stalls and created a new 
selling community far away from Kanai.  
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This was merely a symbolic gesture; Maclean (2010) describes the force of 
social relations in micro businesses in Bolivia, where if someone deviated from 
the social rules, she was condemned for being selfish and lost customers as a 
result. This was problematic in rural areas in particular, where there were fewer 
opportunities to form extra-community linkages than in urban areas (Maclean 
2010: 507). Paradoxically, while competing in prices is supposed to be rational 
and efficient in financial terms, in Limpopo it generally happened at the cost of 
excluding someone from the selling community.   
Aside from reflecting the reluctant solidarity, conflicting relations and power 
games among poor entrepreneurs (cf. Bähre 2007b), Kanai’s case can be seen as 
an example of too narrow conceptualisation of social capital. Instead of 
considering it simply the capital of poor women, and assuming that women in 
microcredit programmes are able to transform various social resources into 
income, Bebbington (2007: 158) argues that social capital needs to be 
understood in terms of the broader relationships of hierarchy, difference and 
power. In the same way, microcredit markets should be considered as a form of 
social practice rather than just a certain physical place (Elyachar 2005: 96). In 
the microcredit game of SEF clients, the exercise of power became evident in the 
various fields and spaces, which themselves had different meanings and 
symbolic values for clients, and which all created their own hierarchical order. 
The best selling places for certain clients offers a typical example of such a 
system.  
Blurred distinction between business and domestic affairs  
Also characteristic of SEF clients’ business strategies in Limpopo was the 
blurred distinction between business and domestic affairs. Women were usually 
responsible for the housework; often they also provided for family’s subsistence 
alone. They took charge of food procurement, washed the dishes and laundry, 
cleaned the houses, carried water and attended to the children. Organising child 
care was a continuous challenge. SEF clients often took their babies along to the 
centre meetings and market places, breastfed them when needed, and then 
continued their duties. Women also used their extended families and other 
social networks to help with child care. The children of many interviewed 
women lived with their grandparents in other villages or towns while the 
mothers ran their businesses; some women took care of their grandchildren 
while the parents worked in town or if the parents had died.  
According to the interview data, Limpopoan women’s relations with their 
natal families were close. Mothers, daughters and sisters substituted for each 
other in businesses and everyday activities. For instance, Flora, SEF client from 
Mosetsana, told how her daughter, who lived in Polokwane, helped her with 
stocking and selling. Reciprocity within the natal family ensured support, not 
only to elderly generations but also to daughters who were single mothers or had 
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been left by their husbands. In general, people struggled to take care of their 
elderly parents or disabled family members, and many households took in their 
daughters if they had been abandoned by their partners. In such cases, 
household “immobility, a choice not to move” (Lee 2009: 60, 79), became an 
important survival strategy for women.  
The success of SEF microcredit clients was connected to and dependent on 
active social networks and supportive kin in particular. Those women whose 
husbands were retired or enjoyed regular wages or other benefits could secure 
their everyday expenditures or budget against unexpected financial shocks 
better than those women-headed households who relied exclusively on women’s 
microcredit and micro businesses. In this respect, Jamila, the traditional healer 
that I met a few times in Lamune, was one of the fortunate ones: her husband’s 
pensionable pay together with her ability to “work as a team” with him helped 
considerably in her business strategies. Similar stories occurred in all the 
villages studied. 
The interviewees utilised various networks of social and financial support for 
generating income. If “serious” help was needed, women tended to turn to their 
kin and relatives in accordance with the rule of reciprocity: women first asked 
for help from their mothers, husbands, adult children, sisters or other close 
relatives. As was revealed in the interviews, the ability to utilise social networks 
in urban areas was an important way for SEF clients to advance their businesses. 
Indeed, SEF clients utilised their networks widely in the cities, especially in 
Johannesburg, Polokwane and Durban. They ordered items from their husbands 
or other relatives working in the cities, who then bought the required items in 
Chinatown or the Indian markets and delivered them to the women. While 
everyone went shopping in a nearby town at the end of the month, better-off 
clients often rented a taxi for transporting stock in Johannesburg or Durban. 
Linda described her travels to Johannesburg as follows:  
 
There is a group of people with whom we hire a taxi. Each of us pays R250 
for the taxi fare. We leave around 8 or 9 in the evening. When we get halfway, 
the driver rests, we sleep on the road. Then around six in the morning we go 
to a place where they sell steel. Around eight we go to the shops where we 
buy our own things. We also go to the chemistry …  and buy warm clothes. 
We go to the northern part of the city to buy duvets. Then we go to a place 
called Jambo and buy cosmetics … head pins, eyebrow pencils … and to a 
place called Plaza where we take a trailer. The driver takes us to cheap places 
and goes back to Plaza; that’s where he packs the taxi. We go to China City to 
buy cheap bags … and cheap clothes. Then we go to Plaza … and put our 
luggage in order. From there people still go to shops to buy jackets, for 
instance. They go to the mall and buy duvets and covers. Around four o’clock 
in the evening we go back, and around 2 a.m. we come back home. 
Linda,  MCP client in Lamune, 20 June 2007  
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Many clients depended on their relatives for help in the business, and 
acquaintances provided important links to information and commercial 
privileges. Some clients shifted the business operations to their children so they 
could take on domestic or formal sector employment: “I make 200 when my kids 
sell the simbas [crisps] and sweets at the school. Myself, I’m working; I wash 
people’s houses, and I’m able to make 600 per month”, Imani, SEF client from 
Lamune explained. Children helped their mothers with the housework or in 
running the businesses − sometimes at the expense of school.  
Although help from family members was crucial for Limpopoan women, it 
would be short-sighted to consider kinship relationships entirely reliable. 
Neither were these relationships stable nor permanent. As Lee (2009: 46–47) 
and Mayoux (2001) point out, different members within a household may have 
competing ways of using and valuing supporting networks. A strategy used by 
one member of a household may harm another. As Lee (2009) suggests in the 
case in Cape Town, the household was a key site of contestation through which 
conflicting values, perspectives and lifestyles were expressed and mediated. 
Disagreements over strategies, rights and responsibilities were often expressed 
in gendered terms, and occurred between different generations, reflecting the 
unequal distribution of power in domestic relations (Lee 2009: 46–47; 72). This 
is a phenomenon which has been mentioned little in social capital debates based 
on the assumptions that shared values, solidarity and reciprocity prosper within 
kin and neighbourhood (Bebbington 2007: 157, Bähre 2007ab, Mayoux 2001: 
451–452, Molyneux 2002, Silvey and Elmhirst 2003).  
Despite women’s strong relations with their natal families in Limpopo, 
bridging the generation gap was not always easy. Women’s relationships with 
teenagers or adult children were often demanding, in addition to other 
livelihood pressures. It was difficult for young people to establish sustainable 
livelihoods and raise their own families; lack of resources forced them to live 
with their parents or leave their children with relatives, which often created 
generational conflicts between women (cf. Lee 2009). Conflicts in the networks 
of reciprocity were especially obvious in situations where some of the household 
members earned regular incomes but were not willing to contribute to the 
common pot of incomes (cf. Lee 2009). The shifting values of the young made it 
problematic to force regular contributions towards household finances, even 
when work was found, which made elderly women the core providers in a 
multigenerational structure of care.  
Kanai, SEF client from Lamune, described her children, born in 1980 and 
1989, as “completely enervating her”. One of the children was studying, while 
the other was working as a builder, which made him, in Kanai’s view, obligated 
to participate in the household expenses. This did not happen, however. “He gets 
his own money but he does not help me”, Kanai explained to me. According to 
her, instead of supporting her business, the children stole food and sweets from 
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her stock. Half-blind and diabetic, she wished that the children would help her 
at least with the housework: “But they don’t agree; they don’t want to help,” she 
regretted. Linking such worries with the Bourdieuan representation of social 
networks as arenas of struggle, it became clear in the interviews that even in 
such a close social composition as a family or household, team play, shared logic 
and solidarity could not be taken for granted. Consequently, if intra-household 
conflicts between different genders and generations are not acknowledged, there 
is a risk that social inequalities and their reproduction within these networks 
will also remain unnoticed. 
 While immobility was an important survival strategy for many women in 
Limpopo, from the older generation’s point of view, such a system was expensive 
and burdensome and thus sometimes an unwanted responsibility – even if it 
brought a certain authority. In general, equalising the state pension between 
White and Black South Africans in 1993 (Lee 2010: 66), and further, between 
women and men (News24 2010), has had a great impact on rural livelihoods.26 
Pensions began to provide a safety net for African households with no other 
source of income. Old people, previously amongst the most vulnerable in society, 
were now able to gain some relief to poverty. In 1995, about 42% of the poorest 
quintile of Africans received an old-age pension (Lee 2010: 66). 
Despite the critical importance of pensions for many poor South African 
people, the average of R800 a month was not enough to cover everyday 
expenses. Despite their regular pensions, pensioners often lived from hand to 
mouth. When I asked women whom they considered the most vulnerable people 
in the village, they often mentioned pensioners in particular. My interpreter 
worried about pensioners because they were “easy targets for mashonishas”, the 
loan sharks, and were “in serious trouble with their debts” or “exploited by their 
relatives”.  
The problems of HIV and Aids only increased the weight of the burden. 
South Africa has the highest number of people infected with HIV and Aids in the 
world: an estimated 5.6 million in 2009. Approximately a third of women aged 
25–29, often living in rural areas, are bearers of HIV (AVERT 2009). This means 
that elderly women often have to take care of family members suffering from 
HIV and/or Aids-orphans. What makes the situation even more problematic is 
HIV-related suspicions: in the narratives of SEF clients in Limpopo, this topic 
was still a taboo. Typically, fears and stigmas were linked to HIV and Aids. If 
someone was suffering from HIV-related illnesses, people were not necessarily 
keen to take care of the patient – or at least they wanted to keep it a secret from 
villagers.  
While many SEF clients told me that their husbands supported their 
businesses, in the interviews, SEF clients complained bitterly about how men 
had ignored their responsibilities as caretakers, which is a typical example of the 
                                                 
26 R810 per month in 2007; R1,010 in 2009. 
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extensive literature on challenges in intra-household relations (Lee 2009, 
Mayoux 2001, Rankin 2002). One reason for men’s absenteeism from household 
responsibilities was structural. Because of high levels of unemployment, men 
had few choices for making a living in Limpopo. Long-distances had made the 
periods of job search and migration longer. “My husband works in 
Johannesburg. He comes back twice a year”, or “My husband has a taxi-business 
in Durban. He sends me some money”, were typical utterances by SEF clients. 
As they were usually men who left, more and more women were becoming single 
household heads, depending on the remittances from husbands and other 
relatives. These remittances, however, often remained insufficient and irregular, 
or were not forthcoming at all. Similarly, men’s engagement with household 
expenses was often sporadic. Women did not know what the absent workers 
were earning, and the amounts and schedules of the payments were variable. 
Some migrants wanted to stay permanently, which further changed the 
kinship relations and the shift towards a matriarchal household structure. Often 
the husbands who left started new families and new lives in towns or cities. Sons 
who left in search of work to Cape Town or Johannesburg often left for good, 
and it could take years before they contacted their natal families. This happened 
to Ada, SEF client from Pekenene, whose son had moved to Cape Town to work 
there as a teacher. “There is a tendency that men just leave and they don’t come 
back. So he hasn’t been back in six years”, Ada explained. The son had married a 
Xhosa woman, an unwelcome event that Ada considered as the fundamental 
reason for the son’s reluctance to be in contact. Ada’s daughter, instead, visited 
her regularly. “She sends money, and she comes back”, Ada stated, attesting to 
the stronger reciprocity between mothers and daughters.   
Although the success of women’s businesses was often connected to 
financially supportive husbands, sometimes women’s participation in 
microcredit only reinforced conventional gender roles. SEF encouraged potential 
clients to discuss the loan with their husbands. Sometimes SEF personnel visited 
husbands to introduce SEF rules and to facilitate the women’s enrolment in 
microcredit programmes:  
 
We get this member and go to her house: “Ooh, this is your home!” We greet 
the husband, say hello, and tell him to choose SEF. Because culturally women 
here in Tzaneen, if somebody wants to do something, she must go to the man 
to get the approval. “Oh, my husband, I need to do one, two, three things. Do 
you think it is ok?” Then, if the man says it’s ok, then she can go and do those 
things.  
Simo, development facilitator in Mogalantšu branch, 13 July 2007 
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Dropping out of microcredit groups because of a spouse’s opposition was fairly 
common (SEF 2008: 6). According to the SEF clients, because of bad 
experiences with loan sharks, the main concern for many men was that their 
wives would plunge into a cycle of debt. As Susu, MCP client in Pekenene, said, 
her husband did not like her signing contracts and being obligated to pay. “He 
supports stokvels more, because with stokvel you don’t owe anybody”, Susu 
explained. However, Susu was determined to continue with her businesses:  
 
I’m the one who is working here. I mean, he lives in Jo’burg, so I just do what 
I can here, handling my business. He comes back every month and sends me 
money. When I make good profits, I send him some money too, so it’s easier 
for him to come back with my stock.  
Susu, MCP client in Pekenene, 8 June 2007 
According to many women, their husbands first strongly opposed microcredit, 
but the desire for a better life made the application for a loan attractive – 
especially when they saw the fruits of the hard work in the form of a new house 
and improved living conditions. In remote places, especially, where many men 
were unemployed or miserably paid, women’s extra income was essential for the 
family’s survival.  
Sometimes men took control over financial matters in the households even if 
the money originally belonged to the women; in such cases the women could 
spend very little directly on themselves. As Josephine, SEF client from Leloba 
explained: “You can’t really spend money on yourself, because you always think 
about the loan which you have to pay back.” At the same time, women often did 
not know how much money their husbands, boyfriends or other male supporters 
were earning. “They are African men, you know! They don’t tell such things”, 
was their explanation.  
Many women fretted over the “lure of alcohol and other women” that had 
weakened men’s power of reasoning. This was the case with Jamila and her 
husband, too. Despite the good team spirit, not all had gone smoothly between 
them. Jamila’s arms flailed around in the air as she told a story about her 
husband and his girlfriend. ”Normally he brings money home. Then one day you 
find out that some of the money is missing from his salary. But when you try to 
ask what happened to the rest of the money, he just says: It’s nothing!” “Then 
another day I realised that the hundred rand missing from his salary is because 
he was buying food for another woman!” Jamila continued. This did not deter 
Jamila, however. Jamila went to see this other woman to tell her that what she 
was doing was not right. “But she just stands up and wants to fight!” Eventually, 
“after a good fight”, Jamila and the extra-marital girlfriend wound up in the 
police station, where the police put an end to the matter. As a result, the 
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husband mended his ways. After all, Jamila was a good choice for him: she made 
money. “Everything we do, we do as a team. We invest together and we have 
built a very big house together,” Jamila said. Not all women were equally lucky, 
however. While SEF clients sometimes reacted strongly to their husband’s 
involvements with other women, in many cases, there was not much they could 
do about it.  
SEF clients rarely mentioned their social responsibilities and domestic duties 
to the representatives of SEF: They did not want SEF to interfere with their 
personal affairs, nor did they believe SEF would be willing to do so. This is partly 
because the clients were advised by SEF fieldworkers that problems in the family 
should not be solved in public. As Beth, SEF client from Lamune, described, 
“SEF isn’t involved in our personal lives; this is how SEF operates. We solve our 
problems. If there is a person who has a problem, we assist her. It’s not SEF’s 
business.” 
In reality, SEF clients’ enrolment in microcredit programmes depended 
greatly on the way that rights and responsibilities between household members 
were distributed. Social responsibilities were just concealed from the SEF staff 
as if it would have been possible to separate them from business affairs. This did 
not mean that the SEF staff was unaware that there were problems in women’s 
businesses or household relations. The following quotation from Maria, one of 
the branch managers, illustrates this:  
 
Branch manager: Women run businesses and give money to their husbands. 
“You take this and buy cigarettes; you take this and buy alcohol!” 
Interviewer: Why do they give the money to their husbands? 
Branch manager: They love them! They are taking care of them! Husband is 
not working; he depends on the business of the wife. So the wife is buying 
him clothes, food and everything.  
Interviewer: How about those who are cheating on their wives? 
Branch manager: Of course they are cheating! If you give him money, he will 
take the money and eat with another woman and you will be left suffering. 
He might tell you that “give me the money; I want to buy this and that”. But 
he won’t buy anything. And you have agreed with him that he will pay so that 
you can pay your loan back. At the end of the day, he doesn’t pay and you are 
the one who is suffering, looking around for the money.  
Maria, branch manager in Hlare, 13 July 2007 
Typically, SEF discovered the truth too late. As Maria explained, “if the groups 
pay back properly and have the means to get the money, SEF doesn’t hear 
anything”. Thus, while such situations typically took place in clients’ homes or at 
other “hidden stages” (Wilshusen 2009a), and because clients were usually 
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reluctant to mention their problems to the representatives of SEF, it was difficult 
for the organisation to interfere in problematic situations. Moreover, female 
fieldworkers also felt that it was difficult for them to intervene in clients’ 
domestic affairs and to challenge unequal gender relations because they were 
women themselves and thus in a subordinate position to men. As Maria said 
when describing the challenges with clients’ disinclined and threatening 
husbands: 
 
We normally talk to the husband, but he just barks: “I’m hungry! Why did 
you give money to this woman? She’s not doing fine and now you are coming 
to my place. I don’t want you here!” So I have to calm him down and try to 
tell that I’m not here to fight with him. It’s just that we had an agreement. 
“Ja-nee!27 You had an agreement! But not with me! Get out of my house!” 
You see? 
Maria, branch manager in Hlare, 13 July 2007 
Lineah, a branch manager with a 16-year working history at SEF, managed the 
gender-based problems by restricting men’s access to SEF loans: “When I was 
working as a development facilitator, I did not give men loans because they are 
criminals! I decided to give loans only to women.” The SEF rules stipulated that 
no more than one man was allowed in an MCP group, while the TCP programme 
was designed only for female members (SEF 2006: 24). This new policy was 
created after the miserable results of SEF’s attempt to provide microloans also 
for groups with male members. In the interviews, SEF clients described how 
difficult it would have been for women to claim their outstanding debt from 
male members because of the men’s superior position over women. As many of 
the clients explained, men tended to take advantage of women in groups and 
forced women to pay their debts. There were circulating rumours about men 
who just “took the money and left the women to pay”. Some women implicated 
that the question was about gender inequalities; some women told me about 
groups in which men had been abusive to their female peers. At times my 
informants told me fairly shocking stories about domestic violence, abuse and 
other shattering experiences. When I asked whether Lineah’s loan policy had 
changed after she started to work as a branch manager, she answered: 
“According to SEF rules, there can be one man in a group. But I tell my DFs that 
men are giving us problems, we only take women.”  
These comments not only illustrate the complicated power relations among 
various groups of actors; they also offer an example of “historically contingent 
and contextually specific political cultures” associated with the hidden practices 
of staff members of the microcredit organisation in interaction with their clients 
                                                 
27 Ja-nee is an Afrikaans term and means “sure” or “that’s a fact” or “of course” in English. 
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(Wilshusen 2009a). What these findings also implicate is the inability of 
microcredit to efficiently challenge the unequal gender structures that are 
prevalent, not only in intra-household relations but also between clients and 
staff members of the microcredit organisation, as well as between the clients’ 
husbands – or wives – and staff members. 
Gender relations renegotiated  
Although men had much control over their wives in terms of mobility, sexuality 
and household relations (Mattila 2011: 253), this did not mean that Limpopoan 
women were “passive victims” or that they had no authority over other members 
in the household. In many of the informants’ households, women in particular 
took care of financial matters and briefed their husbands on such issues. 
Participation in businesses and earning money undoubtedly also increased at 
least some women’s decision-making power, as Jamila’s case suggests. Because 
of their poor employment opportunities, men often became economically 
dependent on their wives and daughters, in contrast to “mainstream ‘gender and 
development’ -notions of women’s economic subordination” (Mattila 2011: 253).  
As Rankin (2002: 8) explains the matter in her study on Middle East and 
Asia, while women recognised male domination as an ideology, they also 
“complied in strategic ways to ensure their own and their children’s security”. 
SEF clients did not always tell their husbands how much money they earned 
from their businesses or how much money they had deposited into the savings 
accounts. In a certain sense, the women also utilised a protective element 
included in the SEF saving mechanisms. SEF encouraged clients to save a small 
amount of money on a two-week basis, and although the savings were personal, 
the approval of all group members was required to withdraw the savings from 
the post office group account. Such a system was developed to protect against 
malpractices but also made it more difficult for husbands or other outsiders to 
access the group members’ money.  
Sometimes women strategically used their obligations to SEF as an excuse for 
not helping their husbands or other relatives. While help from a relative could be 
considered as a gift, according to the existing social rules, it was expected that 
such favours would be repaid by the reciprocal fulfilment of the demands of 
needy relatives and friends. Guérin (2006) notes in her study of microfinance in 
Senegal that under such conditions, people usually avoid saving in cash because 
having cash on hand makes a person vulnerable to demands by relatives and 
friends in need. As Bähre (2007a) notes concerning the informal “financial 
mutuals” in Cape Town,28 the financial mutual serves as a social constraint 
                                                 
28 By this term Bähre (2007a) refers to various rotating savings groups, credit associations and burial 
and funeral societies. 
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ensuring that money is available when needed for certain purposes, and shared 
with selected people. While members of these financial mutuals force each other 
to contribute to the common pot, at the same time, the system makes it possible 
to influence the flow of money and relationships, and thus “separate oneself 
from certain people” (Bähre 2007a: 170). 
In semi-urban areas, women had also found political ways to organise 
themselves. Limpopo has a long history of women’s societies, such as credit and 
savings clubs and religious associations, and in recent years, political 
movements such as the ANC Women’s League have gained increasing influence. 
These movements play an important role in supporting marginalised women 
and encouraging them to question the unequal distribution of resources and 
hierarchical positions of power. Beth, one of the SEF clients, explained the 
situation as follows: 
 
Beth: At present there is one [SEF] group member who has problems. She 
has an abusive husband. After every meeting, she bought a stock of goods 
with the money she took from SEF. And he threw them away, which is quite 
bad, you know. But we came together as a group and we’re trying to solve this 
problem. 
Interviewer: What can you do about this problem? 
Beth: Well, we went to the house and made an appointment to see this guy. 
He didn’t want to meet us that day; he didn’t want to talk to us. And we’ve 
been going there time and time again, and he isn’t anywhere to be found. So, 
we went to the police station and reported the case as domestic abuse, and 
we also went to the ANC Women’s League. 
Interviewer: So, what exactly are you going to do? 
Beth: Well...we’re not going to use any force or anything, we’re just going to 
sit him down and tell him how it is. Usually in situations like this they 
apologise. 
Beth, MCP client in Lamune, 18 June 2007 
This said it is worth noting that while the empowering effect of social capital in 
western feminist thinking is often considered as a universal ambition of women 
(Mayoux 2001), in the everyday lives of SEF clients the central worry was related 
to multifaceted struggles over generating income rather than on the women’s 
liberation movement. The role of microcredit for SEF clients was important 
because it provided a chance to establish a business and earn cash; microcredit 
was not necessarily linked to the idea of equality as such in the minds of SEF 
clients. As Rosenlew (2012: 47) in her study on conventional women’s groups in 
Senegal suggests, for African women the wellbeing of their children is the main 
worry, not necessarily the struggle for economic independence.  
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While the social capital-oriented literature on microcredit typically considers 
solidarity ties as the key in helping to mobilise women’s productive capacity and 
thus impact on women’s empowerment (Mayoux 2001, Molyneux 2002, Rankin 
2002), for SEF clients, the idea of “solidarity ties” in many cases meant rather 
that because of the rules set by the microcredit organisation group members 
should help each other; otherwise, the operations of the whole group and 
ultimately the operations of the whole microcredit organisation would come to a 
standstill.  
SEF clients were of course in many ways independent “bosses of their own 
lives”, as the research on the empowering effect of microcredit on women often 
suggests (Hossain et al. 2011). It is difficult, however, to estimate the real scale 
of independence gained. Has the absence of men and the move towards a 
matriarchal household structure strengthened women’s position within the 
family or in the society in general? What is the role of microcredit in this 
process? González de la Rocha’s (2007: 51) study on the resourcefulness of the 
poor in the context of diminishing labour options in Mexico stresses that there is 
little reason to consider women’s participation in generating income as a 
“feminisation” of household economies. Instead, she argues, diversity of income 
sources and the co-existence of various workers within households should be 
seen as a “forced by-product of poverty” to ensure survival. 
During the fieldwork, the general impression of a somewhat subordinate 
position of South African women that I had internalised took a new turn when I 
participated in the centre meeting in Leloba and carried out an interview with 
one of the SEF male clients. This 80-year-old man, Elias, had replaced his wife, 
who had fallen ill and was incapable of running her businesses. A couple of 
weeks before our interview the wife had, however, requested Elias to leave SEF. 
Although he was sad, he had no choice. As Elias said, dropping out of SEF was 
his wife’s definite wish: 
 
Elias: I would love to continue with SEF, but my wife started this thing and 
now she’s telling me that it’s time to pull out. 
Interviewer: What are you going to do after SEF then? 
Elias: There is nothing I can do. I would love to continue with SEF: I love 
doing business because this money was helping me; I was able to buy 
vegetables and bananas and sell. That’s what kept me busy. 
Interviewer:  If you finish with SEF, will you be able to continue with your 
businesses?  
Elias: I don’t think it would be easy to do business without SEF, because I’m 
a pensioner. And that money is only for household needs, not for business.  
Elias, MCP client in Leloba, 5 July 2007 
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The conversation with Elias, this old man who was supporting his wife and Aids-
orphan grandchildren, stuck in my mind, since this situation contrasted sharply 
with the view that I had formed from various interviews and SEF policies and 
procedures: this view according to which loans were usually targeted at women 
because they accepted responsibility, and according to which women’s 
enrolment in microcredit programmes was greatly affected by the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among household members: the dominating men and 
their mothers and wives.  
Inspired by Elias’ story, I started to ask more about SEF clients’ views on 
men in the microcredit groups. It became clear that there was the other side of 
the coin, too. The attitudes towards micro businesses were fairly gender-
sensitive and micro entrepreneurship was commonly considered a “women’s 
job”. Elias explained that although many men were unemployed, they could not 
start their small businesses through microcredit “because that’s what women 
do”. Rahma, SEF client from the same centre as Elias in Leloba, revealed that 
often men did not want to tell their families if they had joined SEF. According to 
Rahma, this was not only because of the image of businesses as women’s work, 
but also because of wives’ suspiciousness towards other women: “She doesn’t 
believe that you are looking for money for SEF. She thinks you want the money 
– and her husband – for yourself.”  
 
 
Symbolic capital as a source of power 
Success story of Jamila 
The crucial factors that finally mark the better-off clients from the poorest is 
encapsulated in the following story of Jamila, the traditional healer in Lamune. 
Jamila was not only able to utilise various social networks as well as regular 
incomes in the household; importantly, she managed to take advantage of her 
social networks as well as social status, bolstered by various power symbols.  
Jamila was one of the most successful microcredit clients whom I met during 
my field research in Limpopo. In 2000, at the age of 46, she took a chance and 
invested the start-up loan of 800 rand in duvets, blankets and hair care 
products. Gradually she was able to expand and diversify her businesses. She 
had taken a 7,600 rand loan around the time of my fieldwork. Her monthly 
revenues had risen a dozenfold to nearly 7,000 rand. After seven years of hard 
work she was finally able to see the fruits of her labour. Jamila earned her 
income mostly through the clothing business and by selling other more 
expensive items such as blankets and bedsheets. From these goods she made an 
approximately 2,000 rand profit a month. Jamila’s principal source of 
livelihood, however, was her work as a traditional healer, which, in a good 
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month, earned her about 3,000–4,000 rand. Prices varied according to the 
services offered, as Jamila herself explained: “Protection for the house costs 300 
rand, removing bad luck 500 rand, curing children’s headaches 200 rand, and 
problems in extremities 800 rand.”  
Jamila managed her savings, investments and cash flows through various 
financial and social mechanisms. She had separate accounts for different items 
and incomes. The money loaned was for the business; the account at Standard 
Bank, SB, was for personal items, such as children’s university fees and other 
“serious expenses”; the account at the Post Bank was for SEF savings. Her 
husband was well-off and they owned a big house in semi-urban Lamune. She 
was about to buy a car, had a television, a radio and a mobile phone, and good 
access to information and services. Networks and kin relations enabled her to 
manage any risks and sudden events through help, money, advice and improved 
security.  
In addition to the SEF loan, Jamila had opened credit accounts at local 
shops: she had bought electronics and furniture on hire purchase. She was a 
client of two funeral societies called Two Mountains and Africa Solution in the 
town, and a member of two informal burial societies in the community. She 
saved through four different stokvel saving societies, and was in charge of 
various associations. Inspired by these operations, she began to run her own 
credit business. With a 15% interest rate she was able to offer a good option to 
the mashonishas, who commonly charged a 50% nominal interest rate for their 
loans and set ultra-strict loan terms, typically requiring that the whole loan sum 
with interest had to be paid in a month.  
Eventually this innovative businesswoman even started to charge her SEF 
group mates interest whenever they were struggling with a loan repayment and 
needed monetary help. In a certain sense, she was acting as a loan shark within 
the group. On the other hand, she was acting as any joint surety would act in a 
similar case: as Jamila considered the social collateral insufficient, she was ready 
to guarantee the other members’ loans only against sufficient financial security. 
While the level of security, that is, the amount of savings or other assets poor 
women in microcredit groups had, was hardly sufficient, instead of considering 
furniture or other saleable assets as suitable security, Jamila made group 
members pay a risk premium in the form of interest for the risk of default. She 
explained the arrangement as follows: 
 
[In my group] some people are good. They have businesses outside and they 
are able to pay back; some never fail to pay. But then, when there is one 
member struggling, they are to be helped. I tell them that if I use my money 
to pay their loans, they should come back with interest. Then we agree and so 
I pay for them.  
Jamila, MCP client in Lamune, 6 June 2007 
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Jamila, this successful traditional healer and businesswoman, not only 
understood the rules of the business game; she also gave advice to others and 
simultaneously gained authority through allocated loans, tips and advice. By 
“helping” the group members through low-interest loans, Jamila generated 
bonds that concealed the hierarchical nature of social relationships; this 
provides a clear example of the ambiguity of the systems of reciprocity (Guérin 
2007: 559). Jamila fulfilled her obligations to others and expected other 
members to fulfil their obligations to her, that is, to repay the loan with interest.  
As these matters were not framed as gifts, they soon started to be framed in 
terms of debt in its broadest sense: group members started to owe Jamila 
money, interest, help and gratitude (Graeber 2012). In a certain sense, the SEF 
repayment policies also encouraged the need for these kinds of achievers: by 
helping others Jamila ensured group continuity and future loans, and SEF 
management would not need to encounter the clients’ financial problems. 
Jamila had also internalised the external trademarks of a successful 
businesswoman, which she unashamedly used as a means to boost her 
supremacy over the others: 
 
You find that people are unable to plan. When somebody gets money she just 
squanders it irresponsibly. I ask them to look at me! I’m a good planner! I 
wear expensive clothes; I have gold, these earrings! I tell them that when you 
look at me, as beautiful as I am, it is SEF! 
Jamila, MCP client in Lamune, 6 June 2007 
Every now and then Jamila threatened to leave the group, but each time the 
other members begged her to stay. This kind of strategy was an efficient way to 
reproduce unequal relationships even further. As Cleaver (2005) suggests, 
instead of considering credit and savings societies as networks where solidarity 
and close ties automatically flourish, social relations are fragile and social capital 
has to be constantly negotiated. In these negotiations, the winners are often 
those who are able to capitalise upon their status and control over others 
(Kankainen and Siisiäinen 2009: 269, Siisiäinen 2009: 39). This also held true 
in Limpopo, where poor clients were desperately dependent on the wealthier 
ones, who often took advantage of the situation, thereby increasing their power.  
These “Jamilas” were in the key positions and ran the show. They were the 
most popular and the most involved in the business, and they had managed to 
gain a considerable amount of symbolic capital, a prerequisite for social 
positions to become effective (Bourdieu 1985: 724–725). As people do not 
generate social capital and do not acquire social capital on the basis of individual 
choice but rather on the basis of one’s social position (Rankin 2002: 6), their 
positions and resources had become socially effective and legitimised by others 
(Bourdieu 1985: 731, Siisiäinen 2000).  
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In a certain sense, Jamila wanted to become identified in the eyes of others 
through SEF. Leadership and success with SEF became a symbol of social 
position that differentiated the “Jamilas” as better-off clients in contrast to 
poorer clients. These better-off clients were also eager to show their status on 
various occasions. While the poorest clients stocked up in nearby villages or 
towns, the wealthier ones hired a taxi to Johannesburg or Durban to buy their 
items there; some of them even stayed overnight at a hotel. While the poorest 
clients tried to avoid all types of debts, the better-off clients sometimes assumed 
a debt deliberately and then used the funds for informal money lending. In 
practical economics, associational life and social networks thus became forms of 
symbolic capital – “the sum of cultural recognition that an individual could 
acquire through skilful manipulation of the system of social symbols” (Rankin 
2002: 7). 
In addition to their practical role in microcredit businesses, these “Jamilas” 
thus had a wider symbolic position in the reproduction of the social 
differentiation among SEF clients. Through various power symbols, such as 
houses, better cars or more intense associational lives, Jamila and similar 
businesswomen differentiated between “us” and “others”. Such differentiation 
was not confined to the divide between wealthier and poorer members within a 
group or centre. The MCP clients in Leloba also strongly distinguished 
themselves from the MCP clients from Pekenene, for example, whom they 
considered to be in a lower social position due to their poorer residential area 
and lower socio-economic opportunities. Mobility and access to vehicles, 
number of rooms in the house, water facilities and domestic appliances were 
some of the idioms of affluence that clients used in this differentiation. 
At the same time, many of the most vulnerable clients were excluded from 
advantageous business circles because of their poverty and disadvantaged social 
status. In fact, social indicators were often more relevant than financial situation 
in determining whether one was included in or excluded from social networks 
(Bähre 2007a: 86). Contradictory images of successful versus questionable 
businesses were confusing. People told horror stories of persons engaged in the 
clothing business “who sell their items on credit and then have problems in 
getting their money back”; of vegetable hawkers “who lose all their capital 
because of spoiled stocks of tomatoes”; and of beer brewers “who cause all kinds 
of problems in communities by persuading men to drink too much”. In contrast, 
others preferred the clothing business “because it gives you plenty of money”; 
the food business “because people need something to eat every day”; the phone 
business “because it allows people to stay in communication with other people” 
(cf. Karim 2011: 101); or the beer business “because men always drink”. In this 
jungle of differing valuations and rumours, convincing others about their 
trustworthy status became increasingly difficult for those who wanted to join a 
microcredit group. 
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Thus, social networks, while enabling certain actors access to particular 
resources, thus reflecting the hierarchical relations of the networks, at the same 
time deny others access to these resources (Bähre 2007a; 2007b). The optimal 
group members were those who were “reliable” and “able to pay”, and “who 
knew enough, but not too much”, while no group wanted somebody with a “poor 
reputation” or “slowness to pay” to threaten their businesses or to discredit their 
reputation. While money and assets were significant elements in the selection of 
group membership, equally important in the selection of group members was 
access to various forms of capital, as was the case with Jamila, who had a 
leadership position in various stokvels and a commonly acknowledged status. 
These distinctions were implicitly reinforced by the SEF’s ranking system, which 
evaluated the most successful clients as the most prestigious. This was not only 
because of their ability to help their poor fellows and thus ensure high 
repayment rates; these clients also served as convincing examples of success for 
other potential clients, thus acting as valuable “business cards” of the 
microcredit organisation − the role which Jamila tended to glory in. 
In a certain sense, the microcredit organisation also implicitly widened the 
gap between the better-off and poorer clients by its loan terms. Wealthier clients 
usually got bigger loans from the beginning, and thus gained a better starting 
point for their businesses, and abilities to strategise in the game of microcredit. 
Many of them were engaged in the textile and sewing businesses, where it was 
possible to increase loan sizes more quickly than, for example, in the grocery 
business. The size of dressmakers’ loans ranged from 1,000 to 5,000 rand, while 
sellers of fruit and soft drinks had to be content with a maximum loan of 1,000 
rand. While such a differentiation system proceeded logically and acceptably 
from the lender’s point of view, at the same time, such arrangements had a 
tendency to strengthen the existing power relations between the clients, giving 
increasing authority to those who were already in a better position. 
Hapless story of Shani 
Even if Jamila and other microcredit pioneers distinguished themselves on the 
basis of their privileged social position, in practice, the everyday lives of SEF 
clients were closely integrated. A privileged position was also easy to lose. A 
good example in this respect was Shani, who despite a long and faithful loan 
history with SEF as well as good will, was rebuffed by the neighbour customers 
and quarrelled with other SEF clients.  
The story of Shani encapsulates various problems that SEF clients faced in 
their everyday businesses: stiff competition, ambiguous loyalties between 
microcredit clients, decreased solidarity and intra-household conflicts. It 
challenges the idea of reciprocal trust relations and ties of solidarity as typically 
linked to “community-based” microcredit groups. It is a reminder of the risks of 
simplistic notions of harmonic community relations and horizontal norms of 
 122 | EVERYDAY POLITICS OF MICROCREDIT 
solidarity (Bähre 2007a), and illustrates Bourdieu’s (2005: 198) idea of the field 
of power, in which the economic practices of clients equipped with different 
resources, logics and interests depend on the positions they occupy in the social 
fields. 
When I met this mysterious lady for the first time in the village of Mosetsana 
in June 2007, she wanted to make sure from the beginning of our discussion 
that I understood her position as “one of the key persons” among SEF clients. 
Shani had joined SEF in 1992, one of the first SEF clients ever, which she used as 
a justification for why she deserved special treatment from SEF:  
 
I used to go to meetings in Leloba before SEF could even come here. I’m one 
of the persons who made sure that SEF was brought to the region of 
Phašaka…. I’m one of the best payers as far as the loan is concerned. There’s 
nobody who comes even close. But there is no preference treatment 
according to how long you have been a member or how well you pay.  
Shani, TCP client in Mosetsana, 25 June 2007 
Not all matters had developed as Shani would have wished, and she complained 
about the organisation not keeping its promises concerning loans: “They always 
say that for specific customers or clients who have a good history – like me – 
they would give loans that are suitable.” According to Shani, this did not happen. 
In Thapêlô, the town in which Shani used to live before she decided to move 
back to her roots in the village of rural Mosetsana, SEF had given her a loan of 
10,000 rand. In the latest loan cycle she only managed to get 4,000 rand. “I 
don’t know what the difference is, but I would need a bigger amount to be able to 
do what I want to do: to start a cement business”, Shani bemoaned. Instead of 
being able to expand her businesses, Shani had to be satisfied with a smaller 
loan, stiff competition, and unfaithful customers. She had lost her trust in other 
SEF clients and her neighbours “who never paid back”. I surmised from the 
interviews that Shani’s business community was enmeshed in complicated debt 
relations in which insolvent debt claims were a common source of conflicts 
between Shani and other SEF clients. Shani described the situation as follows: 
 
There was a woman who took a loan of 500 rand but failed to pay. The group 
refused to pay so I paid the loan from my own pocket, but the money was 
never repaid to me. And she’s on the other side of the mountain now. Also, 
another one took a loan in 1992 and I never got that money back. From 1992! 
I told her that I’m tired of this and will take the matter to the police. She said 
she would give the money back the next day, but I only managed to get 160 
rand. 
Shani, TCP client in Mosetsana, 25 June 2007 
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Such vicissitudes were not limited to microcredit businesses. When I met Shani 
a couple of days later, she told me that somebody had broken into her house the 
previous night and stolen CD’s and some money from her son’s wallet. 
According to Shani, the robbery was only a hapless incident “in a series of bad 
luck”. A few years earlier a herd of cattle had demolished her house, and eaten 
and broken Shani’s goods. A number of friends had borrowed money from Shani 
and never paid the money back. After decades of doing business by carrying 
heavy loads of fruits and vegetables on her head, Shani had injured her neck, 
had surgery but had not recovered well, and was thus forced to give up selling in 
the official market places in the town. In essence, Shani was sure that the 
continual misfortunes in her personal life were a result of some kind of curse. 
She had consulted her Shambo, an ancestor, who had foretold that misfortune 
would follow her, even in the future.  
Although Shani characterised herself as one of the critical clients in the 
microcredit community, she had not been able to build up a dense array of social 
networks and close relationships that would have linked her to the 
neighbourhood and communal life. While it was difficult for Shani to 
understand why all these misfortunes in her businesses had happened and why 
people continuously demonstrated reluctant solidarity towards her, eventually, 
she simply reasoned that people were just jealous. According to Shani, women’s 
business dealings had recently become manipulative and insincere: 
 
People just come and do business with you in order to take you down, and 
they don’t bring your money back. I used to sell cigarettes and people would 
just say: “Your cigarettes are not good; they can kill”. Finally, the whole 
neighbourhood joined forces against me and stopped buying from me. But as 
soon as I quit my business, they started selling cigarettes! 
Shani, TCP client in Mosetsana, 25 June 2007 
While listening to Shani’s descriptions of her business history, the conception of 
microcredit as a magic bullet insuring incomes and more empowerment for 
women began to lose credibility. During our discussions Shani re-evaluated her 
business efforts. She had lost her health and tried several businesses with 
varying success. After cigarettes and vegetables she had moved into phones, 
clothing, fat cooks, cucumbers, tomatoes and mageu29. While in the good old 
days, according to Shani, there was always “plenty of food” and “anything you 
needed” in the house, it was no longer possible for her to provide these things for 
her family: “Business is different these days. And there are lots of fights. That’s 
how people are nowadays.”  
                                                 
29 A popular South African non-alcoholic drink among Sotho people. 
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As typical for multi-generational systems of care, Shani, a mother of five, 
provided a dwelling place for her three children and two of her son’s children. 
According to the rules of reciprocity, while Shani took care of the grandchild, the 
son helped her with stocking items. Shani’s two daughter-in-laws, who lived in 
Johannesburg and Polokwane, delivered second-hand clothes to Shani’s home in 
Mosetsana. Otherwise, her relations with kin were not particularly satisfying. 
One of the children was in constant trouble with loan sharks, which caused extra 
worries for Shani: “He’s buying stuff on credit from the Indians and they always 
come and demand their money. I have to give it to them, because he’s never 
home. Sometimes I just run short.” The long-wished for car, which was 
supposed to be used for Shani’s businesses, was used by her children for other 
purposes. Shani did not have a driving licence, and for the children driving 
around was more fun than delivering mother’s business items from one market 
place to another. Shani’s relationship with her natal family and relatives was 
fragile. Even when she lost one of her children, her parents and other relatives 
did not come to the funeral: “I was very sad for my family and for my child. At 
the end of the day, the biggest sorrow was having no support from the family.” 
During our discussions, it became clear that Shani’s life was full of struggles, 
over personal matters as well as business affairs and unfaithful customers. Her 
personal life had been hard. Shani constantly complained about people not 
paying: “Some haven’t paid for four years, some for ten years.” Her variegated 
business history – from the loss of thousands of rand because of ruined 
tomatoes to capital losses because of unfaithful customers – illustrated how 
risky running a business and money lending could be for poor Limpopoan 
women.  
Gradually I began to realise, however, that the case was not only about 
unreliable group members who did not pay their loans or customers who bought 
on credit and did not pay their debts. In addition, Shani referred to the 
unreliable clients in her own lending business. Even if she considered herself a 
kind person who was willing to help, she had taken a calculated step towards 
gaining a more prestigious social status. Shani had started working as a loan 
shark, which finally explained why she had lost the favourable status in the eyes 
of others that she had once had in her early business years in Thapêlô and later 
in Mosetsana. By acting against the socially approved logic of women in 
Mosetsana, Shani became poor in cultural capital and lost social recognition in 
the community. She was now dealing with the outcome of such behaviour – 
social isolation. 
The problems began when Shani loaned 2,500 rand to a man whose wife was 
attending the same centre meetings. He first borrowed 1,000 rand for his own 
use and then 1,500 rand to help his wife in her businesses. The husband did not 
pay the first loan as agreed, but as Shani explained, “When I went to them, they 
said he’s seriously ill but they still wanted the second loan”. When I asked why 
she gave a loan to a man who was not even able to pay the previous one, she 
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simply said that she “had to help”. Before the man repaid any of the loans or 
even the interest, he suddenly died. After three years, Shani still had not got her 
money. When I asked Shani if she ever went to people’s houses and tried to get 
her money back in the same way as the Indians did in her son’s case, she 
admitted that the methods she used were exactly the same: “After three months 
I did go to her and just took a couple of items from her home. And she hasn’t 
paid me back.” Later I found out that this “couple of items” was the leather sofa 
set I was sitting on during our discussions in Shani’s living room. “My intention 
was to make them to pay and then give them their things back. But they never 
came. I don’t sell their stuff, I just keep them.” 
Shani’s behaviour could be seen as a stereotypical example of how increased 
social differentiation may reduce women’s solidarity towards each other. Clients 
were positioned in groups and in the community differently, and they also 
experienced associational life differently. One was respected not only for the 
amount of her wealth, but also for her “sociability” (Bähre 2007b, Ferguson 
1994). Shani’s habitus and “sense of the game”, essential for actors’ ability to 
operate in a social field, were not suitable in the microcredit ambience of 
Mosetsana. As different fields have their different rules and ways of operating 
(Bebbington 2007: 156), apparently the cultural and social meanings of the loan 
shark business, and the compatibility of Shani’s habitus with these connotations, 
led to her discrimination in the women’s business community.  
As typical for loan sharks, Shani’s debt collection methods undoubtedly 
aroused disagreements and condemnation in the microcredit community. This 
did not mean that Shani would have been left empty-handed, however. By the 
standards of the TCP programme of SEF, a loan of 4,000 rand was considerably 
high. Shani formed many instrumental relations for survival. She made the best 
of her fragile family relations and networks in towns, participated in various 
burial societies in the community, and tried to focus on potential customers on 
the other side of the village. Shani was an inventive person, she was planning a 
new cement business and she was proud of her capabilities to keep going, 
whatever difficulties she might face. But as social capital becomes legitimised 
only when acknowledged by other actors (Bourdieu 1985: 731; 1986), 
membership in a communal burial society or microcredit group did not provide 
much more than a potential for social capital. What Shani was missing was the 
legitimacy, the proof of the sincerity of her business operations and ability to get 
support from the neighbourhood in her struggles.  
 While the social capital-oriented literature considers bridging, or the ability 
to socialise with peers (Putnam 2000: 22), as one of the crucial features of social 
capital, for Shani, these bridges were not easily built. This reflects the way that 
the significance and value of various capitals are subjected to reappraisal over 
time and place. Someone previously considered as legitimate may become 
worthless in an instant (Siisiäinen 2008: 13–14). This consideration also 
challenges the approach which emphasises rational actors who take calculated 
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risks to maximise benefits, typically linked to Putnamian formulations on social 
capital (Wilshusen 2009b). While on one level actors may pursue strategies to 
improve their power resources, on the other hand, their practices are in many 
ways defined by social norms and cultural practices.  
Women in Limpopo were competing with each other, and at the same time 
they required sincere solidarity; an act of cold calculation did not suffice to 
create a team spirit and feeling of reciprocity between them. As Bourdieu’s 
theoretical argumentation suggests, trust, like any other source of social capital, 
emerges as a broader cultural construct rather than an attribute of an individual 
(Wilshusen 2009b). While in the clients’ eyes, moneylending was typically seen 
as an act of goodwill, in the case of Shani, although she did not identify herself as 
a loan shark, the other clients felt that her debt claim methods were breaking the 
collective norms and community habits (Karim 2011). As happened to Shani, the 
set of furniture found its way to her home, but neighbours or other SEF clients 
in the centre would hardly value sitting on it. 
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 Microcredit as an arena of negotiations 6
 
FOLLOWING THE BOURDIEU-RELATED conceptualisation of microcredit as an 
arena in which individuals with different positions confront and compete with 
each other, this chapter concentrates on the point of view of members of the 
microcredit organisation. On the one hand, the chapter explores the hierarchies 
and power games within the microcredit organisation; on the other hand, it 
examines how the microcredit organisation produces the “truths” of its 
programmes for the clients in a Foucauldian sense, and what the consequences 
of such truth-promotions are. 
As will be shown in this chapter, the SEF fieldworkers were in a key position 
in the production of such truths; they were close to the clients and maintained 
the “right knowledge” about the microcredit programmes. Despite their critical 
roles as the ones who trained the clients and ensured that the “money was 
brought into the system”, other staff members were suspicious of development 
facilitators’ skills and motivations. There was tension over working hours, work 
load and wages, even though development facilitators had little opportunity to 
negotiate working arrangements to their advantage.  
 
 
Paradoxical roles of development facilitators 
In everyday SEF operations, fieldworkers played a crucial role. Their duties 
included all the day-to-day activities with clients. Development facilitators took 
care of client recruitment, carried out training, business evaluations and loan 
utilisations checks, followed up repayments and updated the organisational files 
in the branch office. They were also responsible for motivating and supporting 
clients in their business operations. According to SEF rules, clients were 
responsible for running the meetings, controlling the repayments, delivering the 
slips and receipts and handling the money at all stages, from the repayment in 
the meetings to the payments into the bank account. The role of the 
development facilitators was not to handle the money but to supervise and 
oversee that everything ran smoothly and in line with the SEF rules. Their 
responsibility was to make sure that the clients were informed of the loan terms, 
rules and responsibilities. The main task was to “bring the money in”: to assure 
that SEF received its money back from the clients and that the repayment rate 
was maintained – in June 2011 it was as high as 99.2 % (SEF 2011).  
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While fieldworkers took care of the SEF’s everyday operations in the field, 
the administrative duties were centralised at the SEF head office in Tzaneen. The 
field staff consisted of development facilitators, branch managers and zone 
managers who operated in the branch offices and in the “field”, while the head 
office housed the departments of administration, finance and accounts, human 
resources management, training, and quality assurance. 
Various vulnerabilities and daily routine challenges determined the 
fieldworkers’ working conditions. One big challenge, according to development 
facilitators, was moving from one village to another with no means of 
transportation. The first meeting might start at eight o’clock in one village. As 
one of the development facilitators explained, he had to wake up at five o’clock 
in order to catch a minibus taxi at seven. “Sometimes you find that there are only 
three people in the taxi, while they need fifteen. They drive up and down just to 
fill the taxi and you know that time is passing.” Because of poor transport 
facilities, development facilitators often had to walk to another village where the 
second meeting took place, which might mean a five kilometre hurried walk. The 
rest of the working hours were earmarked for loan utilisation checks. It was the 
development facilitators’ responsibility to remember where the clients lived, a 
challenging feat with a huge number of clients living in informal settings.  
As no formal places for centre meetings existed, development facilitators 
spent their working hours outdoors, with no cover from sunshine or rain, and 
with no electricity, running water or toilet facilities. Safety issues were a 
constant concern: meetings arranged under a tree or in the backyard of a client’s 
house gave thieves an opportunity to easily follow the meetings from a distance 
and then attack the homeward-bound clients and fieldworkers. At least once in 
the history of the organisation this had led to the death of a development 
facilitator: a few years before my fieldwork in a village called Mankweng a SEF 
employee had been shot to death during a robbery.  
Rather than being socio-economically homogeneous section of employees, 
the social composition of the workforce of SEF consisted of a heterogeneous 
group of actors with different motivations and interests. Various kinds of 
conflicts between SEF staff members in different positions occurred. According 
to the fieldworkers, a continuous struggle between SEF management and the 
field staff arose over working hours, work load and wages. Because of the 
development facilitators’ lack of opportunity to negotiate working arrangements 
to their advantage, and because development facilitators did not have many 
opportunities to meet SEF management face to face, their criticism seldom 
directly reached the ears of the management. Complaints mainly appeared “on 
paper” and in the discussions between development facilitators and branch 
managers.   
From the fieldworkers’ own perspective, development facilitators and branch 
managers had too heavy a workload. The fact that the actual operations took 
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place in the field was, according to development facilitators and branch 
managers, an extra challenge. Thandi described her duties as development 
facilitator as follows: 
 
Development facilitator: I’ve got 10 centre meetings in different places…. 
The first meeting is on Monday with seven groups, another meeting is with 
12 groups. Altogether, I’ve got 94 groups. In 91 of them there are five clients 
[467 clients in total].  
Interviewer: How can you do so many groups? 
Development facilitator: It’s mad, because you also have to do business 
evaluations. It’s a lot of work to do.  
Interviewer: You run the meetings but how about after that, what do you do? 
Development facilitator: I have to go and do business evaluations of clients 
when they apply for a new loan. In the following month I will check whether 
they’ve utilised their loans well. On Fridays I go to the Branch Office to 
update my files. To be honest, handling such a big number of clients is 
strenuous. I’m planning to give away some of my groups, and remain with 
the normal 75 groups, so that I can have time with my clients. Because … 
sometimes you have a hard time finding out where they are living. Because I 
have to know, just imagine, 94 groups multiplied by five, I have to find each 
of them, where they are staying, so that I can go to their places. 
Thandi, development facilitator in Mosetsana, 17 July 2007 
Although fieldworkers were supposed to visit each client and run the loan 
utilisation checks, in fact they did not have time for these operations even in 
theory. Thandi would have been able to use on average 15 minutes, travels 
included, per client a day, during which she would have had to meet 12 clients in 
total.  
What encouraged development facilitators to take as many clients as possible 
was mainly the SEF incentive system. The bigger the number of clients, and the 
lower the number of arrears and drop-outs, the higher the development 
facilitator’s salary. Similarly, SEF gave an annual award for the eight best 
performing development facilitators. Along with these economic rewards, it was 
a matter of honour and social prestige to have a high number of clients. On the 
positive side, the system encouraged development facilitators to reach more 
poor clients, who had no other access to formal financial services. The downside 
was that development facilitators might try to concentrate on the quantity rather 
than quality of their everyday operations. Development facilitators were triple-
bound. On the one hand they had to protect the interests of SEF, on the other 
hand they tried to protect the clients from over-indebtedness, and ensure that 
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clients’ expectations were fulfilled. In addition, they tried to maintain and 
provide for their own families.  
SEF management and the fieldworkers had different perceptions of 
development facilitators’ and branch managers’ workload. Those who personally 
knew the realities and everyday lives of the villages were better able to 
understand the daily struggles of fieldworkers. When interviewed, Bryan, a 
member of SEF management, claimed that the number of clients per staff 
member in the current SEF targets was disproportionate: “The number of clients 
that has to be supervised is unrealistic. We need more employees.” In 2012, the 
number of SEF clients per loan officer was 307 persons (SEF 2012: 1). 
Most members of the SEF management, however, did not consider the 
workload of fieldworkers as a problem. Kim, a member of SEF management, 
emphasised, instead, the lack of fieldworkers’ organisational skills: “I usually 
find that the worse the development facilitator, the more work he’s got to do.” 
According to Kim, if the development facilitators were well organised, they 
would be able to run several centres easily. Within the prevalent scheme, Kim 
relied on statistics as a gauge of success. She gave an example of a development 
facilitator, a current branch manager, who had not had an arrear for two years in 
a single area. Lefty, from SEF management, judged that fieldworkers had 
nothing to do, because “nothing forces them to be at work”. While Lefty had 
adopted a critical and condescending attitude towards “the lazy DFs”, in essence 
the question for her was about poor time management. “They just don’t have a 
structure!” she exclaimed to me.  
Fairly similar were the perceptions of the staff members from the financial 
department, who showed impatience towards the “unskilled DF’s”. According to 
Damon, the banking practices of clients and development facilitators were 
uncontrollable from the administrative point of view:    
 
They don’t attach all their slips, their receipts don’t correspond. They don’t 
add up properly and then we have to go and check all of this. I should have 
everything checked for 100%. But I have to go and recalculate, because they 
put the total correct but the money is missing. There is a slip or two missing 
or the receipts say one thing, while the deposits say another. The instalments 
are not correct in many, many cases.… We get 50 cents less or a rand or two 
or nine extra. I keep telling the DF’s that just as we don’t like underpayments, 
we don’t like overpayments. Because what do I do with this nine rand? And I 
keep telling them that if you see a client has paid extra, next time tell them to 
pay less and write me a note. Then I will sort it out. But they don’t do 
anything, it just comes there and you have to keep on re-calculating, 
otherwise the books don’t balance. 
Damon, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 11 July 2007 
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Another question is how relevant it is to expect clients and development 
facilitators to be able to easily do such calculations. Development facilitators 
carried out the bookkeeping by hand, and correct monetary transactions seemed 
to be more of a miracle than a presumable outcome. During the interviews and 
in the centre meetings clients expressed a limited knowledge of the SEF rules, 
and restricted ability to fill in the required forms as well as to handle the money 
flows and the related banking documents. This was partly because of limited 
business skills, partly because of illiteracy and limited numerical skills on the 
part of many clients; not to mention the fact that typically all the slips and forms 
were written only in English or in Afrikaans languages, known by few of the 
clients.  
Occasionally, due to the poor transportation facilities and limited time 
framework, development facilitators did not arrive for the meetings on time. 
Under these circumstances the clients had to take care of supervising 
bookkeeping and loan repayment by themselves. Sometimes, instead of coming 
to the meetings, clients gave the slips to a development facilitator beforehand at 
an appointed place or sent their friends or family members to supply the 
required documents. In the interviews, development facilitators repeatedly 
remarked that a lower number of clients and proper information technology 
facilities would ease their work load, time management and bookkeeping 
arrangements. SEF was reluctant to provide such conveniences, however, 
appealing to a tight financial situation.  
Although development facilitators went through a three-and-a-half month 
training period before signing a contract, the members of the SEF training 
department considered it was hardly enough. As one of them explained, the 
training, mentoring, and coaching of development facilitator professionals took 
considerable effort: “I think that the course should take at least four years, but 
we try to do it in four months!” During the training period the elected 
development facilitators carried out various tests, interviews and assignments. 
Typical candidates for the posts were young women and men with a secondary 
school education and the ability to communicate in English. In practice, most of 
the candidates had just passed a matriculation exam, referring to a qualification 
received when graduating from high school. While nearly all candidates were 
inexperienced regarding business procedures, their skills and knowledge varied 
substantially. Business training was often based on elementary business skills. 
As Bryan, a member of SEF management, described the training procedures: 
“Mostly we do things at the level of basic management principles: how to 
manage people, how to manage your time, how to monitor, how to organise your 
work, how to plan.” While in principle finding potential development facilitators 
was easy, getting a development facilitator with a higher education tended to be 
insuperable: 
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It would be good to have better-educated DFs, but they would never work 
here…. Because they prefer to work in the offices. The DFs who have a 
diploma would not work in the field, only those with matrix [a matriculation 
exam], with grade 12, are working in the field. 
Bryan, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 9 July 2007 
When I asked Tatu, a member of SEF management, whether better training of 
development facilitators would help in these circumstances, he claimed that 
development facilitators were in this sense somewhat irresponsible, and came to 
the conclusion that in the end the responsibilities and pressures should be put 
on branch managers: “They should supervise DFs and give them better 
incentives so that the one who is doing well will be given more.” Tatu’s comment 
only moved his accusing finger from one actor to another, however, instead of 
seriously considering why problems continuously appeared, and whether there 
was something the organisation could do to solve them.  
While the requirement that branch managers carry out the appointed duties 
– to supervise development facilitators, to help solve problems in the centres, to 
carry out loan utilisation checks and the final group recognition, as well as to 
plan the budget for the branch – was by no means irrelevant, it did not solve the 
prevalent problems nor did it lessen the apparent reluctance of SEF 
management to take responsibility and remove the existing barriers through 
improved training and motivation. The drawback of this logic was that when the 
affairs did not go well, the focus was directed on the personal faults of 
fieldworkers instead of institutional constraints that could have been mitigated 
by improved training or incentive systems. Similarly, while the notions of the 
development facilitators’ poor organisational skills and calls for more discipline 
might have been relevant, equally important would have been to pay more 
attention to how organisational structures, rules, and practices supported or 
constrained the development facilitators’ abilities to carry out their everyday 
duties.  
In this light, the prevalent attitude according to which development 
facilitators were portrayed as unskilled, disorganised and lazy, while at the same 
time being made responsible for carrying out the everyday activities of SEF, 
appeared paradoxical. Equally paradoxical was that these “unskilled” 
development facilitators, who “did not understand much”, as some of the 
management members stated, were made responsible for training the clients. In 
practice, the training meant that development facilitators discussed the terms 
and conditions of the loan, and gave advice on how to manage the loan and to 
resolve the problems within the group. In the interviews, SEF clients expressed 
that they did not have sufficient business skills and that they would have needed 
more assistance and training, especially in basic business management. The 
consequence of this insufficient training was reflected in the outcomes of the 
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programmes. As one of the branch managers claimed, the organisation did not 
have the necessary skills to train clients to manage their businesses. “We give 
loans to people who don’t know anything about business.… If the staff members 
had business skills, they could assist them, train them by showing.”  
What made the situation even more paradoxical was that often the training 
was given only to group leaders whose responsibility was then to train the other 
group members. The microcredit organisation delegated training responsibilities 
to the group leaders and claimed that they were “helping” the organisation. This 
was done, however, without problematising the unequal relationship between 
the rights and responsibilities of the clients – nor their willingness to accept 
such obligations. Development facilitators also utilised this rule for their own 
purposes, and justified the delegation of their duties simply by saying that the 
amount of work they had was too much. Thandi, development facilitator with 
470 clients, complained that it was not fair that she had to carry out business 
evaluations on her own. According to her, it was only reasonable that she could 
delegate a part of her tasks to the group leaders: “They can just go there and 
collect some information and write my papers; so that I wouldn’t have so many 
things to do,” she explained. In practice, because of the development facilitators’ 
difficulties in arriving at meetings in time, the training component in the 
meetings was often set aside for monitoring repayments and recording savings. 
 
 
Suspicions and symbolic violence 
The working conditions and the workers’ negotiation power at SEF were strongly 
determined by their position in the organisation’s hierarchy. Despite their 
critical role for SEF microcredit businesses, and their emphasis on co-operation 
and a sense of belonging, development facilitators remained in a low position in 
the organisational hierarchy. As Bastiaensen et. al (2005) note as typical for 
such organisations, the locus of power was centralised in the head office, while 
development facilitators were positioned at the losing end of the power diagram. 
Development facilitators were able to interact with the staff management only 
through the zone managers, which illustrates not only the development 
facilitators’ poor negotiating power, but also their limited ability to claim their 
rights and express their concerns to the management in the head office.  
Development facilitators were also often treated with suspicion by other staff 
members. The SEF management’s distrust toward fieldworkers can partly be 
explained by their unfamiliarity with the fieldworkers’ working and living 
conditions. Everyday life in the villages was a remote concept, especially for 
many upper-level White people. A member of SEF financial management told 
me that she had never visited rural villages, although she claimed that “it would 
be nice to go sometime”. 
 134 | MICROCREDIT AS AN ARENA OF NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Centre chair counting the repayments in a centre meeting. 
One member of the SEF management, who could be portrayed as a Black middle 
class person, perhaps knew the realities in the villages better, but wanted to 
distinguish herself from “the poor” by using, for example, the division between 
“modern” and “traditional” ways of living as an indicator. Such social 
differentiation is a typical example of how White conservatives and Black middle 
class people sometimes tried to distinguish themselves from both the poor 
clients and the fieldworkers in a lower position. 
These issues correspond to the actions of Lineah, a SEF branch manager, 
whose comments about unreliable development facilitators reflected her wish to 
differentiate herself from development facilitators, although she was only one 
step higher on the social pyramid of SEF. Paradoxically, no matter how much 
branch managers wanted to be defined as part of management, in the discourses 
of SEF management, they remained “only” fieldworkers, with practical level 
duties. As a member of SEF management explained, branch managers were in a 
supporting role and not in as strategic a position as zone managers. 
Development facilitators, in turn, were seen by SEF management in a certain 
sense parallel to their clients. In some cases, the living standards of development 
facilitators did not, in fact, differ significantly from some of the better-off clients. 
Jamila, the successful traditional healer and SEF client, earned more from her 
businesses than development facilitators, who made an average of 4,000 rand a 
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month. Development facilitators also joined stokvels just like the clients, lived in 
small houses in the same villages as the clients, and were connected in various 
ways to the village people. One of the development facilitators told me that it 
was his grandmother, a SEF client herself, who suggested that he should apply 
for the post as a development facilitator. 
The suspicions towards development facilitators arose partly from the fact 
that they – operating as a link between the organisation and clients – had an 
opportunity to misuse their position. According to the SEF rules, the 
fieldworkers should not touch the clients’ money or interfere with the clients’ 
repayments under any circumstances (SEF 2006: 48). Intentional slips, 
however, had occurred. An extreme example took place in December 2006, 
when one of the development facilitators had printed deposit slips and stolen 
over 100,000 rand from the clients’ bank savings. As a member of SEF 
management proclaimed, money can easily become a problem: “Our staff 
members are not very wealthy people. They may be tempted to take money, and 
they sometimes steal in the form of loans.” 
The strategies for managing such missteps and the prevalent mistrust 
towards development facilitators varied among SEF management. According to 
Lefty, who criticised SEF for having no control over how the development 
facilitators spent their days, stricter rules and properly organised time schedules 
were essential: “Even if there is a spot check, DF can just say ‘No, I have to see 
the client!’ How do you know whether she is telling the truth? Because you don’t 
have a schedule!” In a certain sense, Lefty’s comment reflected a “patron-client” 
attitude towards development facilitators, which came up in the SEF staff 
interviews every now and then. A typical example of such arrogance was Lefty’s 
judgement that if development facilitators were not strictly disciplined anything 
could happen; it is illustrative in the Foucauldian sense of the “techniques of 
governance” used to discipline subordinate actors according to the “rules” of the 
organisation (Foucault 1978). 
Partly the distrust of SEF management towards fieldworkers arose from the 
high turnover of development facilitators. At the end of June 2010, SEF 
employed a total of 374 workers of which 316 operated in the field. The staff 
turnover was 21%. The main causes were misconduct (28% of the turnovers), 
poor performance (26%) and personal reasons (22%) (SEF 2010). According to 
SEF management, the poor organisational skills and the high turnover of 
development facilitators were some of the biggest concerns for microcredit 
operations. “They come and go”, SEF officials in the management said, when 
explaining the situation in the interviews. The temptation to leave work became 
clear in the discussions with fieldworkers. Expectations of better salaries and 
benefits from the other organisations enticed some fieldworkers to leave SEF. 
This became clear in the answer of Maria, one of the branch managers, when I 
asked about her intentions regarding SEF: 
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Branch manager: I have been asked to join other organisations. I hear that 
they are getting more money for doing the same work as I do…. So we look 
around.  
Interviewer: How serious is it? Are you going to leave? 
Branch manager: No, I’m not going to leave, but the fact is that they must 
check our salaries. I’m not getting paid the same as the managers of other 
organisations. 
Maria, branch manager in Hlare, 13 July 2007 
In addition to the relatively low salary, the fieldworkers’ temptation to leave SEF 
was strongly related to poor working conditions. As one of the development 
facilitators put it, being on your own, far away from your organisation and 
family, and obliged to adhere to strict time schedules and responsibilities is not 
an easy task. In the interviews, both development facilitators and branch 
managers emphasised their desire to proceed in their careers. “I want to study”, 
“I want to get promoted to a higher post” and “I want to see myself on the top” 
were typical utterances. While many of the fieldworkers desired long-term 
employment with SEF, the high turnovers illustrate that in many cases these 
dreams were not realised.  
On the other hand, threats to quit and requests for higher salaries were 
typical ways for fieldworkers to pressure SEF. Sometimes development 
facilitators felt that their efforts were not rewarded and that their salaries were 
not consistent with their responsibilities and skills. When interviewed, Thandi 
described how the poor working conditions of the development facilitators urged 
many of them to leave SEF. She spoke of the special relationship between 
development facilitators and clients, and assumed that if she left, the clients 
would also leave SEF. Correspondingly, while Thandi emphasised her skills as 
development facilitator and clients’ dependency on her, at the same time, she 
also revealed an authoritarian attitude towards clients, as the following 
quotation exemplifies: 
 
In the area where I’m working, clients are working with me. Suddenly, they 
don’t see me anymore, without explanation. They see a new girl coming and 
working with them. Three months later this one is gone and the next is 
coming in. I don’t know if even the SEF managing director realises this 
problem.… Because if I go, you find that maybe 50 groups remain. Clients are 
used to me. They know me, they know what I like and what I don’t like. So if 
somebody else is coming, they are going to leave, all of them.  
Thandi, development facilitator in Mosetsana, 17 July 2007 
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Given the development facilitators’ relatively little room for manoeuvring in 
regard to SEF management, another question was how often this kind of 
pressure produced the desired results for development facilitators, or how 
seriously SEF management took such claims and means of bargaining – if such 
comments ever reached the management level. Many of those who 
acknowledged the problem did not tend to worry about it very seriously. As one 
of the SEF management members stated, many development facilitators leave, 
“but many of them also come back”. Moreover, the organisation did not need to 
worry about a shortage of applicants for the development facilitator posts. 
Although sometimes competitors tried to “attack” SEF, even going so far as to 
“steal” SEF’s staff members, according to the SEF managing director, there was 
no worry that there would be a shortage of fieldworkers or clients: new people 
were always coming in.  
One real contradiction in the SEF operations was that they invested a 
considerable amount of money and time in development facilitators’ training, 
while other organisations were able to hire already-trained fieldworkers by 
promising higher salaries with no need to organise such training programmes. 
For SEF, the turnover of development facilitators surely was a problem – but 
not acute enough to ask the development facilitators themselves why they were 
dissatisfied. Managing director of SEF was uncertain why drop-out rate was so 
high among development facilitators. He had discussed the issue with SEF 
management several times, but no-one had been able to find a solution:  
 
I’ve asked Lefty, Kim, Bobo; I ask over and over and over again. We all ask 
each other and I don’t find the answer.… So we don’t know.  
Managing director of SEF in Tzaneen, 13 July 2007 
In addition to the limited interaction between SEF management and the field 
staff, the quotation also reflects the problem of information block from one level 
to another, typical for hierarchical organisations. Interaction between the 
various levels at SEF was fairly poor; and the lower the position in the hierarchy, 
the more limited the flow of information. In practice, fieldworkers were largely 
excluded from the decision-making processes at upper levels. Such social 
division and non-transparency undeniably affected the way the tasks were 
carried out and how fieldworkers felt towards the management level. 
Correspondingly, important information from the grassroots did not always 
reach the SEF management. As one of the development facilitators formulated 
the issue, “in the head office, they may know that clients drop out of 
programmes, but they don’t know why”. In the interviews he suggested that 
there was a need for SEF management to visit villages sometimes “to see what in 
reality is going on”. 
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A cautionary example of the poor information flow and the use of apparently 
well-intended but under-problematised terminology by SEF staff members, and 
the consequential adverse impression on clients, became encapsulated in the so-
called Life-project. Life-project was a funeral insurance project that had to be 
cancelled, however, nearly as soon as it was established. According to Bryan, a 
member of SEF management, SEF lost many clients as a consequence. Kim, a 
member of SEF management, and Maria, branch manager, suggested that the 
main problem was that the project followed Western logic in terms of insurance 
policy conditions and in the definition of family. Namely, the project, designed 
by a former North American employee, defined “family” narrowly as a unit of 
husband and wife with their children, instead of “extended family”, which may 
also include brothers and their families, sisters and their families, cousins, 
nieces, and so on. According to Maria, this made people complain: “How on 
earth can this policy not cover that person? She’s my sister!” As the positive 
outcome in any development programme depends largely on shared 
understandings of the various actors’ aims and operations (Mosse 2005: 8), the 
key terms should be clarified. The Life-project is an example of the operation 
that was justified by terminology that meant something totally different to 
clients than to managers.  
In addition to this, according to Bryan, from SEF management, the project 
failed to recognise the dynamics of the community as well as the participatory 
procedures in a project design, which are significant for social capital (Molyneux 
2002): 
 
It was a forced system. If you want to design something you must involve the 
community from the beginning, at the level of community beliefs, operating 
systems and all that. You shouldn’t bring your product and say ‘take it or 
leave it’. It’s not going to work. 
Bryan, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 9 July 2007 
From the fieldworkers’ perspective, the problems of the Life-project culminated 
in the insufficient information flow between the head office and the field. 
Struggles over the production, use and interpretation of information were 
central to the relationships among SEF staff members. Moreover, the 
fieldworkers were irritated over SEF’s unfulfilled promises. In the interviews a 
branch manager described how the field staff had barely begun to collect money 
from the clients when they were informed that the whole programme was 
cancelled: “We had told to our clients that they should pay a little money for the 
insurance. They would pay 20 rand and get 3,000 in the end. It never came. It 
was just a shame for us.”  
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While the strategic and difficult decisions were made in the head office, the 
“dirty part” remained on the shoulders of the fieldworkers: they were 
responsible for reporting the bad news and rebuilding trust relations between 
SEF and its clients. 
While development facilitators commonly considered SEF as “an important 
employer”, “the best microcredit organisation in Limpopo” and as “an 
organisation that cared”, they criticised the organisation for poor working 
conditions, for low salary rates and for poor social motivation. According to the 
interviewees, the incentive system was problematic because it was based 
narrowly on a market-oriented perspective, forgetting other kinds of 
inducements valuable for fieldworkers. Thandi, development facilitator, 
explained the matter as follows: 
 
They don’t talk about the good things we are doing. They only discourage 
you, and tell you the bad things that you are doing. Nobody comes to you and 
tells that you are doing so well! But the bad things that you have done you 
will hear about from the upper level. 
Thandi, development facilitator in Mosetsana, 17 July 2007 
In the interviews, some members of the SEF management sometimes 
complimented fieldworkers somewhat condescendingly, as the following citation 
illustrates: “I have the most respect for what they do. They are the people who 
bring revenue to SEF – so they must do something right.” Indeed, there seemed 
to be a disparity between how the members of SEF management perceived 
themselves and how they actually treated, listened to and talked about the 
fieldworkers. While some members of the management understood well the 
challenges and everyday struggles of development facilitators, the atmosphere of 
care was not always communicated to the field staff.  
In addition to access to information, access to spaces was a typical way to 
exercise power. In this regard, SEF rules prevented fieldworkers from visiting 
the head office without a good reason. As revealed in some interviews, the 
symbolic power of such a rule was significant. For Thandi, the lack of respect for 
development facilitators culminated in this lack of access, and converted the 
concept of symbolic power into the socially recognised symbolic violence, 
perpetuating the social structure favoured by and serving the interests of those 
who are already dominant (Bourdieu 1977: 191–197); in this case branch 
managers or SEF management: 
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Only branch managers are allowed to go to the head office. Sometimes you 
get a chance, but not always; I’ve only had one opportunity. You see, I’m not 
as important as branch managers. We don’t even have a chance to meet other 
development facilitators and share ideas…. So sometimes we tell ourselves 
that maybe we are not that important to the organisation, because we can’t 
even go to the head office. And you always have to tell the managing director 
what you are looking for at the head office. 
Thandi, development facilitator in Mosetsana, 17 July 2007 
From the clients’ perspective, the impressions of such differentiation at SEF 
appeared even starker. In the eyes of clients, “SEF staff” was equal to “head 
office staff”, and the head office, this concrete yellow building, represented 
something unobtainable and something that they could hardly conceive of; it 
became an abstract concept of power. While clients typically felt that they did 
not have the ability to negotiate over SEF rules or operations, it did not mean 
that they would not have tried to. It was just this paradox that because 
communication between the organisation and clients occurred mainly through 
development facilitators, if the clients tried to complain about development 
facilitators’ unfair activities, there were few other choices than to send the 
message to branch managers or other upper level actors through the 
development facilitators.  
Often clients’ social logic and attempt to find room for manoeuvring collided 
with the organisation’s formalised practices and willingness to maintain social 
cohesion through various symbols of power. An illustrative example occurred 
when some clients tried to directly contact SEF management in the head office – 
with unsatisfactory results. These clients had long felt that their development 
facilitator did not do her job well, the most serious shortcoming being her 
inability to arrange new loans on time. The clients decided to take the matter in 
their own hands and travelled all the way to Tzaneen to the SEF head office to 
solve the problem. The result was chaos. The clients were turned away from the 
office and sent back to their village, and the development facilitator was given a 
formal reprimand. SEF management instructed branch managers to make it 
clear to the development facilitators that this kind of incident, the clients’ 
attempt to visit the head office, should never happen again. While the result was 
that the development facilitator in question got into trouble, she in turn rebuked 
the clients for spreading negative stories about her, and reminded them that she 
was just a human being who also “makes mistakes and sometimes forgets 
things”.  
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Contests over authority within SEF management 
Considering the microcredit organisation as an arena of struggle consisting of 
various actors with different interests and power positions (Bourdieu 1977; 
2005: 69–70, Olivier de Sardan 2005: 137–138), the division into two groups – 
field and management – provides a somewhat black-and-white picture of the 
institutional structure of the Small Enterprise Foundation. Similarly to the 
clients’ groups, neither the fieldworkers nor the management were 
homogeneous entities. Also, the staff members, driven by more or less 
compatible goals and endowed with different degrees of decision-making power, 
continuously contested the organisation’s authority. Although power seemed to 
be centralised in the head office, some members of SEF management working in 
the office felt that when “real” decisions were to be made, it was difficult for 
them to have an effect on the negotiations. As one of the management members 
said: “You can comment, but you cannot influence.” 
Perhaps one of the most notable events in this respect, which I heard about 
by chance in the interviews, occurred a day after the organisation had arranged 
its regular management meeting. In those meetings, the departments of human 
resources, training, finance, administration, and quality assurance from the 
Tzaneen head office met with the zone managers, the representatives of the 
“field”. Apparently in the meeting the managing director, MD, had rejected a 
proposal for a new incentive scheme developed by Lefty, using financial 
circumstances as the reason. In the interview, Lefty expressed her feelings about 
such a course of action: 
 
We were going to have a new quality-based incentive scheme for SEF, but 
now it’s cancelled all together. Because when he [MD] was on holiday, he 
came up to the conclusion that this would be terribly wrong! And when he 
came back, he decided no, we can’t do that. After everything was done.  Just 
like that. I’ve even trained these guys here. We started working in June 2006, 
so it’s been a year.… It’s very demotivating.  
Lefty, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 10 July 2007 
Lefty thought that the real power belonged to the managing director. Using 
rhetoric such as the “authoritative king on his throne” surrounded by his 
“legion” referring  to the zone managers, Lefty touched on the wider issue of the 
social differentiation at SEF that was tailor-made to produce and reproduce the 
hierarchies among and between staff and clients. Because access to information 
or spaces was a typical way to exercise power in this differentiation, Lefty’s 
criticism was that “there was no such thing as information flow” between the 
members of SEF management. While improved flow of information would have 
benefitted clients and helped SEF staff members to better identify fundamental 
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flaws, and thus become better prepared to solve them, the limited access to 
information meant that information flow was often transferred through rumours 
and gossips. 
That particular day was my only chance to interview Lefty and I can only 
guess as to whether she would have been equally critical if the interview had 
been arranged a week before or two months after this disappointing meeting. 
Apparently the mood of the meeting had been tense, and when I interviewed 
SEF managing director three days later, he suddenly sighed during our 
discussion: “You know, at SEF, generally most decisions are made based on 
reasoning. And every now and then, very, very seldom, I just say, ‘No! This is 
what we are going to do.’ O-o-oh – the trouble that I get when I do that!” He said 
that he considered the decision-making procedures in any other company as far 
more dictatorial than those at SEF. According to him, in contrast to most 
companies, in which people did what their boss told them to approximately 90 
per cent of the time, SEF management members had basically always had room 
for manoeuvre. “And if you suddenly don’t, it seems to be like a hit to the face!”  
During the discussions with the managing director I could not help from 
wondering about Lefty’s comments regarding the values and motivations of 
NGDO workers in general. Lefty’s perception that some people at SEF 
management were demotivated differed from the managing director’s view, 
according to which SEF, just as any NGDO, was run by committed staff 
members. His argument was that “otherwise it would be impossible for an 
organisation such as SEF to get highly-educated and professional employees – 
as Lefty, for example”. According to this view, the motivation for serving and job 
satisfaction were based on the values of the work; on the will to help the poor, as 
well as the whole society. This view is familiar from much of the literature of 
NGDOs in the global South, and is well illustrated in the following quotation: 
 
Actually, an organisation like SEF, one advantage that we do have is that 
some people really want to make a difference in their lives. They don’t just 
want to earn money. Isn’t this why you have chosen this field? … So I think 
for some of us, when we wake up in the morning, it’s very important for us to 
know that we are making a difference. And we can contribute to something.… 
If somebody offers us a big salary – it’s meaningless. 
Managing director of SEF in Tzaneen, 13 July 2007 
On one hand, it was easy for me to agree with him. At the same time, it was not 
difficult to see the parallels between the SEF managing director’s ideas and 
conventional discussions concerning development organisations that define 
NGDO workers as “well-intentioned, committed people who have visions and 
values” but “no interest in power and coercion” and who have “the willingness to 
contribute to the common good in society, without expecting any calculated 
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pecuniary or other reward in return” (Arvidson 2004: 233). In a certain sense, 
this view reminds of the Putnamian interpretations of collective action. 
According to this logic, collective action, representing shared interests and 
consensus, becomes an indicator of increased social capital, which facilitates co-
operation for mutual benefit (Putnam 1993). On the other hand, this kind of 
view might also serve as a way of “masking of power” in which according to 
Bourdieu (1977) dominance disguises itself as a set of moral relations and relies 
on a public ideology, in which strategies of subordination are transformed at the 
ideological level into relationships of loyalty, generosity, and perhaps, also 
altruism. 
According to Arvidson (2004: 238), the emphasis on altruism characteristic 
for NGDOs tends to be based on the organisations’ own visions of the concept. 
This vision, whatever good intentions it may have, guarantees no particular kind 
of behaviour nor insures against conflicts and ambiguous loyalties among staff 
members. In her study on the motivation and performance of NGDO staff in two 
projects in Bangladesh, Arvidson’s (2004: 245–252) illustrates that both 
altruism and self-interest form rather complex interactions and may co-exist 
within the same social situation. Correspondingly, while motivation for SEF staff 
members came from work “that had a meaning”, at the same time, they wanted 
to be paid for their efforts; otherwise the initial purpose of the work could lose 
its significance.  
 
 
Microcredit as an arena with multiple discourses 
It was no coincidence that SEF fieldworkers were called “development 
facilitators”. The term reflected SEF’s vision of fieldworkers as “those who show 
the clients how to do business” and who “promote development” among the 
targeted population. In a certain sense, they could be considered salespersons of 
microcredit (cf. Bourdieu 2005: 150). Since the main responsibility of the field 
staff was to make sure that the clients were correctly informed about loan terms, 
rules and responsibilities, the field staff was in a key position to contribute to the 
“production of the product” (cf. Bourdieu 2005: 155–161, 167−169) and to 
“advertise” microcredit to clients. Or in Foucauldian terms, in interactions 
between the microcredit organisation and clients, it was especially the field staff, 
who were in a key position in constructing and maintaining the “truth” and the 
“right knowledge” about the programmes. 
While development facilitators explained SEF goals and rules to the clients, 
at the same time they were supposed to provide the organisation with updated, 
first-hand information about the clients’ business operations and logic of 
decision making. Fieldworkers, as “interpreters between the two worlds”, and 
having two “languages” available, were trying to switch between “bank 
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discourse” and the “grassroots way of speaking” when the need arose. According 
to Bourdieu (2005: 155−161), this opens up the possibility of rhetorical 
manoeuvres by which the social distance between different actors can be 
manipulated, “giving a more or less complete mastery of the situation”. As a 
result, when SEF clients spoke in favour of, for instance, inflexible rules, they 
often did it by using precisely the same terms as development facilitators: “SEF 
needs its money”; “rules are rules, people are to blame”; “They fail to repay 
because they do not invest; they should invest and save!” This phenomenon is 
well illustrated by Cleaver (2005: 895), who shows how institutions as 
embodiments of the social process ensure that things are done “in the right 
way”. 
In general, fieldworkers aimed at using words and topics that were best 
suited for the clients, trying to build a better option than those of other 
organisations or loan sharks; and trying to motivate clients not to drop out 
despite the problems in a group or bad luck in business. As Simo, one of the 
development facilitators expressed it, he “motivates and supports clients” and 
“tells about the importance of coming to the meetings and taking loans” as well 
as “reminds them of good examples”. According to Bourdieu (2005: 55), 
promotion work is more efficient when it “stimulates pre-existing dispositions” 
and “provides an opportunity for acknowledgement and fulfilment”; that is, 
when the organisation manages to make clients feel that their hopes and desires 
will be fulfilled and their needs met. According to this logic, what the 
organisation promises and offers to the client is not just credit and other 
financial services, but the discourse surrounding it (Bourdieu 2005: 169),  and 
the hope of a better future (Santisio 2005).  
While the formal SEF rules provided a framework for development 
facilitators in terms of monitoring, training and motivating, their everyday 
operations and social practices were strongly shaped by informal negotiations, 
which Scott (1990: 18–23) calls “infrapolitics” or Wilshusen (2009a) “offstage” 
interactions. Because of their dominating position in relation to clients, and the 
possibility of rhetorical manoeuvre and manipulation, development facilitators 
sometimes took over the direction of operations and the decision-making power 
of their clients. In practice, development facilitators sometimes tried to make 
clients repay and stay in the groups at all costs. If needed, Simo even went to the 
clients’ homes in order to “beg them to come back”, which they usually did. 
Development facilitators were influential in deciding who would receive a loan, 
or if repayment problems occurred, in stopping the centre from getting a new 
loan until the money was delivered.  
The inequality between SEF fieldworkers and clients partly arose from rather 
pragmatic reasons. Not all clients could read or write. Product terms and loan 
application forms were documented in English, even though many of the clients 
had limited language skills and thus difficulties in understanding the principles 
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of business and credit management. The same concerned the monitoring of 
one’s cash flows; the receipts of repayments and savings were only in English, 
which meant that verbal explanation in the local dialect was essential. Many 
clients had poor knowledge of their rights and responsibilities, which limited 
their opportunities to contest the rules set by SEF.  
Clients’ abilities to influence everyday operations of course varied among 
actors and operations. The flexible time schedule of the Leloba centre meetings 
was one example of a less structured order. These meetings were scheduled and 
re-scheduled so they chronologically supported, for example, women’s 
businesses and SEF clients’ ability to participate in selling at special pay points 
on pay days. 
Moreover, although the relation between SEF staff members and clients was 
hierarchical and asymmetrical, it was also ambiguous and coloured with a sense 
of care and affinity. Thus, it would be unfair to argue that SEF management and 
fieldworkers based their working methods simply on top-down models and 
systems of governance to achieve NGDO-specified goals, or that all of them were 
insensitive to the clients’ everyday needs and vulnerable positions. Fieldworkers 
in particular faced the complex realities of clients’ everyday lives. Development 
facilitators felt that their work was motivating because of the opportunity “to 
change the lives of so many people” and “to see how businesses flourish and 
clients succeed”. Correspondingly, they were upset when clients were robbed or 
subjected to violence − issues that were a continuous source of anxiety for 
people engaged in the microbusiness in South Africa. In such situations, 
development facilitators often exceeded their obligations and tried to help 
clients by motivating them and their family or all the group members. If clients 
had problems with mashonishas, some development facilitators tried to 
convince mashonishas to stop debt collections, as the following quotation 
illustrates:  
 
In most cases I go and tell the loan shark that please, just stop this, just stop 
it.… I tell that I’m working for this company and this is my client. What you 
are doing is not right. If he continues to do this thing, I’ll take him to police. 
Some of them get scared and say ok, I won’t claim interest; as soon as she 
gives me my 300 rand, she’s free.  
Simo, development facilitator in Mogalantšu, 13 July 2007 
It also became clear in many interviews that clients considered development 
facilitators “more like us”. They distinguished between “SEF people”, referring 
to “those from town”, and the development facilitators, whom they called by 
name such as “our Rinah” or “our Letsoalo” and whom they often considered to 
be other than “SEF people”. Correspondingly, development facilitators also 
tended to talk about “my clients” and “my people”. The use of possessive 
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pronouns by the clients referred to close relations, and the merging of 
development facilitators into a collective subject. At the same time the 
development facilitators also worked as tools to “personalise the credit” by 
making microcredit attractive to the clients and attempting to create the desired 
group spirit. 
Despite the hierarchical structure of the microcredit organisation, even the 
poor clients as well as the mistrusted development facilitators held resources 
that enabled them to influence the implementation of microcredit programmes 
– “if only by ignoring or disparaging it” (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 186). In terms 
of the everyday resistance suggested by Foucault, clients did not always accept 
disciplinary loan recovery techniques, nor did the fieldworkers always approve 
of the power hierarchies separating them from SEF management (cf. Karim 
2011: 87–88). Although such expressions were rarely possible in the formal 
arenas of interaction, the tensions and efforts of actors in weak positions 
occurred typically in the hidden settings (Scott 1990, Wilshusen 2009a). Clients 
found ways to bend the rules and to mislead the development facilitators. They 
borrowed items for their stocks from neighbours when development facilitators 
came to check their loan investments; they falsified their accounts in the centre 
meetings; they lied and paid loans on behalf of other clients to keep the books 
clean; they displayed solidarity towards each other, but only in the instrumental 
manner.  
Some of the clients had more room for manoeuvre than others; the group 
and centre leaders in particular were often close to development facilitators. As 
the case of the clients who decided to visit the head office illustrates, some 
clients fought back even if they were doubtful of their success. Some of the 
clients left no stone unturned; some even succumbed to wildcat businesses by 
tipping off criminals. 
 Neither clients nor development facilitators should therefore be considered 
powerless victims in the game of microcredit. Olivier de Sardan (2005: 6) 
emphasises, when analysing the social realities of development projects, that all 
actors are on the “hunt for power and advantages”, and therefore never “mere 
victims of a totalitarian system”. In the context of access to resources and 
opportunities, there are ongoing negotiations over the rules of the game among 
different actors within the existing institutional arrangements (Bastiaensen et al. 
2005: 981–982, Bourdieu 2005). However, as Karim (2011: 88) remarks, it is 
also important to note the limited scope of these “weapons of the weak” to 
transform the asymmetrical power relations between the organisation and its 
clients. 
While such power plays typically occur offstage (Wilshusen 2009a), I soon 
realised that the power plays were an ongoing phenomena which could not be 
separated from my interviews and interactions with clients and SEF staff, either. 
This became clear especially in the discussions with Thandi, the development 
facilitator who threatened to leave SEF, and who tricked me in the centre 
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meeting by arranging a dance show while some of the clients were forced to go 
and find the missing amount of money.  
In the interviews, Thandi wanted to make sure from the beginning that I 
portrayed her as a hardworking and diligent employee. With a respectful 
number of 467 clients, she reminded me in the meetings and in the interviews 
that sometimes even 40 groups of women applied for a new loan at the same 
time. “Isn’t that a lot of work to do?” she asked, and was quick to make sure that 
I understood the difference between the workload in the TCP programmes that 
she was running and the MCP programmes in which development facilitators 
“did not have that much to do”. These comments illustrate how the pressure 
over profitability provoked competition between development facilitators, and 
which was expressed concretely in the form of backbiting and gossiping. In the 
interviews, development facilitators were keen to emphasise their own role and 
work contribution while at the same time to diminish other development 
facilitators’ achievements. “I have to do the business and impact evaluations and 
lots of things that those in MCP do not have to do; I’m sure you have realised 
that?” Thandi said. 
I also understood quite soon that I needed to analyse our encounter as a 
“game” if I wanted to understand Thandi’s perceptions and intentions. When 
following and being swept along these games, these presentations provided me 
with interesting information about dominant power plays among fieldworkers. 
Often these power plays were reflected in gender issues and actors’ views on 
conventional gender roles. In some interviews it became clear that male 
development facilitators were considered to be more adequate than females. 
Gender-related differentiation among staff members was exemplified by Ben, a 
trouble-shooter, who “had witnessed the faults of women” several times. He 
described how he had worked as a development facilitator for four years, 
running in total 98 groups [490 clients]. “It is not possible for women to do the 
same”, he claimed, referring to men’s physical and intellectual superiority over 
women:  
 
Development facilitators must walk a lot, women cannot do that. Women 
also have more problems, they are just hassling around, they don’t know how 
to organise things. If I was the SEF managing director, there would be no 
female development facilitators, I would only hire men! … When a man says 
something, clients listen. If a woman says something, she typically screams 
and no one listens. 
Ben, trouble-shooter in Lamune, 18 July 2007 
Undoubtedly, this view was sometimes conveyed to clients, too. On the other 
hand, many clients also longed for authority, “something that only men seem to 
have”, as they formulated the matter. In Lamune, after the centre meeting that 
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ended in chaos, some clients hoped to get a new male development facilitator, 
because “men have the authority to make everybody pay”. Clients also sought 
solidarity among their groups; if this solidarity declined, women asked SEF for 
help, typically calling for stricter rules and discipline. Maybe this partly reflects 
Karim’s (2011: 91) notion that female field workers sometimes adopted 
aggressive behaviours toward the women clients. According to Karim, appearing 
“soft” would mean losing control over the group: “Any clue of their ‘weakness’ 
would be used against these NGO female officers.” 
The interviews with Thandi and her clients eventually revealed that she had 
been cautioned several times by SEF management for neglecting her duties. 
Thandi used her workload as an excuse to delegate and “forget” some of her 
duties. As part of the game, and way of resistance, she also used our discussion 
in the interviews as an opportunity to complain about her working conditions 
and then justify her means and neglect. At the same time, she tried to prevent 
me from asking the clients difficult questions – or asking them anything at all: 
 
Maybe when you ask that has Thandi done this for you, they are afraid and 
say that “no, she didn’t”, meaning that maybe they are answering the wrong 
question. Because our clients, Johanna, are illiterate; so, when you go and 
pose questions to them, they don’t feel free, they give you wrong answers. 
Have you realised that? … They don’t want to be questioned…. Clients hate to 
be asked lots of questions, because they are not used to those people at the 
head office.  
Thandi, development facilitator in Mosetsana, 17 July 2007 
In general, our conversations reflected Thandi’s assumption that I was in a 
position to praise her working skills – or worse, to report back to SEF 
management on her possible drawbacks. I became worried that she would try to 
use her power offstage and make clients tell with whom I had discussed and 
what I had been told. I also sensed that Thandi was worried that I would inform 
on her to SEF. Her concern that clients “would not feel free” with me in my view 
illustrated her own feelings and fears. As the following quotation demonstrates, 
the deepest worry for Thandi tended to be that she would lose her authority over 
clients:  
 
When you are working with auditors, you are not free. They are writing 
something, maybe they are reporting on me. When they come to the 
meetings, they are not in a happy mood. And clients; maybe I’ve done 
something wrong and then in front of clients they just say it and then the 
clients realise that this one says that she’s made a mistake. And then they 
find out that as DF, I’m not free anymore.  
Thandi, development facilitator in Mosetsana, 17 July 2007 
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The adverse economic incentives of SEF salary system, spurred by various power 
plays, induced a constant struggle among development facilitators and branch 
managers to produce the desired results for SEF and to justify their methods and 
operations (cf. Bourdieu 2005: 69–70).  In order to justify her activities in the 
“grey area” of microcredit the field, Thandi began to explain, through metaphors 
and fictitious examples, how SEF management did not have a proper 
understanding of the fieldworkers’ everyday challenges and how she was forced 
to apply formal rules to informal practices. She shifted the responsibility to SEF: 
she blamed SEF for not training her well enough, and called for a better 
understanding of her working methods.  
Partly, Thandi’s frustration was understandable. Although there were strict 
rules for certain operations at SEF, such as development facilitators being 
prohibited from handling clients’ money, some unwritten norms and procedures 
did not follow the official rules and were even encouraged by the upper level. 
According to SEF management, one of the key principles in the microcredit 
scheme was to adhere to strict rules and requirements: “otherwise, people will 
start to take advantage”. While adhering to strict rules was undoubtedly 
necessary, in a certain sense, SEF encouraged development facilitators to take an 
authoritative, top-down position vis-à-vis the clients in order to prevent clients’ 
tactics of resistance. Considerable emphasis was put on the anticipation of 
misuse and manipulation on the part of the clients. Some members of the SEF 
management perceived the work of development facilitators as “a game in which 
you have to be well prepared to react to the opposition’s next move, preferably 
being one move ahead”. Tatu, a staff member in SEF management, gave the 
following advice to development facilitators in this “game of cleverness”: 
 
Don’t tell them when you are coming to check the business. Surprise them! 
Because what they do, they borrow from neighbours, and suddenly you see 
this big stock and tomorrow it’s not there. And then you don’t know the real 
story. So surprise them! Go and check what they are doing. Visit them when 
they are working and watch what they are doing. Because if you tell them, 
they will be prepared. 
Tatu, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 11 July 2007 
Despite the fact that the microcredit group loan system required social collateral 
based on strict rules and monitoring, this strategy focused on tactics of 
governing and concern that without control the clients would waste all the 
money on trivialities instead of investing in their businesses. Correspondingly, 
such a discourse repeated the conventional idea of development practitioners as 
the promoters of the right knowledge, and the clients as objects to be trained to 
become efficient business women – an opposite of the fundamental idea of 
empowering women by releasing them from the highly unequal power relations.
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 Interplay of multiple logics, interests 7
and responsibilities  
 
THIS CHAPTER brings out the contradictions in the relationship between the 
microcredit organisation and the wider economy and society. It offers a short 
description of the challenges of outreach, financial sustainability and impact, 
recognising that the organisation was in many ways “sandwiched” between its 
poverty-oriented goals and the financial pressure from donors.  
At the same time, the chapter brings out the debate about the South African 
“dual economy” and the related issue of “adverse incorporation” of informal 
actors (du Toit and Neves 2007), that is, the disadvantageous ways in which 
poor South Africans are incorporated into economic and social life. The system, 
in which the microcredit organisation operates as a “linkage” between the formal 
and informal economies, and borrowers are considered as agents of their own 
empowerment, is in contradiction to the structural obstacles the poor face when 
operating in the “formal” economy, as well as the continuous vulnerability 
created by systematic political inequality. In its analysis of the process of 
incorporation as a process of “dispossession” (Elyachar 2005), that is, the 
appropriation of social practices to serve as engines for economic growth, the 
chapter warns against neglecting the everyday struggles of poor people in their 
microcredit businesses.  
The chapter argues that the concept of social capital and the idealised market 
models of microcredit rhetoric are insufficient to explain the everyday politics of 
microcredit. Central to the making of the microcredit market in Limpopo was 
relationality (Elyachar 2005: 96–97). Market and clients were mutually 
constituted, the everyday practices of the women were tightly intertwined with 
financial, cultural and social affairs, and the clients’ businesses were hampered 
by structural constraints. This all helps to understand why forming linkages 
between the formal and informal economies does not necessarily alleviate 
poverty.  
 
 
Agendas for poverty mitigation and financial sustainability 
The Small Enterprise Foundation has come a long way to establish itself as one 
of the most successful microcredit organisations in South Africa. According to its 
managing director (MD), much of the SEF’s growth is rooted in the international 
contracts it managed to make in the early 1990s, most importantly with USAID, 
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a US-based governmental agency providing economic and humanitarian 
assistance worldwide, which is one of the early supporters of the “financial 
systems approach” to microfinance. These contracts equipped SEF to a certain 
degree to avoid the financial struggles that South African NGDOs and 
microcredit institutions typically faced during the first years of country’s 
democratisation process; a problem that still tends to be acute (SEFE 2012). 
In the context of South African microcredit markets, SEF has been one of the 
high-flyers. It is one of the biggest microcredit organisations in South Africa 
with its 87,273 active clients in 45 branches in the Limpopo, Eastern Cape, 
North-West and Mpumalanga Provinces (SEF 2012: 1–4). It has a stable 
financial position and has managed to create a status as an organisation that has 
a significant impact on the lives of many poor people.  
The recent years, in particular, have been successful for SEF according to 
many indicators. While the organisation has been able to stabilise itself in 
financial terms, it has also recruited over 75,000 new clients during the last ten 
years, of which over 60% were recruited after 2007, the year during which the 
fieldwork of this study was carried out. Over the period 2007–2012 SEF tripled 
its portfolio of outstanding loans, and increased the average loan sizes by 46%. 
Attaining these figures has also meant geographical expansion: before 2007, 
SEF only operated in the rural Limpopo province; now it has expanded to three 
other districts in South Africa. SEF’s progress in performance records based on 
information from 2002, 2007 and 2012 is presented in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2. Progress in SEF performance records 
 
 June 2012 June 2007 June 2002 
Number of active clients 87,273 41,295  (63% TCP) 
13,387  
(39% TCP) 
Women clients 99% 99% 98% 
Value of loans outstanding R160 million R49.9 million R8.0 million 
Current average loan size 
disturbed 
R2,326 R1,592 R1,033 
Total staff in the end of the year 406 250 103 
Clients per staff member 215 261 209 
Operational and financial 
self-sufficiency 
101% 98% / 97% 51% / 51% 
 
Source: SEF Management Reviews 2002, 2007, and 2012. 
 
According to SEF management, the organisation has been able to progress as 
fast as it wanted, despite the growth of other organisations. SEF’s managing 
director described the situations as follows: 
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Managing director: Sometimes it happens that a microfinance organisation 
starts up a certain place. Those development facilitators are in a panic about 
losing their clients, they are really, really panicked. But what we’ve learnt is 
that things settle down. After a while, they’ve got their 80 groups, 400 
clients. It’s fine.  
Interviewer: The need for loans is just so great?  
Managing director:  This is the market share; we have our 2,000 clients, 
somebody else comes along, they start growing, but we don’t lose our 2,000. 
And they seem to be happy with what they’ve got. So it probably means that 
actually there are 20,000 clients. And our 2,000, which we think is good 
enough, is just a small piece of the pie.  
Managing director of SEF in Tzaneen, 9 July 2007 
While SEF proclaims that its work is not only about guaranteeing operational 
efficiency and sustainability but rather to bring about a positive impact on 
clients’ lives, at the same time, it has been striving with determination towards a 
financially sustainable system of microcredits. SEF’s strategy is to expand its 
services to every South African province. This aim is in line with the prevalent 
“financial systems approach” to microcredit, a model also known as the “best 
practice”, in which one the main considerations is to eliminate ineffective 
subsidies and provide services on a financially sustainable basis to a large 
number of poor people (Robinson 2001; 2004).  
SEF reached complete organisational and financial self-sufficiency during the 
financial year of 2012, for the first time in its history (SEF 2012: 1). This means 
that the operating revenues of SEF exceeded operating and funding costs. The 
funding had been secured through a number of international and national grants 
and loans: grant from GiveWell; grants for loan capital from Whole Planet 
Foundation, Genesis Steel, Sentinel Steel and Service Centre, The International 
Alliance for Women (TIAW), MC Patel Family Foundation, T-NNTT Social Club 
and Elysian Charter School of Hoboken; as well as loans from Hivos-Triodos and 
Triodos-Doen, Swedfund, Tembeka Social Investment, Khula Enterprise 
Finance, The Freddie  Marincowitz Family Trust, Oikocredit, Sentinel Steel, 
ABSA, Standard Bank, SAMAF, Cadiz and Government Employees Pension 
Fund (SEF 2012: 15–16). 
Given the target to help the poorest of the poor, a deep understanding of both 
the financial and social issues is essential for microcredit organisations. In this 
sense, clients’ consideration of SEF as “a bit like a bank that helps the poor” 
appropriately captured the challenges SEF had to meet in its everyday 
operations. In the following quotation, the managing director of SEF describes 
how the challenges emerged in his everyday duties: 
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One amazing thing in this job is that in the morning I may meet a researcher 
from the field who is reporting to me on social impact issues; very detailed, 
challenging social questions. You really have to understand the situation of 
the poor, and what makes poor people poor. In the afternoon, I may have a 
telephone conversation about the bond issues; totally the other side of the 
story. 
Managing director of SEF in Tzaneen head office, 13 July 2007 
While any microcredit organisation needs to manage simultaneously the 
problems of outreach, financial sustainability and impact (Zeller and Meyer 
2003), it was also obvious that SEF was in many ways “sandwiched” between its 
somewhat contradictory goals. While SEF had chosen to remain a NGDO to 
maintain its poverty-focused mission, it was under strong financial pressure 
from the financial department, the board and the donors to meet its financial 
objectives. Bryan, a member of SEF management described the financial 
pressure in the interviews as follows: 
 
For donors to like you, you must show them good figures. For clients, you 
must guide them out of poverty – which will cost you more money. So it’s 
difficult. And for your continuity you end up doing very little for the clients 
and a lot for the donors. 
Bryan, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 9 July 2007 
This kind of comment is by no means exceptional. There is a vast social scientific 
literature on the tensions between funders and development organisations 
(Bateman 2010, Ebrahim 2003, Fowler 1997, Tvedt 2001; 2006), exploring the 
ways that funds are subject to donors’ multiple demands, such as the demand for 
demonstrating successful results. In fact, Bateman (2010) goes as far as to claim 
that the whole microcredit “hype” is constructed in order to sell it to donors in 
favour of economic and political elites.  
In its management review of 2012, SEF is fairly explicit about the pressure 
donors put on the organisation. While SEF states that it would prefer expanding 
and reaching more clients, in the financial year of 2012 SEF had to put the 
financial goals first since “the position of some of its lenders was changing” and 
… “they would prefer to see SEF move above the break-even point based on 
income excluding grants” (SEF 2012: 2).  
The fast growth of SEF illustrates a success story that the members of SEF 
management were happy to share also in the interviews. These figures 
insinuated that more and more clients were served with higher average loan 
sizes and that the ever growing numbers of women helped families pay their 
children’s school fees or improve their dwellings. In these kinds of stories, the 
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microfinance schism that once existed between the poverty reduction target and 
the financial systems paradigm evaporated. As Roodman (2011: 108) describes 
the current view on microcredit management: “Self-sufficient institutions can 
reach poor people impressively, and that is to be celebrated”.  
The downside of the fast growth of SEF was also reflected in the interviews, 
however. One of the – quite understandable – drawbacks of expanded 
operations has been that direct communication between the organisation and its 
clients has diminished. At the beginning of its operations in the early 1990s, with 
two officers in a rural village, the interaction with clients was much more direct. 
As Tatu from SEF management explained, when the number of clients was 
small, SEF staff could have a personal relationship with its clients. This 
connection has recently been lost:  
 
We often got together with clients; we had little parties and we gave prizes to 
those who did best…. Now, we only know people by name, by number, by 
application number, which is rather sad. But I suppose the intention is the 
same. We help them to uplift their families…. It’s just that we’ve grown too 
big for us to be able to see.  
Tatu, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 11 July 2007 
The development facilitators criticised SEF’s target of expanded operations by 
complaining that targeting a huge number of clients with a small number of 
employees constrained the goals of poverty alleviation. In Limpopo, where a 
single development facilitator might have as many as 470 clients, the risk was 
that the clients were left to rely largely on their own resources. Bryan, a member 
of SEF management, emphasised in the interviews that for long-term results 
SEF staff should spend much more time with the clients: “It’s expensive, but you 
need that.”  
As many of the development facilitators’ tasks were transferred to the clients, 
and the group leaders in particular, the picture which Rankin (2002: 2–4) draws 
of the instrumental character of participatory elements in development 
programmes was obvious. In such a situation, instead of focusing on the 
processes of empowering women, reducing administrative costs and ensuring 
good repayment rates becomes the central issue for the organisation. Although 
SEF repayment meetings were promoted because of their empowering effect, 
Bryan pointed out that in many cases the centre meetings had become just “a 
collecting machine”: “The group and centre structure is not functioning. Once 
the loan is out there, they just collect the money.”  
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Merging the arenas of formal and informal economics  
The question of dualism 
Microcredit as a development strategy in South Africa is spurred by the idea that 
the formal and informal economies represent two largely structurally separate 
territories that need to be “linked” by women’s social networks. Describing 
South Africa as a country divided into two economies is peculiar to South 
African policy discourse according to which poor people stay poor because they 
are trapped in a “second economy”, and disconnected from the “first economy” 
(du Toit and Neves 2007: iv).  
In the categorisations, the term “first” economy, conceptualised as formal, 
and the “second”, conceptualised as informal, are often used to distinguish the 
different forms of economic operations circulating within the society. In a 
certain sense, the notion of Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2006: 4), of informal as 
being “outside the reach of different levels and mechanisms of official 
governance”, and formal as being “reachable by these mechanisms”, is 
somewhat useful here. For historical reasons, such a divide has been politically 
carefully controlled in South Africa. Although the strict laws of the apartheid 
regime have now been overthrown and the “Whites only” signs removed, in a 
certain sense, the social and economic differentiation that is upheld by 
prevailing practices and unwritten rules remains as a legacy from those times. 
Still, there are places where poor African people are not welcome or even 
allowed to enter.  
In Tzaneen, the political divide between operators in the informal and formal 
economy was carefully guarded, for example, in the building and yard of 
Tzaneng Mall, a shopping centre in the centre of the town. The official, the 
“formal” side of the building efficiently concealed the informal side, which could 
only be entered from the back of the mall: the Indian drapers, the taxi-rank and 
Black hawkers in the back-yard, and the huge Black people’s market space in the 
basement. The barrier between these two “worlds” was upheld and emphasised 
by numerous warnings that I also received regularly: “You never go there alone”; 
or just simply “don’t go there”.  
Although there is an attempt to maintain this distinction between formal and 
informal economies, in reality these dimensions intersect in many ways. The 
interaction between the informal and formal worlds became clear, for example, 
when entering the “informal side” of the Tzaneng Mall, and understanding the 
busy taxi-rank not only in terms of exclusion and disconnection; in fact, in this 
case the exclusion rather meant that the better-off people were those who 
excluded themselves by avoiding the area. At the same time, this informal world 
served as a link that connected rural African people with the urban economy (du 
Toit and Neves 2007).  
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While poverty for the poor in Limpopo is often described as limited access to 
markets and to the “first” economy, what du Toit and Neves (2007: 51) suggest is 
that poverty persists rather because of the disadvantageous ways in which 
people are incorporated into economic and social life: a phenomenon that du 
Toit (2007), Elyachar (2005), Hickey and du Toit (2007) among others call 
“adverse incorporation”. In practice, this term refers to various issues: the 
extreme inequality of income or the unequal provision of public services with the 
non-poor benefiting the most from public education, healthcare, water, 
sanitation, and transport services (cf. Butler 2004: 66–67). 
Paradoxically, at the same time these interactions maintain the gap in living 
standards between the “haves” and the “have-nots”. Typical examples are 
African women who as domestic workers clean White peoples’ houses or men 
employed on the registered farms, who lack a written working contract or all 
forms of employment benefits (cf. Mattila 2011). Equally, the distorted system 
offers people from rural villages limited access to markets in the “formal” parts 
of the town, while the commercial chain stores of the “first economy” have 
untrammelled access to rural markets (du Toit and Neves 2007: 35).  
Limpopoan women’s struggles to move into the first economy also became 
evident in the interviews with SEF clients. A typical example of these struggles 
was clients’ efforts to develop their traditional beer businesses into official 
systems of the country. The rule according to which the license must be received 
from authorities and beer must be bought from the authorised brewery caused 
difficulties for the clients. In theory, the licenses were available. The problem 
was that poor households could not pay the charges required to access them. In 
addition to fixed capital, many SEF clients also lacked information, as the 
following quotation reveals: 
 
Ofure: I’ve got a storage space outside my house, that’s where I run my 
tavern, and I’m still busy with the building. From that I’m going to apply for a 
licence because you need a licence to be able to sell real beer. 
Interviewer: Where do you apply for the licence? 
Ofure:  Well, I’m not well informed about the whole procedure. I am still 
struggling with putting up the building …. That’s why I joined SEF, just to be 
able to build the tavern. But according to what I hear people saying, I have to 
go to the police station to get the application forms. And it’s quite expensive; 
it costs about 3,200 to 4,000, or even 6,000 to get the license. 
Ofure, MCP client in Leloba, 5 July 2007 
The lack of information and fixed capital were not the only obstacles for the poor 
to break into the formal markets. Equally large barriers were the strict rules of 
formalisation controlled by the state officials. Such rules represent state officials’ 
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efforts to guide and control operations in the formal but also in the informal 
economy. This became evident in the “development work” of Tzaneng mall: 
Occasionally, Tzaneen town officers tried to get rid of the informal side of the 
mall. As Kim, a member of SEF management explained these officials wanted to 
“clean up” the town: “They go and hire a company and ask them to clean the 
town. And the company, they just go and clean, you know, the ‘trash’.” Both SEF 
and its clients – as any vendor in the market place – were powerless in the face 
of these attacks. When I asked if there was anything SEF could do to stop this 
kind of “cleaning”, Kim regretted that there was very little SEF could do. “What 
happened here in Tzaneen, we heard that coming, we helped, but the reality is 
that it may happen anytime, whatever time a week, we don’t know.”  
In this regard, trumpeting integration on the one hand, and hampering poor 
people’s entry into the first economy on the other seems paradoxical. As du Toit 
and Neves (2007: 51) suggest, what policy-makers really should do is to “seek to 
reduce the vulnerability and disadvantage created by systematic inequality” and 
to “support the livelihood strategies that are found at the margins of the formal 
economy” (du Toit and Neves 2007: iv).  
SEF balancing with the structural constraints 
The fact that SEF is a non-governmental development organisation operating on 
the grassroots level, but in many ways connected to and belonging to the formal 
economy and regulated by various laws, means that the operations of SEF are in 
many ways acts of balancing between “formal” and “informal” practices. This did 
not emerge without conflicts at SEF. First, because of its “dual” economy, South 
Africa is considered a particularly demanding environment for microcredit 
organisations to attain financial sustainability. As SEF managing director 
described in the interviews, in financial terms, SEF has to be able to recover the 
formal economy expenditures from the revenues of clients operating in the 
informal economy. In other words, while salaries, the main cost of the 
organisation, follows the “first” economy expenditures, interest on the loans, the 
main income of the organisation, is gathered from the “second” economy. It is 
challenging for any microcredit organisation to sustain the exchange ratio.  
Another challenge is rather symbolic, but it might produce tangible results. 
According to SEF management, it was a big challenge for microcredit 
organisations to become differentiated from mashonishas, the loan sharks. As a 
member of SEF administration remarked, microcredit in South Africa has not 
yet been fully acknowledged as a part of the formal financial system: “We are 
still struggling in identifying ourselves. If you go to any common people and ask 
about microfinance, they will tell you about mashonisha; even those who are in 
the sphere of government.”  
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Taxi-rank in the back yard of the Tzaneng Mall. 
The same phenomenon was brought out in the interviews with SEF clients. 
Many potential clients tended to worry whether SEF was a mashonisha. There 
were rumours about harsh loan recovery methods of SEF:30 
 
Interviewer: What happens if some member does not pay her loans and it 
just keeps going? 
Client: We complain to the [SEF Branch] office and they will go to her house 
and tell her to pay the loan. If you don’t pay the loan, the SEF people will 
come to your house and … whatever goods you have, they will sell it so that 
they can get their money back. 
Lisbeth, MCP client in Lamune, 4 June 2007 
This again is an example of how the various groups of actors in the field of 
microcredit portray each other as “the other”; yet the terms mean different 
things to different people ‒ projecting prejudices and reflecting predominant 
power hierarchies between different stakeholders, different group of actors 
becoming captives of their “real” and assumed habitus in social fields with 
multiple positionalities. Yet microcredit as any other developmentalist 
configuration can hardly be seen as a monolith. Rather it consists of numerous 
                                                 
30 Even though these kinds of rumours might have not been true, for some clients they were real. I 
never had an actual knowledge of the issue. In my view, these rumours most likely reflected the 
continuous problems in the centre, and the usage of threats as a loan recovery method. 
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local and global level agencies and actors with different aims and power 
positions as well as multiple realities. As Hilhorst (2003: 4–5) notes, NGDOs are 
many things at the same time – and they also present different faces to different 
stakeholders. This means that SEF’s position in relation to different stakeholders 
also varied in a complex way, shifting from being a “receiver” in the eyes of 
donors to a “donor” or “helper” in the minds of its clients. To be automatically 
identified as a mashonisha undoubtedly makes attaining the position of a 
credible financial actor more difficult. 
Partly the challenges of SEF to find shared understanding with clients were 
explicated by the policies of the past. Given the historical and political context of 
South Africa, concerning that governmental policy was able to keep Africans and 
Europeans apart from the 17th century onwards, creating “an enabling and 
supporting environment” for clients’ businesses is a great challenge for any 
development organisation in the country. SEF clients’ and community members’ 
experiences of apartheid, various control mechanisms and the non-transparent 
political practices have undoubtedly influenced how people position themselves 
in relation to governmental agencies or development organisations, and thus 
make interventions challenging for any present-day organisation. The view of 
SEF management on the commitments between SEF and clients can be noted 
from the following quotation: 
 
People are used to fighting against authority, and ignore authority. Now, 
when the microcredit programme comes to the client and says if we do this, 
you promise to do that, they say yes. It can easily happen that people just 
ignore regulations later. But at SEF we really hold you to your promise. So 
the first time when people try to break their promise we say:  “No, this 
promise is the one you keep!” And actually once you have done that, people 
have got a very high sense of honour.  
Josef, a member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 13 July 2007 
While the reluctance towards authority and bureaucracy may serve as one 
possible explanation for clients’ unwillingness to follow the rules of SEF, another 
additional explanation also exists: clients resist the rules because they have good 
reasons to do so (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 69). Not all clients considered SEF 
rules as legitimate. Many SEF clients stated that they had been concerned about 
the strict rules of the programmes in the beginning. Some clients or their 
relatives were worried that they would find themselves in a circle of debt. 
Sometimes it was difficult for women to find reliable group members, and some 
women felt that running businesses and participating in and organising 
meetings took too much effort, which made them question their reason to 
continue with SEF altogether. In other words, clients also questioned the 
functionality of the formal sector institutes.  
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SEF clients were also wary of the formal sector services in general and were 
reluctant to use them. Clients were not alone in airing their suspicions towards 
formal services in the interviews; some SEF staff members also described their 
struggles with the formal services. The apartheid regime and its notions of 
hierarchy, privilege and segregation had considerably influenced the socio-
political practices in South Africa. After having been considered socially invisible 
for decades, it was difficult for many Africans to believe that public services also 
belonged to them. In the interviews, it became clear that for many of the SEF 
clients there seemed to be little reason to expect anything good from formal 
institutions. Interestingly, it was sometimes difficult for SEF clients to 
understand that SEF “that helps the poor” was, in fact, established by [White] 
South Africans. Elias, SEF client from Leloba, described his impressions of SEF 
as follows: 
 
I just know that SEF isn’t South African -based, you know. There is a great 
deal of influences that SEF is getting from foreign countries, that’s my 
perspective towards SEF. 
Elias, MCP client in Leloba, 5 July 2007 
 
Empowering debt 
Poor women as agents of their own development 
While development organisations are keen to inform about the positive role they 
are paying in society in order to expand and increase their impact further, and in 
this way to legitimise their operations, SEF needed to think carefully what kind 
of rhetoric it used with various stakeholders of its operations, and in what ways 
it was ready to help women “to help themselves” amid the various societal and 
financial challenges. In the following quotation, Josef, a member of SEF 
management, describes the responsibilities of clients as loan receivers and the 
SEF as an organisation: 
 
We are not saying you must use the loan for business. We say: we only give 
loans for business. And they must use the loan for their plan, their business 
plan. So if somebody applies for a loan for the business but intends to use it 
for children’s education, she lies to us. And actually, what they are saying is 
that it’s our fault that we are not giving it for education. They ask: ‘Why don’t 
you give loans for education?’ No, no, no, no. We will only provide business 
loans. Please go next door. But the clients say: ‘There isn’t a next door NGO.’ 
So, whose fault is that? 
Josef, member of SEF management in Tzaneen, 13 July 2007 
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As Josef’s statement suggests, in negotiations between SEF and clients, the rule 
of the game for clients became “either take it or leave it”. And surely it is an 
organisation’s right to define why it exists in the first place. For SEF 
management, the liability distribution and tasks of clients and SEF were quite 
clear. The primary task of the SEF was to give loans to businesses instead of 
taking responsibility of the clients’ other needs or of the disadvantages created 
by the systematic political inequality. At the same time, there was a hidden 
message in the above citation for other developmental operators: “You carry out 
your responsibilities; we take care of ours”.  
Another question, as Karim (2011: 195) remarks, is to what extent 
organisations that work with the poor, and instrumentalise poverty to develop 
their organisation, owe a moral responsibility to these people they seek to 
empower. Or in Foucaldian terms: are these forms of power justified? Is the 
strategic position that the microcredit organisation is trying to achieve 
legitimised? The legitimisation of a non-governmental development 
organisation’s existence is strongly influenced by the way the organisation 
benefits the “target group” of development interventions. In this regard, what 
ultimately counts is not necessarily what the organisation succeeds or fails to do, 
but rather what it claims to do and the “side-effects” of its operations (Ferguson 
1990: 254).  
While Josef considered business instead of poverty alleviation as SEF’s point 
of entry, he in a certain sense passed on the baton of “development” or 
“empowerment” to the clients and in this way legitimised SEF’s existence and 
rules of operations. Obviously, and understandably, Josef also wanted to 
disentangle himself from the promise that microcredit would automatically and 
alone bring about development and help the poor Limpopoan women. This was 
well exemplified in his allegory comparing the promise of microcredit for poor 
women to the corresponding promise of university education for students. 
According to this comparison, if students study hard and learn, they will have 
good opportunities for new jobs: “Not guaranteed, but a good opportunity”, 
Josef remarked. Accordingly, if one does not study, and does not work, probably 
nothing will happen. This is what SEF is all about, too, Josef stated; it is trying to 
give a client an opportunity. “But I know that the clients have to do 98 per cent 
of the work to change their lives. We do a very small part; critical – yes – but 
very small.”  
This kind of thinking parallels the most recent discourse on microcredit and 
women’s empowerment suggesting that rather than lifting people out of poverty 
microcredit is fundamentally about improving people’s options (Roodman 2011, 
2012). The risk in this kind of thinking, however, is that limited attention is 
directed at the everyday struggles of poor people themselves, as well as unequal 
relationships in the global economy and its “formal institutions”, and that the 
functioning of this “formal economy” or “formal institutions” is not 
problematised. 
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At the same time, the superior power position of microcredit organisations as 
loan providers to financially needy women creates what Karim (2011: 35–37), in 
the spirit of Foucault’s theoretical ideas, calls “NGO governmentality”: “a mode 
of governance through which NGOs modulate the behaviours of their rural 
clients toward NGO objectives”. Through loans, clients are constituted as both 
the subjects and objects of development – or more accurately, “subjects and 
subjected”, as Elyachar (2005: 193) formulates the matter, when describing the 
“empowerment debt” as part of a new mode of governance “in which the 
individual polices himself or herself”.  
SEF clients’ positions also varied in complex ways in the eyes of the 
organisation. The clients were considered as “the poor receivers” and “targets” 
by SEF, while at the same time they were called “business women” and “agents 
of their own development”. This system in which microcredit organisations 
operate as “linkages” between poor women and the global market, and in which 
clients are considered as subjects, as agents of their own development, has 
brought microcredit organisations and the rural poor into a mutually dependent, 
yet ambivalent, relationship (Karim’s 2011: 131). SEF clients’ desperate need for 
cash forced them to submit to strict rules when few other choices were available. 
In exchange, the poor clients gave up some of their autonomy to receive these 
services (Karim 2011).  
While microcredit clients in South Africa should have a right to be considered 
as actors – that is, as active subjects, and not merely as passive objects or 
“targets” of development – it is important to emphasise that these women are in 
many ways in a vulnerable position because of their gender, their skin colour, 
and their structural position in a society. Similarly, while people are often 
engaged in various networks of social support that are vital for the maintenance 
of their livelihoods, at the same time social networks and solidarity relations are 
constrained by the structural conditions of poverty. Moreover, the everyday lives 
of poor women are complex, and their loans are linked to hierarchical power 
relationships, inequality, and various social obligations, and characterised by 
ambiguous norms of reciprocity. It is essential to understand that these subjects 
are not “isolated” or “autonomous”, but relational (Elyachar 2005: 96, Karim 
2011: 35–37). Relational subjectivity refers also to multiple obligations and 
reciprocities that constrain clients’ social and economic roles. This complex 
dialectic between personal ambitions and the social obligations became clear 
also during the course of this study. 
What is needed then is more attention not only to the effects of the lack of 
physical assets on the poor, but to the structural constraints that hamper the 
everyday practices and decision making of the clients (Cleaver 2005). As Nygren 
and Myatt-Hirvonen (2009: 865) note, although poor women’s social networks 
are often crucial for survival, given the complex interlinks between human actors 
and structural conditions, “such actions are hardly enough to substitute for the 
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role of wider socio-political movements and public institutions in addressing the 
structural dimensions of development”.  
Strategising – or coping with the poverty? 
Based on these critical observations this study tightly supports the argument by 
du Toit and Neves (2007: 9–10) among others that much more attention should 
be directed at exploring the livelihoods of the marginalised poor themselves: 
“the precise nature of their links with the mainstream economy, and what this 
means for their social and economic (dis)empowerment”. 
In fact, microcredit organisations are not the only ones for whom it is 
challenging to attain sustainability in such a complex economy as South Africa; 
the same holds true for clients. Many SEF clients, for instance, although 
operating in the informal economy, have to buy the bulk of their groceries and 
business stock from the formal economy, which further limits the development 
potential of their businesses (Baumann 2004b). Furthermore, microcredit rules 
are sometimes better suited to an idealised market model than to everyday 
reality. One such rule is the SEF rule according to which credits are granted only 
for business purposes and the money loaned has to be utilised according to a 
business plan. In principle, it sounds like a fair rule. At best, it encourages 
clients to carefully consider what kind of business they really want to have: What 
are their goals? Why do they think the goals are worth of pursuing? And what is 
their plan for reaching those goals? In reality, however, many clients in Limpopo 
had limited possibilities of strategising in their businesses.  
Establishing a business in an informal setting in rural Limpopo is risky: the 
business is vulnerable to violence and crime, incomes are low, customers are 
economically poor and markets are saturated.31 The group formation process 
was at worst random and joining a group served as a requisite for getting a loan. 
In these cases, in fact, SEF fieldworkers and peer clients interpreted the SEF 
rules fairly loosely and proposed an opportune business scheme, as the following 
quotation from one of the SEF branch managers reveals: 
 
Some in our TCP area just come and take a loan knowing nothing about the 
market and business. When they hear that SEF is borrowing money for the 
business they ask: “What can I sell?” So it’s for us to explain to them that you 
can sell these…. We motivate them and when they make loan proposals we 
tell them, based on the experience that we have in business, the positive side 
of the business.  
Maria, branch manager in Hlare, 13 July 2007 
                                                 
31 In regard to this, Bähre (2007a: 139) rightfully expresses astonishment that uneducated and 
inexperienced poor women are expected to invest their money in businesses in an unprotected 
informal economy, while many foreign investors – who are much better able to protect themselves 
against various financial and political shocks – are reluctant to invest in South Africa’s economy.  
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In many cases, clients simply had no choice; or they had no strategic intention as 
such. According to one of the SEF development facilitators, the simple fact was 
that most clients did not like to do business planning: “They have seen their 
neighbour selling some things at spaza and people buying, so they think that fair 
enough, I’m going to sell that too.” While some clients followed strict indicators 
for a successful business, the everyday business activities of many others were 
based on the logic according to which the emptied carton meant that the 
transaction was done; and that was enough.  
In regard to “serious” strategic planning, such as succeeding against competitors 
or securing the future of the business, SEF clients had limited opportunities to 
deal with economic insecurity and poor access to resources while trying to 
perform a balancing act between the personal aspirations of livelihood 
improvement and the rules of social reciprocity.  
When I asked clients what the biggest challenge in their businesses was, they 
nearly unanimously referred to unreliable customers and group members. 
Another drawback was the fierce competition between clients. Sporadic business 
activities and stiffened competition complicated clients’ efforts to generate 
income and manage money. Some of the first SEF clients, the “trailblazers” of 
SEF microcredit programmes, made it clear that even if they were in a certain 
sense optimistic about the future because of microcredit, the growth of 
microcredit operations had brought with it new kinds of problems. As some of 
the SEF clients remarked, “It was easier to sustain a business ten years ago; now, 
if you invent a new way of doing business, suddenly there are ten others doing 
the same”. Yet a village cannot sustain 500 tomato hawkers.  
 
Micro entrepreneurs running their businesses. 
 INTERPLAY OF MULTIPLE LOGICS, INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES | 165 
Jamila, one of the most successful SEF clients that I met in Limpopo, also 
signalled her displeasure with tougher competition. She had managed to make 
good money by working as a traditional healer, and eagerly emphasised in the 
interviews from time to time that “you cannot become a traditional healer just 
like that”. She was irritated that so many women were attempting to penetrate 
the healing business. “It is a gift”, she explained and related a remarkable story 
about her dreams and discussions with her ancestors, the physical pain and 
spiritual struggle she had gone through, and the skills that she had acquired 
before she was ready to become a proper herbalist and a healer. However, it was 
difficult for traditional healers to reject new entrants. While innovative leaders 
were those whose businesses thrived and who brought new ideas and products 
to the markets, the ideas of the pioneers were rapidly copied and exploited by 
others. Business success of women such as Jamila encouraged a number of 
micro entrepreneurs to begin the healing business, which rapidly saturated the 
markets. As Jamila somewhat acidly and arrogantly explained, often these “false 
healers” skip demanding training; they simply buy aspirin in the town and begin 
to “heal” people with these pills. 
Competition existed not only between SEF clients, since they were many 
other actors too participating in small businesses. A big threat for fruit hawkers 
were the retail dealers, who bought bulks of fruits directly from farms without 
intermediaries and who thus, brought down the prices. What the wealthier SEF 
clients considered as a real threat were the Indian and Chinese shops, which 
were spreading everywhere, even to the most remote villages, and which easily 
undercut the prices. “China, China, everything is made in China!” some women 
sighed when I asked them about the situation. Maria, a branch manager, 
described the situation as follows: 
 
You find that the Indians are selling the same stuff as SEF clients. Some 
clients go as far as Durban or Johannesburg to buy those things while the 
Indians are selling them cheaper. Another challenge is that there are lots of 
people who are selling at the pension points. This one is selling tomatoes; 
that one is also selling tomatoes.... There are lots of people that are selling the 
same stuff and at the end of the day you find that they are not getting the 
money they are supposed to get.  
Maria, branch manager in Hlare, 13 July 2007 
In addition to this, some SEF employers were worried about the possible 
mushrooming of commercial chain stores, such as Shoprite or Pick ’n Pay 
supermarkets, and how this trend would affect the SEF clients’ businesses. 
Clients who were running their businesses in semi-urban areas had already 
experienced competition. They complained, for instance, about customers who 
 166 | INTERPLAY OF MULTIPLE LOGICS, INTERESTS AND RESPOSIBILITIES 
had stopped buying coca cola cans from them, because supermarkets in the 
nearby town were selling 2-litre bottles at the same price.  
Surely a more complete analysis would reveal other crucial factors beyond 
the stiffened competition. However, given the difficulty for Limpopoan women 
to make a living from sporadic sources of income, and their limited opportunity 
to control the political-economic conditions that affected their livelihoods, what 
clients’ complaints implicate is the powerlessness and negligence of microcredit 
organisations in the face of these structural dimensions of poverty. In many 
cases, the microcredit organisation granted loans to similar businesses in 
saturated markets with little thought of the clients’ ability to advance their 
business operations and to manage the everyday struggles for a livelihood. 
Sometimes clients had to save some of the loan money to repay the loan. As 
Josephine, SEF client from Leloba, explained: “It’s not easy for us to pay back 
loans. You just have to keep the loan money and save it for the repayment of the 
loan, because there are lots of us selling the same stuff here.”  
Under these circumstances, the question is how relevant it is to expect fair 
economic returns with a narrow profit margin, stiff competition and poor 
customers, whatever the clients’ business plans might be. Many of the 
interviewed clients had little opportunity to carefully consider whether the 
money loaned was invested in a productive business or spent on daily 
consumption needs. Under the financial pressures, many women were obliged to 
prioritise short-term requirements of daily survival over the longer-term 
demands of business management. A considerable number of women were 
providing alone for their families, trying to survive by selling coca cola or “fat 
cooks”, donuts, with a loan of R500–R800. Many had no savings or assets with 
which to protect themselves against unexpected failures, and if such failure 
recurred, they had to rely on the charity of relatives. Credit and the meagre 
economic returns that were used for stock supplements and basic consumption 
rapidly dwindled away. Balancing between these multifaceted needs and 
concerns required considerable compromises.  
While some of the SEF clients were able to increase their incomes markedly, 
in most cases incomes were relatively small and unstable, which made clients’ 
businesses highly vulnerable to financial shocks. This was illustrated at the 
beginning of my fieldwork, when the public sector strike, one of the biggest 
strikes in South African history, closed the doors of public schools and hospitals 
for two months.32 This strike not only resulted in large disruptions in 
government hospitals, schools and transport, but also affected the activities of 
SEF clients who were running their businesses at school yards and clinics. Bina 
and Letsha, among many other SEF clients in Pekenene, were desperate about 
what to do in the face of vanishing customers and decreasing revenues: 
                                                 
32 The strike arose out of demands by trade unions to raise the pay for civil servants by 12%. The 
government offered a 7.25% pay raise, which the trade unions refused to accept.  
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Bina: Business is different; I’m not working very much because of this 
[strike]. I’m selling at home but it’s not busy. 
Interviewer: Do you have any other plans? 
Bina: I sell tomatoes and go around. 
Interviewer: How much money would you make if there wasn’t any strike 
and how much money do you make now? 
Bina: Basically it’s on a day-to-day basis; I’m able to make about 1,000 a 
month. But now when I’m selling at home, I make about R400, which means 
I lose about 600 because of the strike. 
Interviewer: How do you feel about it? 
Bina: It’s disturbing but that’s just how it is. I can’t do anything about it. It’s 
not only the school that is on strike; the nurses have joined them too; the 
whole public sector basically. So I can’t sell even here next to the clinic 
because the nurses are not there. 
Bina, MCP client in Pekenene, 28 June 2007 
Letsha: Business is slow. The strike has an effect. Some of us were selling at 
school.  
Interviewer: So what do you do during the strike? 
Letsha: I sell snacks. I’ve got a container. Even now when I was coming from 
there I carried the container and sold along the way. This keeps me in 
business. I put my snacks in the container; when the container is empty, I go 
back home. 
Interviewer: How about profits? 
Letsha: Due to the strike I’m not able to make more than 20 rand a day. 
Usually on weekends I’m able to make 150. So I’m selling, but the business is 
not easy. 
Interviewer: Do you have any other income but this business? 
Letsha: It’s only the business. 
Letsha, MCP client in Pekenene, 28 June 2007 
The above conversations took place at the end of June 2007, when the strike had 
continued for four weeks. These clients were selling fruit, juice and snacks to 
kids in the schoolyard – but the experience could be nearly anyone’s in the 
prgramme. When I asked Letsha about the strategies that she had if the strike 
continued, she simply answered: “I don’t know. I’ll just see what will happen and 
when they finish it.” 
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Fruiterers waiting for customers. 
SEF clients were floundering in an unexpected situation, poorly-equipped to 
cope with the financial shock. The disaster that struck the clients’ businesses and 
their incapability of handling the situation challenges the common view of 
market-oriented microcredit rhetoric, according to which the poor can strategise 
whatever their financial circumstances, a phenomenon that González de la 
Rocha (2007) calls “the myth of survival”. 
Under these circumstances, microcredit management-thinking, according to 
which clients follow systematic business plans, tends to be based on a narrow 
conceptualisation of the poor’s everyday struggles for their livelihoods. The 
everyday struggles of SEF clients to earn an income can hardly be seen as a 
result of strategies to get rich or empowered as such. The motivation for running 
their businesses in many cases arose from the opportunity to get cash from SEF 
and to survive despite impoverished conditions, in which there was no 
possibility of earning regular wages (cf. González de la Rocha 2007). As noted by 
Francis (2002: 544) in her study of livelihood diversification in South Africa, we 
should question how appropriate it is to conceptualise the livelihood activities of 
the poor in terms of “strategising”, rather than in terms of coping with poverty 
and unequal power relations. This is a typical example of what Olivier de Sardan 
(2005: 118–123) calls “development populism”. According to him, the romantic 
ideas that intellectuals have about the poor overestimate the resources of people: 
not only the resources peculiar to them but also the mechanisms of power 
related to various resources.  
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Considering the structural challenges, and the clients’ poor ability to create 
room for manoeuvre, the distinction made by de Certeau (1980, 1984) between 
“strategy” and “tactic” becomes relevant in conceptualising SEF clients’ income 
generation practices. According to de Certeau, as well as to Scheper-Hughes 
(1992: 471–475), while a strategy refers to a locus of power, “tactic is an art of 
the weak” (de Certeau 1984: 37). As Cleaver (2005) demonstrates in her study in 
Tanzania, the capabilities of the poorest to have their voices heard are restricted 
and therefore their ability to benefit from social capital through social networks 
is often limited. Those in a weaker position must thus show real virtuosity in 
what Warr (2006: 500–503) calls the “art of social capital”, in order to find ways 
to cope with this unfavourable position.  
Busy business-women  
On the same basis, many of the SEF clients were hardly the “independent 
entrepreneurs” or “natural business women” that inaccurate microcredit 
rhetoric sometimes claims. This did not mean that SEF clients completely lacked 
business skills or that they would not have had any marketing strategies; in 
contrast, as du Toit and Neves (2007: 42–43) remark, a significant amount of 
hidden knowledge and effort is required to sustain informal economic activities 
at the margins of the formal economy. A development facilitator at SEF pointed 
this matter out as follows: “If a person can survive on a 2,000 rand loan for six 
months, and take care of a family of seven, she must understand something 
about the business!”  
Although SEF clients had limited ways to expand their businesses or to 
attract new customers, some of the women had invented fairly creative 
marketing and selling tactics. Those who were running tax shops often had a 
sign on the door. Barmaids passed the word around through neighbours and 
friends – or did it literally themselves by attaching an empty malt liquor packet 
to the head of a stick, and running round the village hollering that the beer was 
ready. Beth, who had a telephone business in her front yard in Lamune, used to 
engage in lively banter with her customers in order to provide them with a 
pleasant buying experience: “Every time customers come to my place, I laugh 
with them, I make jokes and they start making phone calls. That’s how I make 
business!” If Ramona, a dressmaker from Leloba, went to town, she always wore 
her own creations so that people could come and ask where she had bought 
them: “I always make sure that I have a pen, paper and a measuring tape in the 
bag!” 
For many women, external trademarks were the most important marketing 
strategy. For Becky, who sold cold drinks, sweets and bed duvets in Lamune, 
appearance was everything: “The first thing I do, I clean the house. After that I 
take a bath and just look nice. So when people come and buy something I don’t 
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have to be concerned about my looks. I should always look good!” In fact, good 
customer service and a clean business environment proved to be the primary 
marketing tactics for SEF clients. This might be partly because common 
cleanliness and food hygiene were elements greatly emphasised by SEF field 
members when supervising their clients. Another explanation for the 
importance of external trademarks was the idea that clients who took care of 
themselves gained the respect of others. Bähre (2007a: 86–91) illustrates how 
the selection of stokvel members strongly depends on the respect of others, 
which is determined on the basis of person’s ability and will to “help each other” 
and “take care of oneself”.  
There is thus no doubt the SEF clients were active business women and 
money managers (cf. Collins et al. 2009). Many women were very busy. It was 
just that sometimes the busyness seemed to be the real issue; this was clearly 
illustrated in the following story of Maisha. At the same time, the idea of poor 
women being integrated into the market as “projects”, as Cross and Street 
(2009:9) and Elyachar (2005) formulate the matter, and thus constructed as 
new entrepreneurial subjects became obvious (Elyachar 2005, Karim 2011). 
Maisha, SEF client from Mosetsana, who was supporting her family with her 
beer and fish businesses, was using various financial instruments ranging from 
40–50-rand savings for SEF every two weeks to R80 for funeral insurance, and 
two rand for two other burial societies in the neighbourhood. In addition to the 
SEF loan, a monthly payment of about 240 rand for a fridge went to a retailer in 
Tzaneen. In addition, she always made sure that there was enough money to 
cover food expenses and unexpected costs at home: “I save money in case 
somebody at home becomes ill…. I’ve got a safe at home where I put money and 
I make sure that the key is always with me”, Maisha explained to me. 
She introduced her bookkeeping methods by showing me her account book, a 
black notebook where she wrote down expenditures and revenues. The figures 
revealed how much she had used in Tzaneen the previous weekend, how much 
she had invested in fish, sweets, and biscuits and how much she was expecting to 
earn from her businesses. Maisha spelt out her most recent notes in the book as 
follows: 
 
Having bought this stock, I will calculate that ok, this is how much it costs 
me, and this is how much I have. Then from that, looking at the stock I have, 
I'm able to see how much this has cost me and how much profit I'm going to 
make. This is where I balance my sales and you can see this is the total, fish 
R403. And this is the profit that I make out of that, R190. This is my buying 
money, R210. Then from that, I take this fish and I calculate it per item. Then 
from that I'm able to calculate how much I get back. Then this 403R I'm able 
to take back, to put aside the money that I use to buy the stock; that is R210.  
Maisha, TCP client in Mosetsana, 13 June 2007 
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When I asked whether she could say how much profit she had made the previous 
month, Maisha said that she never really calculates how much she makes. She 
did not want to limit her accounting to any specific time span, because it would 
have been too complicated: “There are lots of things, you know; per month there 
is a loan that we pay, and fortnightly I go to the post bank and pay the taxi fare 
and all these kinds of things. And then I take a specific amount and buy stock. By 
that time I’ve reached the point that I can pay everything that I owe to SEF.” 
Maisha’s story illustrates many things. First, it suggests that women’s 
incomes and expenditures were a complicated set of the informal and formal, 
material and immaterial assets and liabilities that they tried to manage. Second, 
the story illustrates Maisha’s business logic: While the difference between 
profits, revenues or expenditure was often blurred in clients’ minds, the main 
aim for many women was that eventually they would reach the point where the 
SEF loan had been paid.  
This is a typical example of what happens when people are taught to 
conceptualise their lives in terms of profit or loss and to become serious business 
women (Elyachar 2005: 194), without considering whether these lessons 
function to their advantage. In Maisha’s case the lessons were instrumentalised 
but not necessarily internalised. Elyachar (2005), who participated in a number 
of microcredit training sessions in Cairo, explores in detail the consequences of 
the instrumental character of business training: by teaching clients to use the 
business language to track their incomes, money and accounting, microcredit 
institutions created a language through which people spoke about their lives in 
general; they learned to “speak the language of the money”. 
In addition to the social logic directing SEF clients’ businesses, Maisha’s 
story reflects the meaning and importance of various status symbols in women’s 
businesses; in this case in the form of an account book. While Maisha’s balance 
sheet might not reveal the exact truth about her profit and loss account or 
financial assets and liabilities, the basic elements for calculating one’s financial 
net worth, it displayed her business logic and the way she managed her money. 
From the financial point of view the account book was not very significant; 
particularly because she kept some information on the quantities in her head, as 
SEF clients typically did. What was important about the account book was that it 
was significant in itself for Maisha.  
As Maisha herself explained, keeping an account book was important 
because it made her feel like “a business woman”. Apparently, the book gave her 
confidence in managing her money flows, even though she may not have had a 
clear picture of her real financial situation. Moreover, the complicated account 
system, both in her head and in the book – although it made it more difficult for 
others to estimate her real financial circumstances – appeared in the eyes of 
others as a sign that she was a serious business woman. The account books were 
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helpful also when they served as convincing evidence of the liabilities clients 
had, and were relevant when some relatives or neighbours became too needy 
and began to ask for their financial help (Bähre 2007a, Guérin 2006).  
“There’s no market” 
The heart of the problem in the microcredit rhetoric or in the rules according to 
which loans are given only against proper business plans is that such rules and 
descriptions define how microloans are supposed to be used; they suggest what 
micro entrepreneurs should be like, and describe how the market is supposed to 
work (Elyachar 2005; du Toit and Neves 2007). Unfortunately, these idealised 
market models are not pure descriptions of reality. They are insufficient to 
explain the everyday politics of microcredit that I witnessed in Limpopo: not 
only the complex distribution of rights and responsibilities between the 
microcredit organisation and microcredit groups together with the multifaceted 
struggles over authority and power mediated the different actors’ social agency 
and opportunities to benefit from the microcredit programmes; also social 
obligations and cultural constraints largely determined clients’ everyday 
businesses. Turning away from the idealised models to practice reveals the 
paradox of this strategy, and at the same time, suggests that the Putnamian 
interpretation of social capital is not an adequate concept for understanding 
these markets.  
Elyachar’s (2005: 96–97) inspiring analysis of craftsmen’s markets in Cairo 
holds true in many respects in this study. Central to building up microcredit 
markets in Limpopo was relationality. Market and clients were mutually 
constituted, and financial, cultural and social affairs were tightly intertwined. 
Success in business was not only about clients’ ability to compete in market 
factors such as price and quality. There were no market places where buying and 
selling proceeded strictly according to the indicators of supply and demand. 
Business was conducted between people who knew each other. The network was 
the market, and to sell any product clients had to create their markets, their own 
networks. The most successful clients were “Jamilas”, those who were able to 
create the market and “run the show”. Jamilas were best equipped to make these 
markets and “to bring their market with them” (Du Toit and Neves 2007: 43, 
Elyachar 100, 115–120, 150, 209). Their success was not based merely on 
“business skills” or accounting practices; support from kin, power and symbolic 
capital were central to their success.  
This helps to understand why SEF clients’ impression on market or savings 
or debt or SEF rules sometimes differed from the outlook of the microcredit 
organisation: “Stokvel is for savings, while SEF loans you money”, is how they 
explained the difference between the two instruments, and furthermore, “stokvel 
money is your money, but a SEF loan is SEF’s money”. Sometimes when I asked 
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what the difference was between microcredit and stokvel, both SEF clients and 
my interpreter were astonished at the question; they could not understand the 
reason for such a comparison. Only in few occasions clients drew parallels 
between stokvels and SEF savings, yet the logic between these two ways of 
saving was different. In clients’ minds SEF savings were compulsory, as 
withdrawal required approval from other group members, while stokvel was 
optional, and thus an “individual” way of saving. According to this logic, the 
market, understood as a socio-political institution and as a form of practice, had 
established informal financial mutuals, while microcredit groups were 
established for the market. 
In this light, the view according to which microcredit is rooted in informal 
credit and savings associations is somewhat misleading. In this discourse, there 
is confusion between the idea of conventional credit and savings associations as 
networks of social capital and a source of empowerment, and the recent 
discourse on financially sustainable microcredit. The adaptation of a stokvel 
type of lending strategy by microcredit programmes has surely occurred, but not 
necessarily in the same way in the clients’ minds as in the minds of microcredit 
providers or development agencies.  
Accordingly the close social ties within groups, friends and kinship typically 
linked to informal social networks in microcredit discourse, and the ability of 
these ties to generate trust and solidarity, become easily misinterpreted, 
romanticised and taken for granted. As this study has shown, although family 
ties and other social networks provided crucial social support for Limpopoan 
women, these ties were also full of tensions and power-laden negotiations, and 
were highly problematised by SEF clients. Cultural symbols and meanings are an 
inseparable, although often neglected, part of microcredit.  
Another paradox in these idealised market models is that the failures tend to 
be attributed to the faults of some clients or groups (Elyachar 2005: 210). In the 
interviews with SEF management, some of the SEF staff presented fairly 
categorical images of their clients: “disadvantaged but inventive people”, 
“lacking business skills although naturally business-oriented”. This is precisely 
the contradiction that Olivier de Sardan (2005: 120) considers inherent in the 
developmentalist system: “On one hand, development situations imply that the 
local populations are self-reliant and inevitably rely on an endogenous dynamic, 
but on the other hand, they just as inevitably involve external interveners and 
assume that transfers of knowledge and resources will naturally take place.” If 
this does not take place and problems occur, it is typically assumed that poor 
people “somehow lack entrepreneurial ability, do not understand markets or 
lack the required ‘mindset’” (du Toit and Neves 2007: 42–43). 
This was well internalised by SEF clients who, although complaining at times 
about SEF rules, at the same time emphasised that “the rules were not the 
problem, people were”. SEF clients had surely learned that the “market” did not 
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function as they had been told; i.e. that once they had a good business plan and 
they worked hard and invested in their businesses, they would soon enjoy the 
fruits of their labour. If something went wrong, instead of questioning the 
concept of the market or the microcredit mechanisms, these clients blamed 
untrustworthy group members or their poor business skills and called for more 
training (Elyachar 2005, du Toit and Neves 2007: 39). 
Even if the SEF microcredit management considered competition and a 
saturated market to be a problem, and acknowledged the structural problems 
and social constraints that clients faced, the management failed to recognise the 
extent to which clients had to struggle on a daily basis to earn money from 
somewhere. The fundamental question is whether the real bottleneck was in the 
clients’ skills and erroneous cultural practices or rather in the weak pillars of the 
society; was it in the adverse incorporation of the poor or in the distorting 
microcredit rules and mechanisms? Which one should be emphasised?  
In my view, the most constructive way would be to open the door to multiple 
explanations and considerations. As du Toit and Neves (2007: iv–v) suggest, it 
would be helpful to understand the South African economy as “both unitary and 
heterogeneous”, to strengthen existing measures to reduce vulnerability and to 
consider ways of counteracting disadvantageous power relations within which 
people are caught. Equally important would be to support the livelihood 
strategies of the poor, and to emphasise the utility and quality of microcredit 
services per client rather than concentrate on the increasing number of clients.  
 
 
Erosion of solidarity 
For SEF management, the system of joint liabilities and peer-monitoring 
mechanisms was the only secure way to carry out the business of microcredits. 
At the same time, SEF had begun, however, to prepare itself for possible 
strategic changes in future. In the interviews, the managing director of SEF 
pondered that while clients’ needs in terms of credit did not change that much, 
their attitudes towards other services and elements of the group loan system 
seemed to be shifting: 
 
People do not value centre meetings or the social forces so much anymore…. 
They want to be more independent. So we must watch out for that. I haven’t 
seen that yet, … but it might happen in coming years. 
Managing Director of SEF in Tzaneen, 13 July 2007 
In recent years, SEF has apparently more carefully analysed the networks of 
solidarity among women, the future of the group loan mechanisms, and its 
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policies. In its management review of 2011, SEF emphasised that the key to 
improved microcredit mechanisms lies in diversifying its services and in 
promoting new ways for clients to repay their loans. As stated in the SEF 
management review (SEF 2011), while SEF continues to emphasise the 
importance of investing in businesses, if the clients demonstrate their capacity to 
repay, SEF may provide, especially for clients in later loan cycles, a part of the 
loan for “other needs”, such as for house improvement, medical expenses or 
different types of financial shocks.  
In order to assess clients’ capacity to repay, SEF is piloting a new method, 
based on a new savings policy,33 according to which savings would work as 
financial collateral. This means that the same amount of monitoring, typical for 
political covenants, is no longer needed. This would ease development 
facilitators’ workload (SEF 2011: 10). Such a strategy is in parallel with the 
reforms that took place during the process in which Grameen Bank, SEF’s role 
model, became Grameen II in 2002. The aim of Grameen II is to provide 
services that meet client demand and at the same time are profitable for the 
Bank, the main elements being to focus more on savings, to abandon the old 
idea of social collateral, and to provide flexible loan services with negotiable 
repayment schedules (Hulme 2011: 17–20, Yunus 2011).  
In numbers the results of such a change in lending policy have been 
impressive. After the establishment of the new programme, Grameen Bank 
managed to triple the deposits (US$478 million), to double its portfolio of 
outstanding loans, to recruit 2.5 million new clients and to open 500 new 
branches (Hulme 2011: 18). According to Hulme (2011: 12–18), however, this is 
because of the new strategy that Grameen Bank is following in actuality: the 
services of Grameen II are not targeted to the poorest of the poor but to “less 
economically deprived” than was the case in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
Struggling members programme, the special poverty-targeted programme, only 
serves 56,000 clients against more than 25 million extremely poor in the 
country and against the total number of 8.4 million clients (Hulme 2011: 17–19).  
At the same time, there are, indeed, researchers who argue that going fully 
commercial has implied that microfinance NGDOs have turned to richer clients 
to reduce their risks, avoiding the poorest, least profitable people (Bateman 
2010: 41–42, Karim 2011: 74–75). This is well illustrated by recent studies, 
which argue that microcredit has failed as a development and empowerment 
strategy, particularly after the commercialisation of microcredit in the early 
2000s. In this commercialisation process, by targeting its services to the “less 
economically deprived” instead of the poorest of the poor, the Grameen Bank II 
project has operated as a pioneer. 
                                                 
33 In terms of South African law, SEF may not take deposits. Therefore, instead of providing its own 
saving services, the organisation “strongly motivates” clients to save at the Post Bank or Nedbank.  
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In addition to the new savings policy, SEF has carried out a number of social 
reforms in recent years in relation to its staff members’ competence in 
particular. Over the period 2007–2011, SEF increased the number of staff 
members from 250 to 392 and thus managed to decrease the ratio of SEF staff 
members to clients from 261 to 190; numerous interviews during the fieldwork 
of this study showed that this was considered to be an important issue. SEF has 
also established new leadership and staff well-being programmes, and has 
initiated a graduate training programme in co-operation with several South 
African universities. It has developed a new tool, the Progress out of Poverty 
Index, PPI, for determining clients’ poverty status and monitoring their progress 
(SEF 2011). According to SEF (2011: 7–8), such reforms are directly reflected in 
the organisation’s performance: in 2011, both staff turnover and drop-out rates 
of clients decreased to the best level in over 10 years.  
According to the recent statistics, 77 per cent of SEF clients belonged to the 
TCP-programme (SEF 2011: 3), a programme targeting the “very poor” clients, 
and based on the identification system of the Participatory Wealth Ranking, 
PWR (SEF 2011: 3). This does not automatically mean that the TCP clients 
would be considerably poorer than their “better-off” peers in MCP programmes. 
However, the fact that more and more people are enrolling on the TCP 
programme and the number of clients per staff member has decreased might be 
a sign that more clients are able to get training services, which MCP 
programmes often lack.  
SEF has also established a new department for research and development 
called PRIDE, which focuses on quality management and improvement of 
clients’ business skills, as well as on research in how to improve SEF’s 
responsiveness to clients’ broad financial needs. One of the concrete changes 
that has taken place is the replacement of “skills development” sessions at centre 
meetings to “structured learning conversations”: activities that have been 
developed together with the US-based organisation Freedom from Hunger to  
provide clients with a better knowledge of their businesses and the ability to act 
as advisers to others (SEF 2011: 9). 
The number of social reforms which SEF has made in recent years has 
brought international prizes. In September 2010, GiveWell, a US-based charity 
evaluator ‒ and one of the SEF donors ‒ rated SEF as the top microfinance 
organisation (GiveWell 2010, SEF 2011: 2). In the same year, CGAP, together 
with the Michael & Susan Dell Foundation, The Ford Foundation and the Social 
Performance Task Force, awarded SEF the highest level of the 2010 Social 
Performance Reporting Award because of SEF’s transparency in social 
performance reporting (SEF 2011: 2). SEF was also selected as one of the five 
finalists for the Giordano Dell’Amore Microfinance Best Practices International 
Award, for its transferable practices and well developed quality management 
system (FGDA 2011).  
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These prizes undoubtedly fortify SEF’s status as an organisation that has 
greatly impacted the lives of poor people in South Africa. Additionally, they can 
be considered as a sign that SEF is receptive to different kinds of evaluations, 
demonstrating at the same time SEF’s commitment to transparent reporting on 
the social performance of is work. What these acknowledgements also suggest is 
that many of the problems in the microcredit mechanisms and in SEF operations 
have, if not been solved, at least received more attention in recent years.  
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Theoretical aspects 
This study analyses microcredit as a socio-political arena and a form of everyday 
politics and power by drawing on a case study of microcredit operations in 
Limpopo, South Africa. Special attention is paid to the complicated rules and 
responsibilities affecting the relations between the microcredit organisation as a 
loan provider and women clients as loan receivers, as well as to the ambiguous 
networks, norms, and forms of decision-making among the clients as 
microcredit groups and participants in small business ventures.  
In much of mainstream development thinking, microfinance has been 
promoted as a “magic bullet” for economic development and poverty alleviation 
in Southern rural and peri-urban settlements with high rates of chronic poverty, 
unemployment, and lack of working capital. Microcredit models which provide 
loans for small groups of mainly low-income women clients, who then invest the 
money in micro-enterprises and share joint liability over repayments, have been 
encouraged as innovative mechanisms to prevent the poor’s need for financial 
collateral and to decrease their dependence on precarious systems of informal 
money-lending. The essential idea in such group-based lending models is that 
community-based microcredit groups rely on reciprocal trust relations and ties 
of solidarity, which promote high loan repayment rates and fair forms of 
participatory development.  
As this study shows, social capital-oriented arguments for microcredits as 
innovative forms of poverty alleviation and participatory emancipation tend to 
be based on simplistic notions of harmonic community relations and horizontal 
norms of solidarity (Bähre 2007a, Maclean 2010, Molyneux 2002, Rankin 
2002). Such an approach can be criticised for its inability to analyse 
contradictions and conflicts among various actors, multifaceted power relations 
and social inequalities, and the tight interlinkage between economic decision 
making and the cultural, social, and political context (Bourdieu 1977; 1986, 
Guérin 2006, Meagher 2006, Olivier de Sardan 2005, Rankin 2002). The 
analysis of microcredit as an arena of negotiations and trade-offs can reveal a 
much more complicated picture of how the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities between the microcredit organisation and microcredit groups, 
together with the multifaceted struggles over authority and power, mediate the 
different actors’ social agency and clients’ opportunities to benefit from the 
microcredit programmes (Meagher 2006).  
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In this respect, this study rejects the Putnam-oriented approach to social 
capital, according to which social capital refers to “social networks and the 
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2000: 
19). By emphasising the trustworthiness, solidarity and shared objectives 
involved in close social networks, the Putnam-oriented approach often fails to 
see social networks as dynamic arenas of exchange and power (Wilshusen 
2009a; 2009b). As this study illustrates, although close ties with kin and 
neighbours were crucial for Limpopoan women’s livelihoods in many ways, 
solidarity in such ties did not always materialise as intended, and various kinds 
of tensions emerged. Correspondingly, the social relations between the members 
of the microcredit groups were based on ambiguous forms of co-operation and 
conflict around diverse interests, and multifaceted social relations within the 
ambivalent politics of everyday life (Wilshusen 2009a). Concerns over loan 
repayments and liabilities, requisites to monitor each other’s business activities, 
and duties to attend microcredit meetings promoted different kinds of tensions 
among the women engaged in microcredit programmes, thus complicating the 
women’s solidarity towards each other. Challenges to meet the requirements of 
the loan repayments affected the ways in which the microcredit group members 
trusted each other, how solidarity was shaped, how money was allocated, and 
how the businesses were operated. Strict rules and responsibilities regarding the 
microcredit organisation, combined with different stakeholders’ multifaceted 
interests, further complicated the situation. Structural conditions of poverty and 
marginalisation placed the women in competition with each other over limited 
resources and easily saturated markets. 
In its analysis of the role of social networks in poverty alleviation in terms of 
distribution of resources and power relationships, this study draws on works of 
Pierre Bourdieu. For Bourdieu (1977, 1986), social capital represents both the 
embodied forms of social networks and the power resources involved in such 
networks. In contrast to analyses that focus only on the formal arenas of social 
interaction and a rational understanding of human agency, Bourdieu 
emphasises the importance of often-overlooked negotiations occurring in 
informal and invisible arenas of political engagement. Within this framework, 
social capital is understood as both a product and producer of cultural and 
political economy, where social networks, while enabling access to particular 
resources for certain actors, at the same time constrain the access to these 
resources from others (Bähre 2007a).  
Conceptualising microcredit as an arena in which various types of actors, 
driven by more or less compatible goals and endowed with different degrees of 
decision-making power, co-operate and confront each other is thus considered 
essential in order to reveal the complexity of social relationships and rules 
interwoven in microcredit programmes. Even though the notion of social capital 
is referred to in this study, assumptions that the clients somewhat automatically 
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support each other and strive for collectively-shared goals tend to glorify social 
cohesion and trustworthiness, while at the same time underestimating the 
existing tensions and asymmetries (Cleaver 2005, Molyneux 2002). Through an 
analysis of how access to resources and social networks is mediated by power-
laden distinctions, and how certain forms of social capital serve to reproduce 
these distinctions (Bourdieu 1977), this study aims to illustrate the complex 
forms of negotiation and contestation involved in the interactions between 
women in microcredit groups, as well as between microcredit groups as loan 
receivers and a microcredit organisation as a loan provider (Hietalahti and 
Nygren 2011). 
This study also aims to link the everyday politics involved in microcredit to a 
wider socio-political and financial context, and to recognise that many of the 
power relations and socio-political processes shaping the conditions of the 
microcredit programmes extended far beyond the local boundaries. The study 
points out the need to pay careful attention to local politics and institutional 
processes when evaluating the achievements of and challenges for microcredit 
programmes. On this basis, the purpose of this study is to examine the 
opportunities of the women in Limpopo to negotiate the terms of their 
involvement in the microcredit programmes through practices that were 
structured although not completely determined by the wider institutional and 
political-economic settings. By exploring the aspirations, concerns, and 
strategies used by different actors involved in the negotiations and trade-offs 
over microcredits, the study provides an analysis of microcredit as an arena 
where different stakeholders have varying degrees of power to decide how and 
by whom the resources are used, and who controls strategic decisions. At the 
same time, this study illustrates how economic and social spheres became 
intrinsically interwoven in the politics of microcredit, in which financial 
strategies were tightly enmeshed with socio-political power relations, while 
socio-political power relations were strongly mediated by the use and control of 
financial resources. 
 
 
Everyday politics of microcredit 
The attempt to define group-based microcredit as a solution to poverty in the 
spirit of the Putnam-oriented rhetoric of social capital thus proved to be artificial 
in the case of Limpopoan women. Undoubtedly women built up a solid 
repertoire of social networks and used extended kin and other resources 
available as a survival strategy. Mothers, daughters and siblings helped each 
other materially as well as immaterially. Husbands and siblings in the cities 
supplied stocking items. Informal burial societies and formal funeral insurance 
schemes in particular were an essential part of Limpopoan women’s livelihoods 
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strategies. However, other kinds of approaches are needed to grasp the 
complexity of social practices as well as diverse income-generating activities.  
Relations of reciprocity within households or between neighbours provided 
crucial support for women, but at the same they were characterised by conflicts, 
disagreements, tensions and struggles over power and material benefits. 
Household dynamics strongly influenced women’s opportunities to participate 
in and benefit from microcredit. The relations between neighbours and kin were 
in many ways fragile and subordinated to complicated power relations. Thus, an 
important theme of this study involves examining the everyday politics involved 
in microcredit by describing the everyday struggles involved in women’s income-
generating activities, and by showing how social ties between the clients were 
mediated by a complex web of solidarity and conflict within the ambivalent 
politics of everyday life (Wilshusen 2009a). 
This study also shows the large number of different formal and informal 
financial and social instruments in women’s livelihood strategies, and in this 
regard challenges the somewhat sensational character of microcredit as a 
solution to poverty. Women’s financial affairs were inextricably intertwined with 
their livelihood portfolios based on irregular streams of formal and informal 
incomes. Any single activity alone was hardly enough to cover the everyday 
needs of Limpopoan women and their households. Joining a microcredit group 
did not automatically provide financial success. The better-off clients generally 
handled several activities simultaneously, trying to manage their money by 
saving when they could and by borrowing when they had to. On the other hand, 
the situation for the poorest clients was extremely difficult, since without the 
ability to seek support from various social networks and income sources, 
providing for the family with the microloan alone proved insufficient. Under 
these circumstances, analysing the role of microcredit – even if crucial – in 
isolation from people’s overall struggles for their livelihood is difficult. This 
difficulty is amplified by the fact that the original role of stokvels, informal credit 
and savings associations, as vital survival strategies for the poor in the 
Limpopoan villages was still in effect. Many poor still relied solely on informal 
financial instruments and had no access to or familiarity with formal financial 
markets. This can be verified also by statistics according to which the third of 
South African adults are still lacking a formal bank account (Napier 2009: 10). 
Characteristic of women’s money flows were not only their irregularity but 
also their insufficiency, which sometimes forced women to cover old debts by 
new ones. Some of the women managed to improve their situation; others only 
sank deeper into over-indebtedness. Often short-term requirements took 
priority over the longer-term demands of business and domestic needs. The fact 
that women ran their businesses in risky and insecure environments where the 
risk of income loss was continuously present, attests to the validity of the idea 
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that clients’ businesses and women’s possibility of influencing their situations 
were often inhibited by this continuous vulnerability.  
The present study emphasises the importance of analysing microcredit in its 
social, political and cultural context. Financial, social and cultural norms and 
practices strongly shape the ways clients operate their micro-businesses in 
Limpopo. Prices and places and dates for selling are often agreed together within 
the business community. Pensioners’ pay days give a rhythm to the women’s 
efforts to run their businesses and collect debts from their customers. Women 
mourning for their dead relatives and family members suspend their financial 
and social activities for months. The distinction between the financial and social 
components in the women’s lives proved to be artificial in a situation where 
economic activities, social relations and cultural conventions are intrinsically 
interwoven in people’s efforts to earn their living from fragile business ventures 
and shifting social alliances. This notion is in line with Bourdieu’s suggestions, 
according to which it is the structure of power relations and the negotiating 
power of each actor within the field that determine the conditions for economic 
acts. Characteristic of the business strategies of the women in Limpopo was a 
complex dialectic between the personal aspirations of livelihood improvement 
and the collective norms of co-operation and social reciprocity. 
The present study also reveals how in principle microcredit is mainly about 
re-organising and institutionalising conventional credit and savings networks, 
stokvels, into a new form. By extending credit services to the poor, microcredit 
has operated as a portal to the formal financial markets for many women; yet the 
division between the formal and informal worlds has been exceptionally 
apparent in South Africa owing to the history of apartheid, and has meant 
systematic isolation of non-Whites in different aspects of life. The study, 
however, challenges the conception that because of the long history of stokvels, 
solidarity and reciprocity relationships, often associated with these kinds of 
social networks, can automatically be assumed to exist in the established 
microcredit groups. In fact, the study questions the assumption that solidarity 
automatically flourishes in any kind of social network. Even the voluntary-based, 
traditional forms of solidarity groups were not free of moral hazard. The 
temptation of taking money and not paying it back was sometimes too 
irresistible, which caused other group members a high degree of stress and a 
continuous sense of vulnerability.  
At the same time, this study challenges the possibility of creating trust and a 
“sense of group habitus” by a mandate from above. As this study shows, the ties 
among SEF clients as well as between the organisation and the clients were 
characterised not simply by trust and consensus but also by conflicts, tensions 
and power-laden negotiations. The instrumental character of solidarity ties and 
trust relations was revealed in various ways, including the fragility and 
ambiguity of these relationships. Joining a group was sometimes simply a 
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requisite to get a loan, not necessarily a sign of solidarity among group 
members. Because SEF services came in the form of cash, it is not surprising 
that many clients joined microcredit programmes to get access to money and 
survive, not necessarily to end poverty and feel empowered. 
Furthermore, for clients these two instruments, stokvels and microcredit 
groups, presented totally different strategies, which is one illustrative example of 
the multiple logics of different social groups. These issues are important to 
consider, since as the positive outcome in microcredit programmes depends 
largely on shared understandings of the various actors’ aims and operations 
(Mosse 2005: 8), the key terms should be clarified. As the study indicates in the 
case of Limpopo, sometimes SEF justified its microcredit operations by 
terminology that meant something totally different to clients (Mayoux 2001, 
Wilshusen 2009a). For clients, a SEF loan was not their money, but “SEF’s 
money”; repayment meetings were not their meetings, but “SEF’s meetings”; 
and SEF savings were not their savings, but “savings that required SEF’s 
approval”. For the same reason, it was sometimes difficult for the clients to 
understand why SEF did not collect its own money or organise its own meetings. 
Organising centre meetings were a continuous struggle and subject for 
complains. In these negotiations with SEF, women were at the losing end of the 
power diagram. “Rules are rules”, these clients explained and without following 
them, there would not be any loans. This notion challenges the view that stresses 
women’s capacity and ability to create room for manoeuvre, whatever the 
circumstances and the institutional setting (cf. Nygren and Myatt-Hirvonen 
2009). Such a view easily forgets that in reality people often had no other choice 
but to join a group – sometimes even with people they barely knew. 
 
 
Power games and vertical inequalities 
While opportunities for success in the microcredit businesses varied among SEF 
clients, social differentiation between the SEF clients became apparent early on, 
and in many ways was implicitly enforced by microcredit rules. Although 
microcredit is targeted to the poor with no access to formal financial services, 
not just anyone could get a loan. In addition to organisational rules and credit 
rationing, clients excluded potential clients from the business circles because of 
their poverty or disadvantaged social status. Possibilities for success were 
greatest among those clients who had an ability to utilise various social networks 
as well as regular incomes in the household, and especially among those who 
took advantage of not only their material resources but also of their social status, 
bolstered up by various power symbols. Differentiation easily reproduced 
relationships of inequality among SEF clients.  
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Loan terms also implicitly boosted differentiation by providing wealthier 
clients with bigger loans from the beginning. The chair and centre leaders, who 
were already high in the hierarchy among clients, were given authority, and 
wealthier clients were in a better position to strategise in the game of 
microcredit. Sometimes strict rules in the microcredit schemes only 
strengthened the existing power relations. This became clear especially in the 
centre meetings. Often strict rules and a group loan system based on joint 
liability created and aggravated tensions within the groups.  
The present study demonstrates that microcredit solved many problems, but 
also maintained and reproduced new ones. The question was not only about the 
lack of skills among SEF clients or unsuccessful institutional control on the part 
of SEF: microcredit mechanisms and the group loan model are inextricably 
intertwined with the processes of inclusion and exclusion and the exercises of 
power. In this respect, the study analyses the dynamic interaction between 
clients and SEF staff, as well as the contradictions within the organisation and 
within clients’ groups. Considering microcredit as an arena of trade-offs and 
negotiations, both the group of clients and the group of SEF staff proved to be 
internally differentiated actors with multiple interests, aims and power 
positions, rather than a homogeneous group of “Southern women” or “MFO 
workers”.  
Microcredit organisations have many roles at the same time – in this case 
that of a bank, an NGDO, a helping hand, a donor, and a receiver – and they also 
present different faces to different stakeholders. This study follows Hilhorst’s 
(2003: 3–4, 7–8) notion that through the everyday politics of the organisation, 
different actors negotiate the meaning of their organisation and enrol 
“outsiders” into accepting it. In these negotiations between SEF and clients, 
fieldworkers who were close to clients and who acted as “interpreters of the two 
worlds” played a crucial role. As within the clients’ groups, the negotiations 
between SEF staff and the clients were not only restricted only to the official, on-
stage interactions, but were actualised also in the informal, off-stage 
consultations. Development facilitators explained the rules and responsibilities 
to the clients and provided the documents needed in the loan processes for SEF 
and the clients. They made sure that the bookkeeping remained “clean”, that 
clients operated their businesses “the way SEF wanted” and that clients paid 
their loans, in one way or another; all these are examples of the organisation’s 
efforts to regulate the clients operations toward NGDO-specified goals (Foucault 
1978).  
Based on these findings, the present study further argues that legitimisation 
of the operations of a microcredit organisation is a much more complicated issue 
than simply negotiating the meaning of its work and enrolling outsiders and 
donors into accepting it (cf. Hilhorst 2003). It is crucial to understand the 
importance of everyday politics in order to understand microcredit operations. 
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As it became clear in the case of Limpopo, convincing others that a microcredit 
organisation is trustworthy and capable of carrying out its operations depended 
much on the meanings development facilitators in their everyday practices with 
clients gave to the organisation (Hilhorst 2003: 8, 25–26). Bringing to light the 
everyday struggles that clients went through in order to get the money from 
somewhere; how these struggles often remained unproblematised by the staff 
members; and how the trust relations among various actors were created and 
challenged, is one of the key achievements of this study. Through these 
demonstrations this study aims to contribute to the existing debate on social 
capital by showing how Putnamian interpretations of social capital fail to 
account for the complex and dynamic interactions that occur within social 
networks (Wilshusen 2009b). 
While those high in the microcredit hierarchy usually had more room for 
manoeuvre – development facilitators in comparison to the clients or SEF 
management in comparison to the field staff – this did not mean that dominant 
discourses would have been automatically accepted by those at the other end of 
the hierarchical scale. The meanings of empowerment or limits for compromises 
were renegotiated in different contexts, and different actors were trying to find 
space for manoeuvre within such negotiations (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 186). 
This notion brings out again the validity of Bourdieu’s theories in the analysis of 
microcredit. In microcredit as an arena of struggle, various actors with different 
interests and power positions, driven by more or less compatible goals tried to 
contest each other’s authority (Bourdieu 1977; 2005: 69–70). 
This means that those low in the hierarchy should not be automatically 
considered as powerless victims in some kind of totalitarian system of the 
microcredit game (Foucault 1978, Olivier de Sardan 2005: 6). This became clear 
through various examples in the case of Limpopo: such as clients bending the 
rules and tricking the SEF staff; or development facilitators transferring their 
responsibilities to the clients or making clients repay the loans at any cost in 
order to keep the repayment records correct in the eyes of SEF management, 
and thus raise their own salaries. At the same time, clients also questioned 
development facilitators’ efforts to create strict rules arbitrarily and denounced 
those who tended to treat them with disrespect.  
 
 
Complex rules and responsibilities 
This study also challenges the expectations of microfinance providers regarding 
microfinance management, which tend to be based on the assumption that 
impoverished women operating largely in informal markets would follow 
systematic business plans in their business activities. It can be questioned how 
appropriate it is to conceptualise the business activities of the poor in South 
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Africa or elsewhere in the global South in terms of strategising rather than 
coping with poverty and struggling against inequalities (Francis 2002).  
As this study shows, because of its complex economy, South Africa is a 
challenging environment for microcredit organisations aiming at financial 
sustainability. While SEF aimed to fulfil its double mission of improving the 
living standards of the poorest of the poor and attaining financial self-
sufficiency, in reality, it was sandwiched between these two contradictory goals. 
On the one hand, it was accountable to the financial board for its operations, 
while on the other hand it struggled to conduct its original mission of helping 
the poor. While SEF had chosen to remain an NGDO to maintain its poverty-
focused mission, it was under heavy financial pressure from the financial 
department, the board, and the donors to meet the financial aims. The 
fieldworkers strongly challenged the SEF’s target for expanded operations by 
arguing that the assistance of a huge number of clients constrained the goals of 
poverty alleviation if more employees were not hired. In the practices on the 
ground, many of the development facilitators’ tasks had been transferred to the 
group leaders. Paradoxically, in such circumstances SEF decided to transfer 
many of the training responsibilities from the organisation to the clients, making 
the microcredit groups and their relations of solidarity instruments for 
diminishing the costs of screening and monitoring.  
In the microcredit rhetoric this tactic is promoted in the name of “supporting 
the entrepreneurship of the disadvantaged”, where the poor who were previously 
considered as passive receivers of aid are now seen as creative agents of their 
own development. The problem is that through such arrangements, the 
responsibilities, while not necessarily the rights, of the women are considerably 
increased. SEF clients were forced to shoulder additional transaction costs 
without any economic compensation. These included time and effort spent on 
finding group members, costs of monitoring the repayments and delivering the 
money to the bank, obligations to cover for group member who was robbed, and 
duties to teach business skills to new clients. 
For SEF, the group lending model with joint liabilities and peer-monitoring 
mechanisms worked as social collateral because of the clients’ lack of ability to 
provide financial collateral. While the relationship between the microcredit 
organisation and the clients at first sight seems to be contractual, this study 
illustrates how in practice these relationships were continuously negotiated and 
ambiguous in character. As a result, seemingly contractual relations and 
obligations were enmeshed in moral obligations and intertwined with social 
norms and complicated cultural rules of reciprocity. In theory, repayment was 
based on women’s joint liability and solidarity towards each other. In reality, 
loan recovery was secured through strict rules and various disciplinary tactics 
and by extending repayment responsibilities to husbands and other relatives. In 
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other words, not only the group but also the kin and relatives operated as a 
social collateral for the microcredit organisation. 
The contradiction between written and unwritten rules that were used in 
parallel in SEF everyday operations became clear in conflicting situations in 
particular; it was the responsibility of the clients and the fieldworkers to manage 
these situations – in one way or another. While SEF defended its strict rules, 
considering conflict situations as clients’ problems, at the same time, it justified 
its decision not to intervene in negotiations over conflicts using essentialist 
views of African women and their communal way of life. In these situations, 
there was little consideration of the wider political-economic structures that 
constrained the opportunities of the poor to advance their business operations 
and that limited their chances to rid themselves of poverty and social 
marginalisation.  
To conclude, microcredit as a tool for poverty reduction and the related social 
capital-oriented arguments cannot be understood without considering the wider 
social, political and economic structures. Development agendas based on 
romanticised views of social capital as a remarkable asset of the poor and on 
visions in which the responsibilities of pro-poor development are being 
increasingly shifted from governmental institutions to market-based 
mechanisms, or to the poor themselves, contain the risk of a “privatisation of the 
economic crisis” (González de la Rocha 2007, Kay 2006). This is especially true 
if we consider the overall problems of economic insecurity and political volatility 
characteristic of South Africa, as well as of many other parts in the global South. 
These, together with the unequal access to resources, constrain the ability of the 
poor to advance their business operations and to create pathways out of poverty. 
Social capital cannot substitute for policies designed to achieve integrated forms 
of economic and social development through redistributive measures and sound 
economic policies (Bebbington 2007, Hietalahti and Nygren 2011, Nygren and 
Myatt-Hirvonen 2009). In the case of microcredit programmes, more attention 
should be given to the political-economic structures that constrain the 
opportunities of the poor to advance their business operations and that limit 
their chances to eliminate poverty even when capacities for social creativity and 
initiatives for co-operative action are present. 
The present study also illustrates how the complicated rules and regulations 
of the microcredit organisation shaped the ways that different actors co-
operated with, contested and confronted each other. An important point in the 
study is that without careful consideration of the mechanisms that mediate the 
norms and responsibilities between the microcredit organisation and the clients, 
as well as between the clients themselves, it would have been difficult to 
understand microcredit as a socio-political institution that regulates the 
business affairs of the poor. 
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In my view, the significance of this study lies in the analysis of everyday 
politics involved in microcredit as a socio-political arena. This is an aspect about 
which relatively little information currently exists in the debates on microcredit. 
By applying the theoretical ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, and bringing the 
distribution of resources and power relationships into the analysis, the study 
contributes to the debates on microcredit and social capital, offering new 
insights into the manner in which different actors in the microcredit arena 
interact, co-operate with and confront each other. By combining the method of 
participant observation with the thematic interviews as well as informal 
discussions, and bringing the perspective of both microcredit clients and the 
organisation into the analysis, this study has also illuminated the hidden stages, 
in which the game of microcredit is largely played. As this study focuses on the 
lives of women, it is able to provide only one window on the complex processes 
of the everyday lives of poor people in the South African context.  
Since in-depth analyses of informal negotiations and interactions are fairly 
difficult, future investigations in the field of microcredit as a form of poverty 
alleviation would be of value. Another important issue to study further is the 
future of microcredit programmes in the global South. The boom of microcredit 
and the assumptions related to Putnam-oriented interpretations of social capital 
have supported the tendency of international development agencies to direct 
attention towards financially sustainable and commercially-leaning 
microcredits. While sustainability as such is something to support, the drawback 
tends to be that the approach easily neglects the social life circumstances that 
direct women’s everyday businesses. In this sense it would be interesting to 
follow SEF’s growth and expansion into new geographical areas, as well as to 
evaluate the results of its recent orientation from group loan mechanisms 
towards more individual loan systems, which utilise clients’ savings as financial 
collateral for the loan. An interesting question that is little explored in this study, 
and that would be important to analyse in greater depth in the future research, is 
why SEF wants to be considered and labelled as an NGO. This question 
interlinks microcredit with many other important themes, such as the historical, 
cultural and political struggles of poor African women and the allocation of 
rights, resources and power in post-apartheid South Africa.  
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